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If people do not: believe 
that mathematics is simple, 
it is only because they do not realize 
how complicated life is.
- John von Neumann
1 1 1
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ABSTRACT
The electric utility industry in the United States is 
currently experiencing a new and different type of growing 
pain. It is the pain of having to restructure itself into a 
competitive business. Many industry experts are trying to 
explain how the nation as a whole, as well as individual 
states, will implement restructuring and handle its numerous 
"transition problems."
One significant transition problem for federal and 
state regulators rests with determining a utility's stranded 
costs. Stranded generation facilities are assets which would 
be uneconomic in a competitive environment or costs for 
assets whose regulated book value is greater than market 
value. At issue is the methodology which will be used to 
estimate stranded costs. The two primary methods are known as 
"Top-Down" and "Bottom-Up." The "Top-Down" approach simply 
determines the present value of the losses in revenue as the 
market price for electricity changes over a period of time 
into the future. The problem with this approach is that it 
does not take into account technical issues associated with 
the generation and wheeling of electricity. The "Bottom-Up" 
approach computes the present value of specific strandable 
generation facilities and compares the resulting valuations 
with their historical costs. It is regarded as a detailed and 
difficult, but more precise, approach to identifying stranded 
assets and their associated costs.
XV
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This dissertation develops a "Bottom-Up" quantitative, 
optimization-based approach to electric power wheeling 
within the state of Louisiana. It optimally evaluates all 
production capabilities and coordinates the movement of bulk 
power through transmission interconnections of competing 
companies in and around the state. Sensitivity analysis to 
this approach is performed by varying seasonal consumer 
demand, electric power imports, and transmission 
interconnection cost parameters. Generation facility 
economic dispatch and transmission interconnection bulk 
power transfers, specific to each set of parameters, lead to 
the identification of stranded generation facilities. 
Stranded costs of non-dispatched and uneconomically 
dispatched generation facilities can then be estimated to 
indicate, arguably, the largest portion of restructuring 
transition costs as the industry is transformed from its 
present monopolistic structure to a competitive one.
xvi
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 History of the Industry
The electric power industry of the United States is 
undergoing a revolutionary transition from vertically 
integrated and regulated run monopolies to fully competitive 
unbundled industries of generation, transmission, and 
distribution. State legislatures and regulatory agencies 
throughout the country are struggling with the challenges of 
restructuring. Industrial customers, as well as residential 
and commercial customers are questioning current regulatory 
practices and the monopolistic structure of electric 
utilities and are either advocating or rejecting proposals 
for significant change.
A historical view of the electric utility industry in 
the United States reveals three significant periods. The 
year 1973 serr/es as the dividing point for the first two 
periods. Before 1973 the industry was characterized by 
steady growth. Many large baseload steam generation plants 
were built, technology advances were routine, fuel prices 
were relatively stable, and electricity demand grew and was 
expected to continue in the immediate future. Regulatory 
policies were predictable during the early period. In 
addition, generation production planning focused on 
economies of scale, and competition within the industry did 
not exist.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
After 1973, the industry entered a second period that 
was much more turbulent and less predictable. The energy 
crisis of the middle to late 1970's and early 1980's sent 
energy prices soaring. As a result, growth in demand for 
electricity fell sharply. Few technological advances were 
made during this period. The main steam generation 
advancement pertained to nuclear power and it was far 
overshadowed by the many accident-related setbacks that 
occurred during its development.
A major change in the industry occurred when federal 
regulatory policy shifted to compensate for the energy 
crisis. The shift resulted from the enactment of the 
National Energy Act of 1978. This Act was composed of five 
statutes :
(1) Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA),
(2) National Energy Tax Act,
(3) National Energy Conservation Policy Act,
(4) Power Plant and Industrial Fuels Act (PPIFA), and
(5) Natural Gas Policy Act.
The National Energy Act of 1978 was intended to ensure 
continued economic growth during a period in which both the 
availability and the price of future energy resources were 
in jeopardy. The two important themes backed by this piece 
of legislation were :
(1) to promote conservation and the use of other 
energy sources, and
(2) to reduce the country's dependence on foreign oil.
While all statutes of the National Energy Act affected 
the electric power industry, PURPA and PPIFA affected it in 
the most significant manner. PURPA was designed to encourage
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a more efficient use of energy through the cogeneration of 
electric power. PURPA required existing electric utility 
companies to interconnect and purchase power from any non­
utility qualifying facility (QF) at a rate not to exceed the 
connecting electric utility's avoided cost of generation. 
This new mandate was quite different from traditional 
monopolistic cost-of-service regulation where prices are set 
at an electric utility's cost of production. Under PURPA, 
prices are still set at the local utility's cost of 
production, not the QF's cost.
While PURPA encouraged cogeneration, PPIFA limited the 
number of economically feasible generation fuel options 
available to an electric utility by prohibiting them from 
constructing any new steam baseload generation facilities 
which were fueled primarily by oil or natural gas. Natural 
gas was still available for intermediate, peaking, and 
cogeneration facilities, but only coal and nuclear fuels 
could be used for baseload generation facilities.
One could argue that electric utility deregulation 
began with the enactment of PURPA and PPIFA. Together they 
initiated a new power market where established electric 
utility generation facilities coexist with cogeneration 
facilities. These two pieces of legislation were the 
foundation for competition within the electric utility 
industry. Since the enactment of the National Energy Act of 
1978, the non-utility share of total electricity generation 
facilities in the United States has more than doubled
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(Dismukes et. al., 1996a) . The third period began with the 
enactment of the National Energy Policy Act of 1992.
1.2 The Energy Policy Act of 1992
In October of 1992, the United States Congress passed 
a National Energy Policy Act (Public Law 102-486). The Act 
added momentum towards competition initially started by 
PURPA and PPIFA. It provided for the generation of electric 
energy by independent power producers for wholesale or 
retail sale. This piece of legislation encourages non­
utility power production by creating a new category of 
electricity providers known as exempt wholesale generators 
(EWGs) . These EWGs differ from QFs in two distinctive ways:
(1) they are not required to meet PURPA's cogeneration 
or renewable fuels limitations, and
(2) utilities are not required to purchase power from 
EWGs .
In addition, the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 allows
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to order
electric utilities to provide access on their transmission
systems for EWGs. Specifically, Subtitle B - Federal Power
Act; Interstate Commerce in Electricity, Section 721, part
(1) reads as follows:
Any electric utility. Federal power marketing 
agency, or any other person generating electric 
energy for sale or resale, may apply to the 
Commission for an order under this subsection 
requiring a transmitting utility to provide 
transmission services (including any enlargement 
of transmission capacity necessary to provide 
such services) to the applicant.
This was a significant step toward deregulation. The
situation which now exists between electric utilities and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
EWGs is commonly known as "wholesale wheeling". Wholesale 
wheeling allows many non-generating utilities to "shop 
around" for cheap electric power and effectively reduce 
their historical dependence on electric power generated by 
their local electric utility.
1.3 Importance of Wheeling to Restructuring
Wheeling is defined as the transmission of electricity 
by an entity that does not own or directly use the power it 
is transmitting (IEEE PES, 199 6) . A transmission network 
plays a strategically important role in electric power 
wheeling. By providing the critical connection between 
neighboring markets, it enhances the geographical scope of 
the power system.
The United States electric power system is 
characterized by a high degree of interconnection and 
diverse ownership of transmission assets and generation 
resources. The implementation of wheeling in the United 
States hinges upon the establishment of property rights, 
adequate infrastructure capacity, usage protocols for 
transmission networks, and mechanisms for compensation and 
usage charges.
There are two major risks associated with wheeling. 
First, there is economic risk. Fundamentally, it is the 
failure of a competitive electric power supply market to 
develop. If this were to occur, it is possible that 
competition would not replace regulation in assuring that 
consumers are protected from unfair pricing strategies.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Second, there is operational risk. This is simply the risk 
of not delivering electric power to customers, and, in turn, 
compromising the reliability and integrity of a transmission 
system as well as its distribution system. What is important 
about operational risk is that the failure to deliver 
electric power to individual customers will affect all 
customers through congestion and inadequate infrastructure. 
Therefore, if deregulation of the electric utility industry 
is to be successful under both risks, wheeling must first be 
successful. For wheeling to be successful, a complete 
infrastructure evaluation must be performed prior to each 
electric power trade.
1.4 Economic Impact of Restructuring the Industry
Some industry experts argue that substantial 
improvements in the United States aggregate economy are 
highly probable once the electric power industry is 
restructured. They note that restructuring the industry can 
reverse the productivity slowdown that has plagued the 
aggregate economy in the last quarter century. Also expected 
are improvements in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the 
Producer Price Index (PPI), and employment.
In a study by Moroney (1990) of the cross sectional 
relation between output per worker and capital and energy 
intensity in a sample of market and centrally planned 
economies, the elasticity of output per worker to energy 
intensity ranged from 0.15 to 0.19. Maloney et al. (1996a) 
use this figure in another study to project a short run
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increase in electricity use by a minimum of 13.4% to a long- 
run increase of as much as 42.4%. By using this projected 
increase of electricity use and Moroney's elasticity of 
output per worker to energy intensity, Maloney et al. 
estimate an increase in GDP between 0.8% and 2.6%. In 1995 
the GDP totaled $7,340.4 billion. Using these estimates, the 
increase in GDP is expected to be between $60.7 billion and 
$190.85 billion. Maloney et al. conclude that this 
significant increase in the nation's GDP would be attributed 
to electric utility deregulation.
Electricity is also an intermediate good that 
influences prices of many consumer goods. The Producer Price 
Index (PPI) is a measure of such intermediate goods. In 
1995, 5.37% of the PPI accounted for prices of electric 
power. Again, using the estimated reduction of electricity 
prices of 13.4% to 42.4% , resulting from a unit elastic 
increase in consumption, and keeping the prices of all other 
producer commodities constant, Maloney et al. (1996a) 
indicate that competition in the electric power industry 
will cause the PPI to decrease by 0.7% to 2.3%.
Employment is expected to increase because of the 
increase in GDP. During the final month of 1995, 121.2 
million people were employed. The figures above indicate an 
increase in overall employment of 1.0% to 3.15% (Maloney et 
al., 1996a).
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1.5 Stranded Investments
The term stranded investment refers to the cost of 
existing equipment or facilities that are no longer needed 
after one or more customers stop buying power from the local 
utility and instead choose to purchase power from outside 
sources (IEEE PES, 1996). With widespread competition, a 
utility will use its own electric power generation mix of 
investments to compete for market share with other 
suppliers. A problem for an electric utility surfaces if its 
rates exceed market clearing prices for electric power. The 
utility will then reduce its rates in expectation of 
retaining its market share. These price reductions will 
reduce its revenues. If revenue from the sale of electric 
power is less than the total cost of production, then 
certain generation facility investments a utility has made 
in the past are considered uneconomical. It is the forces 
of :
(1) the loss of revenue needed to cover costs, and
(2) the existence of uneconomical generation 
facilities'
that explain why utilities are concerned that some existing 
generation facility investments may become stranded.
1.6 Economic Impact of Stranded Investments
For decades, regulators gave electric utilities an 
incentive to overbuild. "Gold Plating" capital additions was 
the strategy utilities followed to earn more profit (Murphy 
and Soyster, 1983). Through the decades of regulation, 
electric utility companies have been allowed a certain
8
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percentage profit on their assets, so the more assets they 
could accumulate, the better. More importantly, policy 
makers allowed rate increases in the past to recover the 
cost of those investments. If some of the investments are 
not completely amortized and become stranded, a question 
arises as to who should be obligated to pay for them. 
Additionally, determining which stranded investments are 
fully depreciated and which are not can turn out to be a 
difficult task as electric utility companies begin to 
classify their deregulated financial information as 
proprietary. For these reasons, the identification of 
stranded investments is of major concern to policy makers.
Estimates of aggregate stranded costs vary greatly, 
ranging from a low of $10 to $20 billion to a high of $500 
billion depending on the assumptions used to estimate them 
(DOE/EIA-0562, 1995). McKinsey & Company estimates the value 
of unnecessary nationwide electric generating plants to be 
at about $150 billion (Business Week, 12/2/95). The American 
Public Power Association claims that about 5% to 10% of the 
capacity assets of investor-owned electric utilities may 
become stranded. In addition, there are groups who believe 
that a large portion of stranded costs may be attributable 
to nuclear power plants. According to one study from the 
Department of Energy, of the nearly $120 billion in 
undepreciated assets in domestic nuclear power plants, 
nearly $70 billion may be stranded in a competitive 
environment (Yokell et al., 1995).
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Louisiana rate payers "own" two nuclear power plants 
and have a contractual interest in a third. These plants are 
River Bend and Waterford 3, of Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 
and Entergy Louisiana, Inc., respectively and Grand Gulf of 
System Energy Resources, Inc.
The major stumbling block for regulators will be 
whether they allow for the recovery of the large sunk costs 
they approved in prior years. Economist Paul L. Joskow 
favors making quick decisions on fixed or sunk costs and 
then moving on since there is no perfect solution anyway. 
"Only God knows what the right way of allocating sunk costs 
is," states Joskow (Business Week, 12/2/96). The important 
decision for regulators will be whether rate payers, capital 
investors, taxpayers or any combination of all three groups 
should pay for sunk costs.
1.7 "Top-Down" vs. "Bottom-Up" Estimation Methods
It has been widely accepted that the composition of 
stranded costs will be dominated by assets related to a 
utility's generating capacity. The valuation of these assets 
can be determined by two basic approaches. The first 
approach computes the present value of strandable assets and 
compares the resulting valuation with their historical costs 
(DOE/EIA-0562, 1996) . The second approach computes the loss 
in revenue as the market price for electricity changes over 
a period of time into the future, determines its present 
value, and classifies the amount as stranded costs (DOE/EIA- 
0562, 1996). The first method is generally considered a
10
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"Bottom-Up" approach and the second is known as a "Top-Down" 
approach. The "Bottom-Up" approach computes the amount of 
each investment that would be stranded. The "Top-Down" 
approach calculates the difference in revenues under a 
regulatory regime and those likely to accrue with the 
beginning of competition.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has 
adopted the "Top-Down" approach in hopes of avoiding asset- 
by-asset reviews to calculate recoverable stranded costs. By 
adopting this approach, FERC is trying to avoid including 
other items of costs that would likely be added into 
"Bottom-Up" stranded cost calculations. These items could 
include any of the following: fuel supply costs, purchased
power contracts, nuclear decommissioning costs and/or the 
cost of other social and environmental programs. Even though 
FERC has adopted this method, it is up to the individual 
state regulatory authorities as to whether they will adopt 
it. The "Top-Down" approach for estimating the Stranded 
Cost Obligation (SCO) of a departing generation customer 
from an electric utility takes the following form :
SCO = { R S R - C M V E ) * L  , (1.1)
where,
RSR = Revenue Stream estimate attributable to the
departing customer based on the average of 
three prior years' Revenues,
CMVE = Competitive Market Value Estimate either
from sale of released capacity or the 
average annual cost to the customer of 
replacement capacity and associated energy, 
and
11
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L = Length of time of obligation (DOE/EIA-0562, 
1996) .
Obtaining an estimate of CMVE in the above equation 
makes the "Top-Down" approach quite difficult since it is 
strictly based on market analysis. In addition, the "Top- 
Down" lost revenues approach rewards higher priced electric 
utility companies having high RSR's.
A detailed and difficult, but more precise, method for 
estimating stranded costs would be a "Bottom-Up" approach 
that determines exactly which generation facilities are 
needed to meet demand and which are expected to be stranded. 
Even though other categories of additional stranded costs 
might surface, the evaluation of efficient, inefficient, and 
idled generation facilities is pertinent.
It is worth noting that a firm may or may not incur 
stranded costs through "Bottom-Up" analysis because of 
transmission system constraints and/or market clearing 
prices. The stranded cost question is more accurately 
answered by valuing the generation asset portfolio of each 
company under economic dispatching conditions. The valuation 
process is not simple, but can be handled through technical 
and economic methods. First, on the technical side, 
transmission assets and power flow paths need to be 
accounted for to ensure the movement of bulk power from all 
generation facilities in the portfolio to respective sources 
of demand. This is accomplished through the use of basic 
engineering circuit analysis. Second, on the economic side, 
typical regulation practices do not allow firms to charge
12
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prices that reflect the economic value of their assets, 
leaving the true method of economic dispatch in question. 
Marginal prices are needed for a true measure of economic 
dispatch but are generally considered to be proprietary 
information for any particular generation facility. There 
are measures to estimate marginal prices, and that topic 
will be addressed in the next chapter.
In addition, there is no reward for regulated firms to 
operate productive assets with no book value since there is 
no capital recovery. Thus, regulated firms have historically 
had an incentive to idle generation facilities that are 
still economical to operate and would continue to be 
valuable in a competitive market (Maloney et al., 1996b). In 
an unregulated market many of these generation facilities 
would produce net positive cash flows, and it is still 
unclear whether they would be used in estimating lost 
revenues for stranded cost recovery through the "Top-Down" 
approach.
1.8 Other Deregulated Industries
Deregulation has already occurred in the natural gas, 
airline, long-distance telecommunications, railroad, and 
trucking industries. Political agendas, some ending with 
legislation, lead the way in all cases and are currently 
paving the way again for deregulation in the electric 
utility industry. It should be possible to use the 
experience of regulatory reform of the other industries to 
guide the electric utility industry. The specific acts of
13
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legislation used for deregulation for each industry are 
listed below in Table 1.1.
TABLE 1.1
PREVIOUS DEREGULATION LEGISLATIVE ACTS
INDUSTRY LEGISLATIVE ACT AND YEAR
Natural Gas FERC Order 43 6, 
1985






Railroad Staggers Act, 
1980
Trucking Motor Carrier Act, 
1980
The following subsections discuss how each deregulated 
industry relates to the electric utility industry, its 
deregulation process and stranded cost recovery figures 
(where they exist). Industry experts have claimed successful 
economic results by deregulating each of the industries.
Each industry's success demonstrates that deregulation can 
be a positive step for the electric utility industry.
1.8.1 Natural Gas
Like the electric utility industry, the natural gas 
industry includes competitive producers who transport their 
product through a network. Pipelines, like transmission 
grids (neglecting electrical loop flow characteristics), can 
be thought of as a tank of fluid that various parties 
alternately fill and draw from. A gas shipper is similar to 
a person who pours an agreed-upon amount of fluid into the
14
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tank and the buyer as one who draws an agreed-upon amount 
out. Interestingly, the buyer does not necessarily receive 
the exact molecules of fluid the shipper put in. The 
transmission of electricity can be thought of in the same 
oversimplified example (Ellig, 1994) .
To deregulate, FERC Orders 43 6 and 500 transformed 
interstate pipelines from integrated gas merchants into 
providers of gas transportation. Pipelines may still 
participate in the merchant and gas sales business through 
affiliated companies, but the pipeline transmission function 
is now a separate entity with its own set of financial 
accounts. Opponents of open access to gas transmission 
expressed fears that separating the merchant from the 
transportation function would reduce the reliability of the 
pipeline system, but no problems have been exposed so far 
(INGAA, 1996). The electric utility transmission system may 
possess some of its own unique technological challenges, but 
the gas industry's experience suggests that open access 
systems may be more reliable than many people previously 
thought.
The natural gas industry's issue of restructuring 
costs was completed using a two-step process. First, the 
industry went through a period called the "Take-or-Pay Era" 
(1988-1993). Take-or-pay liabilities that pipelines incurred 
were defined as contractual obligations for minimum 
quantities of gas from producers at prices that could not be 
recovered in the increasingly competitive gas supply market.
15
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Pipelines settled some of their take-or-pay obligations with 
producers through cash payments and contract reformation 
(INGAA, 1995) . Next, the "Transition Costs Era" (1993-1996) 
occurred. Under FERC Order 63 6 issued in 1992, customers and 
pipelines were required to reform any remaining bundled 
sales contracts into transportation contracts. The general 
method of recovering gas supply realignment costs was a 
fixed surcharge for all transportation customers (INGAA, 
1996).
The natural gas industry incurred $13.2 billion in 
restructuring costs as a result of regulatory changes 
(INGAA, 1996) . One early gas restructuring cost estimate by 
FERC Order No. 500-H. F.R. 52344 (1989) was for $44 billion. 
Of the gas industry restructuring costs to date, pipelines 
have absorbed 28 percent, or $3.7 billion (INGAA, 1996).
There are several lessons to be learned from the 
natural gas industry's experience with restructuring costs 
that may be relevant to electric utility industry policy 
makers. First, pipelines had to adopt open access and 
provide their customers with choices before their stranded 
costs liabilities were settled (INGAA, 1996). Second, 
pipelines had powerful incentives to hold restructuring 
costs down because they were not allowed to recover 
restructuring costs fully through FERC policies and open 
access competitive pressures (INGAA, 1996). As a result, 
stranded costs in the natural gas industry turned out to be 
significantly less than expected.
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1.8.2 Airline
Airlines and electric utilities share some interesting 
similarities. For instance, privately-owned airlines are 
similar to independent power producers since they can serve 
customers in a wide variety of areas. But, to carry out 
their service, airlines are dependent upon government-owned 
air traffic control systems and airports. By comparison to 
electric utility functions, these are the airline's 
"dispatchers" and "transmission lines" (Ellig, 1994).
Service in this industry was never bundled as it was in the 
natural gas industry or still is in the electric utility 
industry.
Before 1978, airlines were subject to both maximum and 
minimum fares established by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The Board also controlled entry to individual city-pair 
routes. Regulation of this industry had the effect of 
creating a government enforced cartel that artificially 
raised prices. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
deregulated fares and entry into individual routes, which 
set competition in motion.
Since government controlled the "dispatchers" and 
"transmission lines" of the airline industry, no real 
transition costs are known. The best estimate of transition 
costs stems from the airlines that did not survive 
deregulation because of inefficient pricing. Shareholders of 
airlines that went out of business, because of industry 
shake-out absorbed all transition costs in investment losses
17
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(Edison Electric Institute, 1995). The surviving airlines, 
unlike independent power producers, had no real threat of 
stranded costs. They could simply purchase/lease larger or 
smaller aircraft to fit any specific market.
1.8.3 Long-Distance Telecommunications
Similar to the electric utility industry, 
telecommunications involves the transportation of electrons 
over wires (Ellig, 1994) . Currently, local telephone 
companies are economically similar to local electric utility 
companies. Local phone companies enjoy being monopolies on 
the sale of local phone service and on the transportation of 
long distance calls from the originator to the long distance 
carrier and from the long distance carrier to the receiver.
Competition in long-distance telecommunications 
service occurred in stages. In the late 1950's, the Federal 
Communications Commission began to permit competition in 
private microwave service. In the late 1960's and early 
1970's, federal regulators permitted competition in private- 
line common carriage. MCI opened the door to competition in 
1974 when it began offering switched-voice message service, 
the same ordinary long distance service that accounted for 
more than 90 percent of AT&T's long distance revenues 
(Crandall and Ellig, 1997) . The federal courts refused to 
uphold the Federal Communications Commission's efforts to 
relegate MCI to private-line service. This effectively 
opened the door to long-distance telecommunication 
competition.̂
18
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since there were still local phone company monopolies, 
the Federal Communications Commission drafted rules designed 
to ensure that long-distance telecommunications companies 
would be able to use local phone lines to access customers. 
Local phone companies were required by the 1982 Consent 
Decree to provide open access under equal and 
nondiscriminatory terms to competitive long-distance 
carriers (Dismukes et al., 1996b).
Stranded costs associated with the transformation of 
the long-distance telecommunications industry were entirely- 
absorbed by the shareholders of AT&T. The losses were a 
direct result of the break-up of the Bell System. In 1983, 
the company recorded a $5.5 billion dollar extraordinary 
charge to income (Moody's, 1983) . This loss represented over 
10 percent of AT&T's total equity (Moody's, 1983). The 
change resulted from overvaluation of a significant amount 
of AT&T's installed equipment investments under traditional 
rate of return regulation. These excessive costs were not 
recoverable in a competitive market, so AT&T's shareholders 
were required to absorb 100 percent of the excessive 
investments (Dismukes et al., 1996b).
The long-distance telecommunications example 
illustrates that regulators can separate local exchange 
facilities from other sectors of industry without destroying 
service reliability. Local telephone companies simply use 
their equipment to route long-distance calls and then 
collect access fees for doing so.
19
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1.8.4 Trucking
Trucking companies are similar to independent power 
producers in that they do not own the highways they must use 
to serve their customers. Like airlines, trucking companies 
use government-owned highways that are open to all users. 
These highways are analogous to transmission and 
distribution lines owned by electric utilities (Ellig,
1994) .
Trucking deregulation occurred with the Motor Carrier 
Act of 1980. Prior to this piece of legislation, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission rigidly controlled entry into 
the trucking industry. Rate changes by truckers had to be 
approved by the Commission as well as by competing carriers. 
To bypass this problem, many large firms found it profitable 
to acquire their own trucking fleets. These fleets were 
profitable at the expense of being inefficient. Since they 
could not carry another company's goods for hire, they often 
cruised empty on the return trip, wasting fuel, time, and 
money. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 changed this situation 
by expediting entry and permitting truckers to set rates on 
their own initiative.
The insight drawn from the trucking industry is 
similar to the one drawn from the airline industry. 
Inefficient pricing strategies heavily influenced the shake­
out of the industry. Therefore, pricing for electric utility 
generation, transmission, and distribution assets should 
reflect marginal principles. The prices need not be optimal
20
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since optimal pricing in the real world is often difficult 
to determine, but incorporating marginal principles is a 
step in the right direction (Crandall and Ellig, 1997).
1.8.5 Railroads
In an economic sense, a railroad is similar to an 
investor-owned electric utility firm with only generation 
and transmission facilities. The railroad's generation 
capacity is its locomotives and freight cars, and its 
transmission capacity is its track. But, unlike airlines and 
trucking companies, railroads own and maintain their assets 
(Ellig, 1994) .
During the 1970's, federal regulation had bankrupted 
several railroads because of intensified competition from 
trucking firms. The root of the bankruptcy problem stemmed 
from the "value of service pricing" policy mandated by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (Crandall and Ellig, 1997). 
This policy forced railroads to charge higher rates on 
"high-value" shipments of goods. These were the same goods 
that trucking firms were best suited to handle.
The Staggers Act of 1980 deregulated the industry and 
ended inefficient federal railroad policy. However, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission still does have the power to 
regulate rates charged to captive shippers, but 90 percent 
of all rail traffic rates are fully deregulated (Crandall 
and Ellig, 1997) . In some cases the Interstate Commerce 
Commission can require a railroad to permit a competitor to 
use its track and facilities. In this case the foreign
21
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company's train is treated like any other train on the 
host's track. Some railroads even voluntarily permit foreign 
companies to run trains over their tracks. The argument for
doing this is if one company can operate a train less
expensively than the company owning the track, both
companies have a profit incentive to negotiate open access
(Crandall and Ellig, 1997). The end result is transportation 
at a lower cost, which can increase profit for both 
companies.
In each of the above mentioned industries, critics 
argued that deregulation would not work because of special 
characteristics inherent to each industry. Others argued 
that it may have been true that these characteristics caused 
problems at first, but once these were overcome most, if not 
all, consumer groups were better off because of 
deregulation.
1.9 The Dissertation Purpose
This country's electricity system is characterized by 
a diverse ownership of generation facilities and a high 
degree of interconnection. Unlimited transmission 
interconnection capacity would imply an extremely large 
market for electric power, while limited transmission 
interconnection capacity would imply a limited area for 
competition where local generation might be one's only 
source for electric power.
Transmission interconnections are very important when 
it comes to taking advantage of regional power generation
22
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cost differences. If one market has a very large cost 
advantage over another, the transmission paths connecting 
those markets will become congested with flows from the low- 
cost market to the high-cost market. Even though the 
National Energy Policy Act of 1992 mandates that 
transmission system access will not be a problem for EWGs, 
transmission system infrastructure cannot be updated 
overnight.
A problem arises in deciding which generation 
facilities must be committed or idled and when such 
scheduling should occur. With such a diverse and large 
supply of generation resources in the United States, the 
idling of some generation facilities will be unavoidable 
when scheduling to fulfill demand requirements. It is the 
identification of stranded generation facilities that is of 
interest to policy makers.
The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically 
evaluate the supply of electric power generation and 
transmission interconnection capacity for wheeling power in 
and around the state of Louisiana. The goal is to determine 
which electric power generation facilities need to be 
committed to meet the state's peak electricity needs while 
taking into consideration capacity constraints created by 
limited transmission interconnections.
To determine the optimal commitment of generation 
facilities in Louisiana, the dissertation presents an 
electric power production and bulk power transmission
23
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nonlinear programming optimization model. The model relaxes 
intricate power system characteristics such as thermal, 
voltage and frequency stability limitations and allows for 
an economic study of bulk power transfers. The model is 
designed to capture the optimal production and transmission 
of electric power by company control area during a one-hour 
peak period of demand.
The state is broken up into its existing investor- 
owned electric utility control areas, a government-owned 
electric utility control area, its municipally-owned 
electric utility control areas, and other electric utility 
control areas for importing electric power from neighboring 
states. Given average variable production cost data' for 
each generation facility and peak demand for each control 
area, the nonlinear programming optimization model 
characterizes electric power production and bulk power 
transmission trends on the aggregated electric power system.
Obtaining data for the optimization model can be 
considered to be a separate research topic all its own. 
Identifying and collecting average variable production costs 
for each generation facility is a straightforward but 
tedious research task.
From the assumption of a coincident one-hour peak 
demand for electric power, stranded generation facilities 
can be identified and segregated for the estimation of 
stranded generation facility costs to consumers, utility 
companies, or their respective investors.
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Transmission system pricing strategies can also be 
viewed as possible constraining factors for wheeling low- 
cost power. If a transmission access tariff is high enough, 
it can restrict the reach of low-cost power generation 
facilities. Transmission system pricing strategies are not a 
part of this dissertation, but are left for future research.
1.10 Current Legislation
There are many electric utility restructuring related 
bills currently in Congress. Several senators and 
representatives have them in committee ready to be debated 
during the first session of the 105"̂  Congress. A brief list 
of bills follows to emphasize the importance of 
restructuring the nation's electric utility industry.
(1) "Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1997"
Senate Bill #237,
by Senator Bumpers of Arkansas
(2) "Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1997"
Senate Bill #621,
by Senator D'Amato of New York
(3) "Consumers Electric Power Act of 1997"
House Bill #1230,
by Representative DeLay of Texas
(4) "Electric Power Competition and Consumer Choice
Act of 1997"
House Bill #1960,
by Representative Markey of Massachusetts
(5) "Electric Consumers' Power to Choose Act of 1997"
House Bill #655,
by Representative Schaefer of Colorado
(6) "Electric Utility Restructuring Empowerment and
Competitiveness Act of 1997"
Senate Bill #722,
by Senator Thomas of Wyoming
25
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The one important aspect of all bills is that each 
state is allowed to determine its own stranded costs. Once 
these are determined, the state is expected to recover and 
repay all parties having incurred stranded costs.
1.11 Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation is presented in seven chapters.
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter which provides a 
history of the electric utility industry and motivation for 
the research from the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 . 
Chapter 1 also presents the importance of wheeling to 
restructuring the industry, the economic impact of 
restructuring, a discussion of stranded costs, its economic 
impact and valuation, the deregulation of other industries, 
a statement of the problem with the dissertation purpose, 
and current legislation pending. The first chapter concludes 
with an organizational outline of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 introduces previous published and 
unpublished literature concerning dissertation subject 
matter. The chapter begins with a discussion of Regulatory 
Economics where the Averch-Johnson hypothesis is reviewed. 
The chapter then introduces and critiques existing stranded 
cost estimation models. Next, electric utility restructuring 
methods are presented. The Bilateral Contract method, the 
Poolco method, and a combination of both are discussed. The 
chapter proceeds by providing an overview of electric power 
system modeling literature. Specifically, economic dispatch, 
unit commitment, optimal power flow, the transportation
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method for optimal power flow, and multiarea production 
simulation literature are reviewed. Next, the average cost 
vs. marginal cost argument is presented in the context of 
electric power production pricing.
Chapter 3 formulates LaDEUX (Louisiana's Deregulated 
Electric Utility Exchange) , an electric power production and 
bulk power transmission optimization model. It is based on 
economic dispatch concepts with unit commitment, optimal 
power flow, and multiarea production simulation 
characteristics, and is constrained by transmission 
interconnection capacity. The model is nonlinear in 
formulation and is constructed to capture optimal generation 
facility production and bulk transmission of electric power 
during a one-hour coincident summer and winter peak period 
of demand. All modeling notation and assumptions are also 
presented. A simplified example problem is then introduced 
to illustrate formulation of the model as well as its 
solution. The chapter proceeds to present a economically 
designed experimental solution strategy for determining 
stranded and uneconomically operating generation facilities 
and their costs. The experimental design is based on average 
variable and fuel production costs, transmission 
interconnections and their costs, and summer and winter 
coincident peak demands.
Chapter 4 introduces two methods of analysis for 
estimating stranded generation facility costs, each of which 
is based on the economic dispatch results obtained from the
27
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LaDEUX model. First, the Cost-of-Plant method is presented. 
It estimates stranded generation facility costs in the 
strictest form. Next, the Embedded Cost method is presented. 
This method is an extension of the Cost-of-Plant method that 
takes into account costs of facilities that are dispatched, 
but operating uneconomically. Finally, the simple example 
problem introduced in Chapter 3 is revisited to illustrate 
each method of stranded generation facility cost analysis.
Chapter 5 discusses all data sources used to produce 
LaDEUX. The chapter explains how and where all technical and 
economic data were gathered for model development.
Chapter 6 presents stranded generation facility 
results from LaDEUX and stranded generation facility costs 
furnished by the Cost-of-Plant and Embedded Cost methods of 
estimating stranded cost. Estimating stranded generation 
facility costs is a two-stage process where the cost 
analysis performed in the second step of the methodology is
dependent upon the dispatch results obtained first from the
LaDEUX model.
In the first stage, results of sixteen economic 
dispatch experiments are presented. Average variable and 
fuel cost pairs of similar experiments form the ranges for 
capturing true marginal production cost dispatch. In 
addition, a market clearing price and market clearing
facility are determined for each experiment. General
observations and interesting economic dispatch results are 
also presented.
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In the second stage, the economic dispatch of each 
experimental pair is processed by both cost analysis 
methods, and the resulting estimates for stranded generation 
facility costs are given. A stranded cost range is supplied 
for each experimental pair. This is done in the same fashion 
as the economic dispatch results presented from the LaDEUX 
model since true marginal production costs are unknown.
Finally, Chapter 7 furnishes conclusions of the 
dissertation. Results are summarized and limitations are 
addressed. It also presents extensions to the methodology 
for future research for both the LaDEUX model for economic 
dispatch and the Embedded Cost method for estimating 
stranded generation facility costs. The chapter concludes by 
identifying the successes and major contributions of the 
research.
1.12 End Notes
■ The terms "uneconomical generation facility" and 
"uneconomically dispatched generation facility" are 
intended to represent a generation facility whose marginal 
production cost and embedded sunk cost is higher than a 
system's market clearing price for electric power.
■ See MCI Telecommunications Corp. vs. Federal 
Communications Commission, 561 F 2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .
 ̂Average variable production costs are composed of fuel 
costs and operation and maintenance costs.
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction
The individual literature topics reviewed in this 
chapter support the development of a modeling methodology 
employing a "Bottom-Up" approach for evaluating stranded 
generation facilities. The chapter begins with a review of 
the Averch-Johnson approach to regulatory economics. It 
hypothesizes an over-capitalization phenomenon of electric 
utility assets justifying the existence of stranded 
generation facilities.
The chapter then introduces and reviews existing 
models that estimate stranded costs. Electric utility 
industry restructuring methods are then presented as the 
basis for formulating a new modeling methodology to assess 
electric power wheeling and identify stranded generation 
facilities and subsequently estimate their costs.
Next, technical literature is reviewed to support the 
formulation of an economic dispatch model. Once presented, 
literature concerning data for model implementation is 
discussed. Supply side production costs are reviewed first 
and average vs. marginal cost data are then discussed in the 
context of generation facility production costs.
2.2 Averch-Johnson Approach to Regulatory Economics
The Averch-Johnson approach to economic regulation has 
focused upon the actions of the regulated firm subject to a
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regulatory constraint, rather than on actions and behavior 
of the regulatory body itself. The Averch-Johnson approach 
assumes that the regulatory body follows a traditional 
social welfare maximizing role. Since regulators are 
assumed to be maximizing social welfare, the actions of the 
regulated firm become the focus of inquiry.
Averch and Johnson (1962) formed a static, 
deterministic model of the regulated firm subject to a 
regulatory constraint. The regulatory constraint is merely 
a cap, set by the regulatory body, on the maximum allowable 
rate-of-return that the regulated firm can earn. In the 
model, depreciation is assumed to be zero, and the only 
cost of acquiring capital is the interest to be paid on 
plant and equipment.
After formulating this model, Averch and Johnson 
reached two controversial conclusions. Specifically, they 
concluded chat a regulatory bias exists when the regulated 
allowed rate-of-return is greater than the cost of capital. 
This encourages the regulated firm to make inefficient 
capital-intensive investments. A second, but often 
overlooked conclusion, is that regulated firms also have 
the incentive to cross-subsidize less profitable operations 
at the expense of more profitable operations, so long as 
the firms' overall rate-of-return remains unchanged. Both 
of these conclusions provide formal evidence that rate-of- 
return regulation can impose social costs in the form of 
input and output inefficiencies and that over-
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capitalization can lead to the stranding of inefficient 
assets.
The initial Averch-Johnson work has been subject to a 
great deal of criticism and theoretical modifications and 
additions. The idea that the regulated firm pads its rate 
base is not new to practitioners of economic regulation, 
but Berg and Tschirhart (1995) state that academics have an 
incentive to tweak existing models for a quick publication 
rather than take the time to develop an understanding of 
the important issues of the model. The literature begins to 
feed on itself without getting external reality checks. 
However, Averch and Johnson were the first to be able to 
incorporate this idea into a stylized model that has 
survived the test of time, even though detractors such as 
Corey (1971) and others have criticized the model's 
assumptions and have said the model is overly simplistic 
for applied work.
Empirical tests of the Averch-Johnson approach are 
varied and reach differing conclusions. Petersen (1975) 
found that lower rates-of-return were significantly 
associated with higher costs and large proportions of 
capital-related costs. In his model, Petersen reformulated 
the Averch-Johnson hypothesis in terms of cost-minimization 
subject to the regulatory constraint. It is shown that as 
the cost of capital approaches the allowed rate-of-return, 
the regulated firm incurs higher unit costs and spends a 
larger portion of total cost of capital than otherwise. As
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Petersen explains, regulation would be considered to be 
"tightened" if the allowed rate-of-return and the cost of 
capital were equated. Other extensive empirical studies 
presented by both Spann (1974) and Courville (1974) support 
the over-capitalization hypothesis.
Other studies, however, have failed to support the 
Averch-Johnson over-capitalization hypothesis. Baron and 
Taggart (1977) conducted an empirical investigation of the 
Averch-Johnson hypothesis by forming a financial model of 
shareholder preferences of input choices for the regulated 
firm. Instead of focusing upon actual production outcomes, 
shareholder preferences serve as indicators of over- or 
under-capitalization. The empirical evidence revealed that 
an increase in the regulated firm's capital stock, results 
in a shareholder-anticipated reduction in the price of the 
regulated firm's equity. Thus, in order to maintain 
shareholder profitability and support, the regulated firm 
will not choose an input level which is biased towards 
capital—contrary to the Averch-Johnson conclusions. Boyes 
(1976) and Smithson (1978), using different empirical 
models, also failed to find any evidence of over­
capitalization .
In hindsight, it is interesting to question the 
arguments of critics of the Averch-Johnson hypothesis. If 
Averch-Johnson critics support under-capitalizing assets to 
maximize shareholder wealth, then why are investor-owned 
utility companies asking for stranded cost recovery?
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To summarize, the Averch-Johnson approach has become 
accepted as the mainstream, traditional approach to 
modeling economic regulation. The regulatory constraint, 
while not escaping criticism, is considered by many as a 
proper description of how the regulated firm maximizes 
profit in a regulatory environment. The original apparatus, 
as presented by Averch and Johnson, has undergone a number 
of significant modifications and revisions. The empirical 
evidence, however, has remained mixed—some studies support 
the over-capitalization hypothesis, others do not. In 
general, while mainstream, the Averch-Johnson over­
capitalization hypothesis takes a technical approach to the 
study of economic regulation. Regulation is seen merely as 
an optimization problem rather than an intricate balance of 
the interactions of numerous economic agents and interests.
2.3 Existing Stranded Cost Models
To date two models have been developed for the 
estimation of stranded generation costs. Both are versions 
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's lost revenues, 
or "Top-Down" approach to stranded cost estimation. One 
model has been developed and used by the Texas Public 
Service Commission. The other model was developed by the 
United States Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. While the Oak Ridge model's intention is to be 
an electric utility financial and production simulator, it 
does have the ability to estimate stranded generation 
facility costs.
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A review of each of these models is found below. Each 
review contains an explanation of model development and a 
critique of potential results.
2.3.1 ECOM Model of Texas
A need for the Texas Public Utility Commission to 
investigate the problem of potentially strandable 
generation facilities emerged. The Texas Commission 
instituted Project 15001, Stranded Cost Report: Estimation 
of ECOM for Generating Utilities in Texas, to determine the 
magnitude of generation facility Excess Costs Over Market 
(ECOM) under various competitive scenarios affecting 
investor-owned, municipally-owned, and cooperatively-owned 
electric utilities in the state. Legislative questions 
concerning proper direction for the industry and pending 
national competition have contributed to this need.
To determine generation excess costs over market, an 
electronic workbook using Microsoft Excel version 5.0 
software was designed and developed by commission staff.
The workbook is called the ECOM Model. The model estimates 
the after-tax net present value of the change in revenues 
an electric utility would experience as a result of selling 
electricity at market prices rather than at regulated 
prices. It defines generation excess costs over market as 
the discounted present value of the difference between sunk 
costs and the contributions to capital of utility sales 
under competition. The model estimates retail excess costs 
over market but has the ability to estimate wholesale
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excess costs over market as well. It is an obvious "Top- 
Down" approach.
The model's users input disaggregated capital and 
production costs associated with generation assets and 
allocate these costs by resource type and by customer 
class. Users also allocate projected sales by resource type 
and by customer class. Using these cost and revenue 
projections, the model calculates utility revenues under 
continued cost of service regulation. Next, the Commission 
provides a range of future market prices—low, base, and 
high—which is used in the calculation of market-based 
revenues under alternative competitive scenarios. The model 
then calculates the excess costs over market of generation
assets based on the difference between revenues under cost-
of-service regulation and those under competitive 
scenarios. The model can accommodate any number of 
additional relevant scenarios.
The ECOM model can be summarized by the following 
equations :
ECOM = d P V [ F C - ( M P  - A V C ) *  MWIi] , ( 2 . lA)
or
ECOM = dPV[EC + TVC — Revenues] , ( 2 . IB)
where,
dPV = Discounted Present Value,
FC = Fixed Costs of Current Assets,
MP = Market Price of Electricity,
AVC = Average Variable Costs of
Electricity,
MWh = Sales at the Market Price,
TVC = AVC * MWh, and
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Revenues = MP * MWh.
Although sanctioned by the state, several parties 
expressed opposing opinions concerning the adoption of 
ECOM's "Top-Down" approach. In particular, Destec Energy, 
Texas Ratepayers Organization to Save Energy, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, the Office of the Public 
Utility Counsel, Texas Citizens for a Sound Economy 
Foundation, and Consumers Union expressed reservations 
about or opposition to the approach. They all argued that 
the "Top-Down" approach may overstate strandable costs, 
that the method implicitly assumes an entitlement to full 
recovery of strandable generation assets, and that it may 
not be capable of accurately depicting a competitive 
market.
In contrast, several utility parties, including Texas 
Utilities Electric Company and Houston Lighting and Power 
Company, favored the application of the approach. Houston 
Lighting and Power Company in particular proposed use of a 
methodology consistent with the "Top-Down" approach used by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. It is interesting 
to note that in Houston Lighting and Power Company's 
contrasting opinion, it was not mentioned that the company 
has the highest wholesale and industrial rates in the state 
and several inefficient generation units (Matlock, 1995). 
Texas Utilities Electric Company, on the other hand, has 
higher than average wholesale rates and many inefficient 
generation units but does have the lowest industrial rates
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in the state (Matlock, 1995). This is an example of one of 
the problems associated with the "Top-Down" approach. 
Companies that have high rates and inefficient generation 
units have the ability to fully recover stranded generation 
costs. In other words, a company can get rewarded for 
having high rates and being inefficient with production.
It is puzzling to note that in its report. Staff 
Discussion of the Order: Estimation of ECOM for Generating 
Utilities in Texas, 1996, the commission staff states that 
it believes
. .the calculation of a scenarios-hased "Lost
Revenues" approach is wholly consistent with the 
calculation of an asset-by-asset (or a non­
scenarios -based) measure of ECOM. Both "Lost 
Revenues" and asset-by-asset are methods of 
measuring ECOM. The only difference between 
these two approaches is that the "Lost Revenue" 
approach calculates ECOM based on average costs 
over categories of assets—defined by fuel type— 
while the asset-by-asset approach is a "Bottom- 
Up" approach. Under a consistent set of 
assumptions (e.g., allocating revenues to 
certain resources or resource types), the two 
approaches should yield the same ECOM for any 
scenario."
Since no asset-by-asset approach was conducted by the 
commission staff, it is difficult to accept these 
statements indicating that the approaches are similar.
A short-coming of the ECOM model is its inability to 
take into account simultaneous utility generation of other 
facilities around the state of Texas and the ERCOT system. 
It is strictly a utility company-by-utility company 
approach to determining stranded generation costs. The 
model implies that customers are displaced by non-utility
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
generation within a utility company's own control area or 
artificially wheeled power, but customers can be displaced 
by neighboring utility generation through transmission 
system interconnections. The model should be enhanced to 
perform its calculations on a state/system-wide basis since 
all ratepayers within the state/system boundaries are 
likely to pay stranded generation facility costs. The 
"Bottom-Up" approach used to determine stranded generation 
costs developed in this dissertation is designed as a 
state/system-wide approach for the specific identification 
of stranded generation facilities while constraining the 
state/system by its transmission system interconnections.
2.3.2 ORFIN Model of Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Oak Ridge National Laboratory is a research facility 
managed and operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Research 
Corporation for the United States Department of Energy. It 
has on staff three principle researchers studying the 
restructure of the electric utility industry. Eric Hirst, 
Lester Baxter, and Stan Hadley are the researchers, and 
their contributions to restructuring literature are 
numerous.
Oak Ridge Financial Model (ORFIN) described in 
ORNL/CON-424 (1996) and ORNL/CON-430 (1996) is a finance 
and operations model used to help analyze the impacts of 
electric utility restructuring as it pertains to customers, 
existing utilities, and other stakeholders. The model is a 
Microsoft Excel version 5.0 workbook, approximately 1.4
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Mbytes in size. It uses multiple worksheets to separate the 
various calculations, input, and output. The worksheets are 
entitled: Input, Finance, Plants, Dispatch, Charts,
Dispatch Macros, and Other Macros. The model combines 
detailed pricing and financial analysis (an Annual Summary 
Statement, Income Statement, and Balance Sheet) with an 
economic dispatch model over a multi-year period and is 
used to study various types of performance-based rates, 
stranded commitments recovery, and retail wheeling options. 
By varying the performance of a modeled electric utility, a 
user can observe the consequences of various performance- 
based ratemaking algorithms on prices and profitability. 
Modeling individual high-cost assets, as well as 
transmission and distribution assets, and modifying their 
accounting allow a user to compare different stranded cost 
recovery methods as well as ways to mitigate impact. The 
authors of the model indicate that it is a "Bottom-Up" 
approach to calculating stranded commitments. They argue 
that since ORFIN dispatches each generating unit and power 
purchase contract individually it is performing "Bottom-Up" 
analysis.
It is typically accepted that the costs of a utility 
are dominated by the cost of the generation facilities and 
contracts it uses to provide electricity. Because of this, 
the economic dispatch portion of ORFIN has been modeled in 
much greater detail than the other financial worksheets. 
Inputs to the economic dispatch worksheet in ORFIN include
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six pre-existing generation facilities, two pre-existing 
contracts, a new resource (which can be a power plant, 
contract, or demand side management program), and 
additional capacity added on a yearly basis to meet minimum 
reserve margin requirements. Additional, detailed 
information on the operation and costs of these resources 
is provided to allow closer representation of actual 
utilities.
ORFIN incorporates system load duration curves into 
the economic dispatch worksheet. It uses two curves for 
each year : an on-peak season curve (where no maintenance is 
done on plants) and an off-peak season curve (where plants 
are derated for maintenance outages). An additional 
technical aspect of the model is its probabilistic-based 
forced outages of generation facilities. The probabilistic 
forced outages, generally known as a loss-of-load 
probability, create an equivalent load duration curve where 
higher-cost production facilities will see not only demands 
from customers but also "equivalent demands" based on the 
probability of lower-cost production facilities undergoing 
a forced outage.
Also included in the dispatch worksheet is an external 
wholesale power market with tiered prices based on customer 
loads. If capacity and/or transmission constraints keep a 
utility from meeting its customers' requirements, demand is 
purchased on the wholesale market at a market clearing 
wholesale power price.
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The economic dispatch worksheet uses data for each 
year to calculate the generation, contract purchases, and 
wholesale (spot) purchases and sales for the utility. The 
dispatch worksheet first calculates load-duration curves 
for a specific utility's on-peak and off-peak seasons. It 
then sorts the ten generation facilities (including 
contracts) in order of their variable costs. The production 
cost results are then used by the financial worksheet to 
calculate operations and maintenance costs for the utility.
Analysis of stranded commitment costs requires two 
ORFIN runs. The first run is a base case with no retail
wheeling occurring in the utility's control area. The
second run includes retail wheeling with the user
specifying the timing and amount of wheeling that occurs
year by year. The retail wheeling case has retail 
electricity prices set equal to those in the base case. 
Differences in annual earnings between the base and retail 
wheeling cases are the model's estimates of stranded 
commitment losses that the utility's shareholders would 
experience. Keeping prices fixed between the base and 
retail wheeling cases ensures that none of the stranded 
commitment costs are borne by retail customers in the 
model. Instead, all stranded commitment costs are born by 
utility shareholders.
Similar to the problems pointed out in the ECOM Model 
of Texas, ORFIN also has the inability to take into account 
simultaneous utility generation of other interconnected
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facilities. It is strictly an artificial utility company- 
by-utility company approach to determining stranded 
commitments. This model again implies that customers are 
displaced by non-utility generation within a utility 
company's own control area or with wheeled power, but 
customers can be displaced by neighboring utility 
generation through transmission system interconnections.
The model should be expanded to included several companies 
within an interconnected system or power pool. As stated 
earlier, the "Bottom-Up" approach used to determine 
stranded commitments developed in this dissertation is 
designed as an interconnected system-wide approach for the 
specific identification of stranded generation facilities, 
while constraining the system by its transmission system 
interconnections.
Another problem with the model is the authors' 
mislabeling of their stranded commitment calculation. The 
method of computing stranded commitments as defined in the 
model is the difference in annual earnings between the base 
and retail wheeling cases. This is really an estimate of 
stranded earnings and not stranded commitments. The 
financial statements should be adjusted to calculate the 
difference in annual production costs between the base and 
retail wheeling cases. This would amount to an estimate of 
stranded commitments based on a "Bottom-Up" approach. As 
long as some form of revenues is involved in the
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computation of stranded commitments, stranded profit or 
stranded earnings will always be determined.
2.4 Electric Utility Industry Restructuring Methods
Many consumer groups and regulatory commissions 
throughout the country have been investigating different 
methods of moving toward competition. The essence of 
electric power competition is that each customer will be 
able to buy its generation, generation-related services, and 
ancillary services from a market comprised of many sellers.
A customer will no longer be limited to buying these 
services from his/her local monopolistic electric utility. A 
customer will, however, still be limited to buying regulated 
transmission and distribution service from monopolistic 
providers. The methods of moving to a competitive
market most often discussed are :
(1) the Bilateral Contracts method, and
(2) the Poolco method.
Some industry restructuring advocates support a market 
structure that is completely dependent upon Bilateral 
Contracts. In this case, the power flows from contracts 
would be scheduled by the buyers and sellers, and an 
Independent (transmission) System Operator (ISO) would be 
needed merely to coordinate all contract flows and 
reschedule them when conflicts arise (Tellus Institute,
1997) .
There are advantages and disadvantages to 
restructuring using the Bilateral Contract method. One 
advantage is that buyers are able to exercise negotiating
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power by signing contracts of any and all possible 
durations. A potential disadvantage is introduced if 
contracts of long duration have contracted prices above the 
average market price. In this case a customer will end up 
paying too much for electric power. The reverse of this 
situation can be seen as an advantage if the average market 
price stays above the contracted price for the duration of 
the contract.
Other restructuring advocates support a Poolco (power 
pool) market structure. In the Poolco market, each supplier 
would submit bids to the Poolco in specified time increments 
for electric power the supplier could make available. 
Generation facilities would be dispatched by the Poolco from 
lowest to highest bid until total demand in the specified 
time increment was met. The highest bid generation that was 
used to meet total demand in the specified time increment 
would determine a market clearing price. This price would be 
paid to each and every ov/ner of dispatched generation, 
regardless of the type of generation facility (i.e., base, 
intermediate, or peaking load), and regardless of the price 
at which the generation facility was actually bid. The 
market clearing price would also be paid by each and every 
consumer who purchased power from the Poolco, regardless of 
the type of generation facility (i.e., base, intermediate, 
or peaking load) that the customer actually needed to meet 
his load profile (Tellus Institute, 1997) .
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A controversial advantage of a Poolco system over a 
Bilateral Contract system is its ability to collapse the 
contract signing time and the delivery time into the same 
point in time. The contract teirms would be the prices and 
quantities bid by suppliers into the Poolco. A disadvantage 
of a Poolco system is its inability to allow a potential 
buyer the opportunity to "shop around" and play one supplier 
off of another to negotiate a lower price for power. Without 
this negotiation tactic, horizontal market power is likely 
to surface in a Poolco system and raise prices for all 
buyers.
Finally, there are those who support a more 
complicated market structure, whereby a Poolco would be 
established as a competitive short-term energy market (i.e., 
a spot market), and Bilateral Contracts would be used to 
lock in to fixed prices for short-, medium-, and long-term 
power purchases (Tellus Institute, 1997). In this way, a 
customer could:
(1 ) sign contracts for power so that he/she would 
know ahead of time what prices he/she would have 
to pay (i.e., he/she would be ensured price 
stability and predictability) ,
(2) buy power from the Poolco, whereby he/she would 
have to pay the Poolco's market clearing price in 
each time period, or
(3) purchase power through a mix of contract 
purchases and spot market purchases.
To conclude, it is difficult to predict which 
direction regulators will proceed in restructuring the 
electric utility industry. Preliminary evidence has
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indicated that large industrial customers favor a Bilateral 
Contract approach since they have large loads for 
negotiation leverage and small customers favor a Poolco 
approach since they have no market power for negotiations.
2.5 Electric Power System Modeling
It is necessary to explore literature concerning the 
evolution of electric power system modeling and the 
sophistication of solution methods used. The topics reviewed 
increase in complexity as they are introduced. It is hoped 
this review will help demonstrate the impossibility, under 
currently available technology, of formulating and solving a 
complete interconnected electric utility power system model.
2.5.1 Economic Dispatch
Generation facility dispatch determines the share of 
load demand that each facility delivers. The purpose of 
generation facility dispatch is to minimize the total system 
operating cost for delivering power to meet system load 
demand. This minimum cost objective, leading to the term of 
economic dispatch, can be achieved by regulating the power 
supplied by each unit to take advantage of its unique 
operating cost characteristics.
Wood and Wollenberg (1996) present the following 
generic formulation of an economic dispatch model.
Minimize
V
Ft = , (2 .2 )
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F7 = total Cost for supplying the indicated load,
= the Cost Rate for a particular generating unit.
Pi = the Electrical Power generated by a particular
unit, and
P-.oad = total received power for consumption.
In simple terms, the objective function (F-r) is equal to the
total cost for supplying the indicated load. The problem is
to minimize F-r subject to the constraint that the sum of the
powers generated must equal demand. Note that in this static
form no transmission losses or any operating limits are
explicitly stated. Economic dispatch has generally been used
as a single electric utility control area method for
determining which generating units will be committed to meet
a given demand in the most economic fashion. It does not
take into account any electrical characteristics of the
power system.
2.5.2 Unit Commitment
Economic dispatch and unit commitment seem like very
similar topics. Wood and Wollenberg (1996) contrast the two
in the following manner.
The economic dispatch problem assumes that there 
is known demand and N  generating units already 
connected to the system and available for optimum 
operational dispatch. In contrast, unit 
commitment is more complex since it introduces 
more electrical and time factor constraints into 
the dispatch problem. Under unit commitment, the 
problem assumes to have known demand and N 
generating units available, but not necessarily
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operational or connected to the system at the 
present time. The increased number of constraints 
adds more reality into problem solutions.
Unit commitment literature has been a prominent
research topic for at least the last twenty-five years. The
literature has provided general solutions to determine the
schedule of generating units within a power system subject
to device and operating constraints. Most have difficult
solution methodologies.
Unit commitment literature is both wide in spectrum
and deep in computational analysis. Sheble and Fahd (1994)
formulate the generic unit commitment problem as follows.
Minimize


















In addition to the above constraints, the generators must 
satisfy system load and provide for system losses and 
spinning reserves.
There are many different solution methods for the unit 
commitment problem. Solution procedures to more complex 
models include :
(1) Integer and Mixed-Integer Programming,
(2) Branch-and-Bound Techniques,
(3) Linear Programming,
(4) Dynamic and Linear Programming,
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(5) Separable Programming,
(6) Network Flow Programming,
(7) Lagrangian Relaxation,
(8 ) Expert Systems/Artificial Neural Networks, and
(9) Risk Analysis.
More complex Unit Commitment models include inherent 
electrical system characteristics in the constraints.
Baldick (1995) states that because of introduced 
computational complexities from these constraints, ad hoc 
methods have historically been used to schedule generators. 
However, systematic techniques continue to be sought to 
solve the problems because optimal schedules can yield large 
cost savings compared to ad hoc schedules.
Sheble and Fahd (1994) state the primary reason for 
solving the unit commitment problem is to provide a cost 
basis for transaction pricing. They continue to point out 
that research for the future should concentrate on relating 
the unit schedule to the available transactions with the 
intent of selecting the least cost, yet reliable, option.
Unit commitment has also historically been a single 
electric utility control area method for determining which 
generating units will be allocated. It sparingly takes into 
account production costs or any electrical characteristics 
of the power system. Kahn, et al. (1996) point out that in 
most cases the algorithms used to commit generation assets 
do not take transmission network constraints into account or 
do so only in an incomplete fashion. Optimal power flow is 
the subject which allows for the formulation of transmission 
network constraints for power system analysis.
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2.5.3 Optimal Power Flow
The concept of optimal power flow comes from the 
combination of economic dispatch with the theory of electric 
power flow. The formulation of an optimal power flow problem 
results when economic dispatch is stated in terms of 
generation costs and the power dispatched from the 
generation units is subject to a set of equations needed to 
characterize the flow of power from dispatched generation 
units to demand loads.
Optimal power flow has had a long history of 
development and is a very flexible analytical tool. 
Applications of optimal power flow allows for the 
determination of an optimum generation pattern and solutions 
to other control variables in order to achieve minimum cost 
power production while meeting transmission system 
limitations. Current research in optimal power flow centers 
on the ability to solve for an optimal solution that takes 
into account system security.
Wood and Wollenberg (1996) discuss many different 
formulations of objective functions to optimal power flow 
problems. One formulation is to solve for the minimum power 
production cost and concurrently balance all system power 
flows. They also show that it is common to express an 
optimal power flow as a minimization of electrical losses on 
the transmission system. Another way is to express it as the 
minimum shift of generation and other controls from an 
optimal operating point. Still another way could be to allow
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for the adjustment of loads in order to determine a minimum 
load shedding schedule under emergency conditions.
An optimal power flow is a very large and very 
difficult mathematical programming problem. Wood and 
Wollenberg (1996) state that almost every mathematical 
programming approach that can be applied to this problem has 
been attempted and it has taken developers many decades to 
develop computer codes that will solve an optimal power flow 
model reliably. In their textbook they introduce five 
methods of solution to optimal power flow problems. They 
are :
(1) the Lambda Iteration Method,
(2) Gradient Methods,
(3) Newton's Method,
(4) the Linear Programming Method, and
(5) the Interior Point Method.
Wood and Wollenberg (1996) conclude their discussion of 
optimal power flow by stating that, regardless of the 
objective function, an optimal power flow solution must 
satisfy a complete set of power system constraints.
Kahn, et al. (1996) discuss using the Transportation 
algorithm as another method of solution to optimal power 
flov/ problems . They consider it to be a simple form of 
solution since it neglects electrical characteristics but 
does provide an approximate optimal solution.
2.5.4 Transportation Model for Optimal Power Flow
A transportation network model can be used to 
approximate optimal system power flows. With this modeling 
method, power flow on an electrical power line is assumed to
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be limited only by the characteristics of the line 
regardless of system demands of other power lines in the 
system. This is analogous to power being transported in 
trucks on a highway.
Stoll (1989) develops a two-area production model 
example utilizing the transportation model for 
interconnecting transmission network constraints. Adhering 
to conservation of power flow conditions, interconnecting 
transmission power inflow/outflow equations are derived as 
follows.
Load.\reu.\ = GeneratioiiArea.\ — Trcmsmissio/iA - s , (2.4)
and
LocidAr̂uB = GenerationAreaB + TransmissionA - s . (2.5)
For systems with multiple interconnections, equations 
similar to Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.5 apply, but in a 
more general form where transmission flows from all areas 
are included. The advantage of using the transportation 
model is the ease with which analysis can be performed. Its 
disadvantage is that electrical networks are not precisely 
modeled.
2.5.5 Multiarea Production Simulation
Electric utilities in the 48 contiguous United States 
are interconnected with other electric utilities. 
Interconnections introduce operating cost and reliability 
benefits to all interconnected parties. Sometimes 
neighboring utilities may be able to generate power at a 
lower cost than another given utility providing an incentive
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for a higher cost utility to purchase power outside of its 
control area. If the power can be purchased at less than the 
purchaser's generating cost and sold at a price higher than 
the seller's generating cost, then there are mutual 
incentives for both purchaser and seller to conduct business 
transactions.
Stoll (1989) introduces the subject of multiarea 
production simulation as a means for an electric utility to 
analyze opportunities for power purchases or sales. The 
procedure simulates the operation of each interconnected 
utility, calculates when economic interchanges may occur, 
and calculates the interchange purchase and sale prices.
With this method he extends the subject of economic 
dispatch. He introduces transmission interconnection 
limitations into the interchange of power between 
interconnected utilities and uses either;
(1) a linear electric transmission model, or
(2 ) a transportation model
to represent transmission system limitations. The 
limitations must be observed so that no power system 
constraint violations occur.
A transmission network interconnecting several 
electric utilities may comprise many transmission lines of 
several different voltage levels. Stoll (1989) shows that a 
theoretically correct procedure would be to model all 
interconnecting lines and internal lines of each utility and 
solve the multiarea production simulation using an AC 
(alternating current) power flow solution technique that
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recognizes thermal, voltage, and frequency stability 
constraints in conjunction with economic dispatch and unit 
commitment principles. However, he points out that an AC 
power flow technique is too computer-resource intensive to 
use with a simulation of 8760 hours/year. Therefore, the 
exact AC power flow equations are generally reduced in 
detail to a DC (direct current/linear) power flow model or 
reduced further to a transportation model.
2.6 Production Costs : Average vs. Marginal
Stoll (1989) discusses a fundamental principle in 
developing a priority list for the economic dispatch or unit 
commitment of generation facilities. He uses empirical 
analysis to show that the most economic operation tends to 
result when the fewest number of generating units are 
producing electric power. In his analysis, he demonstrates 
how a power system with many generating facilities could 
operate all of them to serve total demand. Since the sum of 
the power output from all of the facilities must equal the 
total load demanded, many of the generating facilities could 
be operating at low-power output, which results in an 
expensive operating cost. Alternatively, he states, a power 
system should commit only enough generating facilities to 
meet the load demanded. In this case, total average 
operating costs are lower. Therefore, minimum operating cost 
policy is to dispatch the minimum amount of capacity for 
service based on some economic priority.
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One might argue that an average cost approach to 
economic dispatch is not an optimal method for prioritizing 
facilities. An optimal method for ranking electric 
generation facilities would be by marginal costs. The 
argument is generally valid, but in the electric utility 
industry, it is possible for average costs and marginal 
costs to yield similar results.
The relationship between marginal and average costs is 
shown in the following equations.
T C= C { q ), (2.5)
AC = C[q) /  q , (2.7)
MC = dC(q) I dq , (2.8)
and noting that
dAC I dq = [q{dC{q) I dq) -  C( q) ] /  q '  , (2.9)
yields
MC = AC + (dAC / dq)q . (2.10)
From above, marginal cost is equal to average cost
plus an adjustment factor [ (cAC/cq) q] . This factor effect is
the "damage" (or "gain," in the case of falling marginal 
costs) to all factors caused by an increase in output, which 
causes the cost for each unit of output to increase (or 
decrease, for falling marginal costs) (Silberberg 1990).
The adjustment factor can be neglected if a relatively 
flat supply curve exists since the adjustment factor term 
[ (cAC/cq)q] will be small, preserving the rankings, or equal 
to zero, creating equivalent rankings. Therefore, by
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neglecting the adjustment factor of a relatively flat supply 
curve, an average cost method for prioritizing generation 
facilities for economic dispatch will yield results similar 
to a marginal cost method. Hence, average cost rankings can 
be a valid method of economic dispatch.
2.7 Review of Literature Summary
The chapter begins with an in-depth review of the 
Averch-Johnson hypothesis where arguments supporting and 
refuting it are presented. The chapter then proceeds to a 
review of existing stranded cost models. While each states 
its similarities to a "Bottom-Up" approach for estimating 
stranded costs, neither focuses on electric power production 
outside of any particular utility company. Each discusses 
lost revenues, which can loosely be interpreted as stranded 
profits. Whereas a true "Bottom-Up" approach does not 
strictly take into account lost revenues, it does allow for 
the estimation of stranded costs on an asset-by-asset basis. 
Next, an introduction to restructuring methods is reviewed.
A Bilateral Contract method and a Poolco method are 
discussed along with the possibility of having the best of 
both methods as a third option.
The chapter then discusses technical issues pertinent 
to the dissertation model. It reviews power engineering 
literature in support of finding a pure "Bottom-Up" approach 
to estimating stranded generation costs. The subjects of 
economic dispatch, unit commitment, optimal power flow, 
transportation modeling for optimal power flow, and
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multiarea production simulation are reviewed. Finally, the 
chapter moves forward to review power system production 
costs. The argument of average vs. marginal costs is 
presented. An optimal economic dispatch of generation 
facilities is obtained by evaluating each facility's 
marginal costs, but the literature suggests that there is a 
situation where average costs can be used as a good 
approximation to marginal cost rankings.
The model developed in the next chapter introduces a 
Poolco approach to multiple electric utility production with 
transmission system interconnections to estimate stranded 
generation facilities and their costs. It is a combination 
of economic dispatch, unit commitment, and optimal power 
flow literature when taken in context of multiarea 
production.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LaDEUX DISPATCH MODEL WITH PLANNED EXPERIMENTATION
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to formulate a model to 
assist policy makers with the estimation of stranded 
generation facilities. This approach develops a model which 
results in the optimal economic dispatch of generation 
facilities and efficient utilization of transmission 
interconnections between control areas within a power pool. 
Traditional economic dispatch and unit commitment research 
has assumed that sufficient transmission capacity is present 
to support wheeling transactions. This, in fact, may not be 
true when deregulation becomes a reality. Thus, economic 
dispatch and efficient power wheeling need to be considered 
simultaneously, not separately as has been done in previous 
research.
A model to determine economic dispatch and optimal 
power flow for wheeling power between control areas can be 
easily formulated and solved as a transportation model, a 
specialized form of a linear programming model. 
Unfortunately, such a model would not consider the effects 
of power losses due to transmission. The inclusion of power 
losses results in a nonlinear mathematical programming 
model. While nonlinear programming models are much more 
difficult to solve, the resulting model more accurately 
portrays system dynamics. Sections 3.3 through 3.7 develop
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such an. economic dispatch model. In order to illustrate its 
formulation and solution, a simple, hypothetical problem is 
introduced and discussed in Sections 3.8 and 3.9.
It is important to test the sensitivity of the 
solution to the model under a variety of typical industry 
conditions. For instance, designed experimentation can be 
used to determine how conditional factors such as seasonal 
peak demand, power imports, and transmission interconnection 
costs affect stranded generation facilities and their costs. 
Sections 3.10 and 3.11 describe such factors. Section 3.12 
outlines and explains the conditional factors used to test 
the sensitivity of the model to various changes in input 
parameters while Section 3.13 presents a solution 
methodology for determining the most likely economic 
dispatch of generation facilities and a means for 
estimating their stranded or uneconomic operating costs.
3.2 Aggregated Power System Literature Used for Modeling
The mathematical model developed in this chapter 
combines key elements of economic dispatch, unit commitment, 
optimal power flow, and multiarea production simulation 
literature by Stoll (1989), Sheblé and Fahd (1994), Baldick 
(1995), and Wood and Wollenberg (1995). A review of this 
literature can be found in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. The model 
developed here is robust in design and provides an 
approximate optimal solution to the system being modeled.
Economic dispatch models are typically limited to 
single company specific dispatch. The same is true for unit
60
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commitment models. Expanding the scope to include multiple 
company control areas for economic dispatch and/or unit 
commitment requires the identification and inclusion of 
transmission lines between control areas.
However, to effectively analyze power wheeling between 
control areas, it is not necessary to become overly 
concerned with power flows within a control area. Optimal 
power flow modeling can be modified to contain only 
transmission interconnections if assumptions are made to 
assure that power flows within any control area are 
unconstrained and satisfy operational limits. Because of the 
increased scope it would present, details of optimal power 
flow within a control area are not being considered for the 
model.
3.3 LeüDEUX: A Nonlinear Progrcunmlng Model
The Poolco method to electric utility restructuring 
was chosen over the Bilateral Contract method for 
development of a nonlinear programming model to estimate 
stranded generation facilities and their costs. Given the 
two alternatives, the choice was simple. The Bilateral 
Contract approach is known to produce suboptimal dispatching 
of generation facilities because power contracts of any 
significant time duration do not react to changes in the 
market. This hedge against power prices can prevent the 
market from clearing at the optimal minimum production cost. 
Wu and Varaiya (1995) show that the Bilateral Contracts 
method faces two fundamental problems. First, they indicate
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that a lack of coordination among independent trades can 
lead to the violation of transmission network constraints. 
Second, power flows are not taken into consideration by this 
method. Wu and Varaiya indicate that all power flows must be 
balanced throughout the network and that transmission losses 
must be included for maintaining a balance of power.
There is the option of having a power pool and 
allowing bilateral contracts to coexist. If this option were 
to occur, Stoft (1996) argues that for its success it would 
be necessary to clear the market for the power pool first 
and allow bilateral traders the option of trading with the 
least possible interference from the power pool.
Implementing Stoft's guidelines would satisfy the problems 
identified by Wu and Varaiya.
After considering all methods to restructure the 
electric utility industry, it seems that implementing the 
Poolco method is arguably the better choice. Even though it 
does not allow consumers to "shop around" for power prices 
and without proper control mechanisms it can provide the 
possibility for producers to develop market power, it is 
technically the better method.
Therefore, the remainder of this section introduces a 
methodology for formulating LaDEUX (Louisiana's Deregulated 
Electric Utility Exchange) , a nonlinear mathematical 
programming model for "Bottom-Up" analysis of an electric 
power system's generation facilities operating under the 
Poolco method for restructuring. The model's objective is
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production cost minimization, but several other important 
features capture the behavior of the system's generation and 
transmission functions. In particular, the model optimizes 
generation facility dispatch as well as determines which 
interconnecting power transactions are needed to meet the 
system's summer or winter peak demand.
LaDEUX employs basic supply and demand 
characteristics. It first determines the availability of 
generation facilities and transmission interconnection 
capacity. Next, it dispatches facilities to meet total 
system summer or winter peak demand. It then utilizes 
transmission interconnections to deliver economically 
generated power to meet the seasonal peak demand in control 
areas with economically inferior production capabilities.
The detailed objective functions and constraint equations 
can be found in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 of this chapter.
3.4 Modeling Notation
A notation index defining all subscripts, cost 
coefficients, decision variables, and system parameters is 
found in Table 3.1 below. It is used for the development of 
LaDEUX's objective functions and constraints.
3.5 Objective Functions
The objective functions developed for LaDEUX are 
piecewise, multi-term linear functions which minimize 
electric utility power production costs. They may also 
include bundled transmission interconnection costs for 
sensitivity analysis. Anderson (1972) makes use of a
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TABLE 3.1
NOTATION INDEX FOR LaDEUX
COST COEFFICIENTS DEFINITION
TC Transmission Interconnection Usage Cost
ACjx Average Variable Cost of Control Area 
j's Generation Facility x
ACCjx Average Variable Cost of Control Area 
j's Contracting Generation Facility x
ACI jx Average Variable Cost of Control Area 
J's Importing Generation Facility x
FCjx Fuel Cost of Control Area j's Generation 
Facility x
FCCXx Fuel Cost of Control Area j's Contracting Generation Facility x
FCIjx Fuel Cost of Control Area j's Importing Generation Facility x
DECISION VARIABLES DEFINITION
GFjx Control Area j's Production from 
Generation Facility x in MW
CGFjx Control Area j's Production from 
Contracting Generation Facility x in MV/
IGFjx Control Area j's Production from 
Importing Generation Facility x in MW
TLj:xy Transmission Interconnection Losses in 
MW for Line y from Control Area j to k
TPj:xy Transmission Interconnection Total Power 
in Ml"7 for Line y from Control Area j to 
k
TDjxy Transmission Interconnection Power 
Delivered in MIV for Line y from Control 
Area j to A:
SYSTEM PARAMETERS DEFINITION
GFCAPjx Capacity of Control Area j's Generation 
Facility x
CGFCAP.x Capacity of Control Area j's Contracting 
Generation Facility x
IGFCAPjx Capacity of Control Area j's Importing 
Generation Facility x
SPDj Summer Peak Demand with Spinning 
Reserves for Control Area j
WPDj Winter Peak Demand with Spinning 
Reserves for Control Area j
TCAPjky Transmission Interconnection Capacity 
for Line y from Control Area j to k
Vjlcy Transmission Interconnection Line-to- 
Line Voltage for Line y from Control 
Area j to k
Z jky Transmission Interconnection Impedance 
for Line y from Control Area j to k
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piecewise linear cost function for his models determining 
least-cost investments for electricity supply. Smith (1993) 
also utilizes a piecewise linear cost function for his real 
time pricing model. In addition, Vardi and Avi-Itzhak (1981) 
use a piecewise linear cost function for their quantitative 
methods in determining short- and long-term planning of 
installed electric energy generating capacities.
Economic theory argues that marginal production costs 
are accurate representations of incremental production 
costs. In industry, marginal production costs are considered 
proprietary information by electric utilities, and they are 
difficult to estimate without detailed production cost data. 
Average variable production costs, on the other hand, are 
not proprietary, but they generally overstate marginal 
production costs and are not usually accepted as true 
representations of production costs.
Marginal production costs are determined by summing 
components consisting of fuel costs and other operations 
costs along with maintenance costs (O&M) and the variable 
portion of administrative and general (A&G) costs. There is 
considerable debate within the academic community as to what 
portions of O&M and A&G are fixed and what portions are 
variable. This in turn makes the estimation of marginal 
production costs almost impossible. The approach chosen to 
handle this dilemma uses boundaries to estimate marginal 
production costs. For one boundary, fuel cost alone is used 
to approximate marginal production cost. Average variable
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production cost is used to approximate the other boundary. 
Therefore, any portion of OScM or A&G added to the fuel cost 
component in order to estimate a true marginal production 
cost is expected to be a fraction of average variable 
production costs. Hence, the true marginal cost of 
production is captured within the boundaries. Consequently, 
the model is developed with alternate objective functions: 
one to model one boundary and the other to model its 
opposing boundary for capturing true marginal production 
costs.
Several terms are needed to sum production costs for 
generation facilities selling electric power into the power 
pool. Each term is characterized by the type of facility 
dispatched to produce power for the pool. The types of 
facilities include local and contracted power plants 
internal to the pool as well as power imported to control 
areas from generation facilities external to it. Each type 
of facility accounts for one of the summation terms in each 
objective function found below.
3.5.1 Production Costs
The objective functions to minimize the average 
variable and fuel production costs during the peak hour of a 
year are found in Equations 3.lA and 3.IB respectively. 
Minimize
E E  AC,.* GF,. + E  S  ACC,. * CGF,. + /GF,. ,
V/';V.v. (3.1A)
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\̂ Iinimize
EZ fC. * GF,. + YZ fCC, * CGF,. + ZZ FC/„ * /GF,.,
/ I  / Ï / Ï
V j : \ / x  . (3. IB)
A transmission interconnection cost term can be added 
to the first two objective functions if bundled transmission 
and production costs are required for the model. Each sale 
of power outside a control area requires a power producer to 
use transmission interconnection capacity. When power is 
sold outside of a producer's control area, the producer 
incurs a usage fee to reimburse a transmission 
interconnection owner for capital outlays and other 
expenses. The addition of the usage fee into the objective 
functions above can be accomplished by extending the 
original summation terms to include transmission 
interconnection usage costs.
Some argue that the addition of transmission 
interconnection costs into the objective functions defeats 
the purpose of industry restructuring. It allows for the 
rebundling of costs, which is against deregulation 
practices. By rebundling generation and transmission 
interconnection costs, it is possible to set a limit on the 
distance a generation facility can sell its power. As 
transmission interconnection costs rise by either distance 
calculation methods or pancaked tariffs, a generation 
facility's total cost of service, consisting of generation 
and transmission interconnection costs, may become higher 
than the market clearing price of a control area targeted
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for sale. This situation makes economically produced power 
in one control area uneconomic for resale in another control 
area.
3.5.2 Bundled Production & Transmission Costs
The objective functions to minimize the average 
variable and fuel production costs with transmission 
interconnection costs during the peak hour of a year are 
found in Equations 3.2A and 3.2B respectively.
Minimize
X Z  * GF,. + ZZACC, .*  CGF,. + Z Z A C / , , *  fOF,. + Z  Z X * TP,,. ,
/ r ; [ / t J k \
Vy ̂  s{j) ̂  0:k e s(_/); V.r. Vy , ( 3 . 2A)
Minimize
Z Z  fC'  "= GF,. + Z Z  fGC,. * CGF,. + '^ ^ F C I , . *  IGF,. + Z Z Z * TP,k. ,
, . , . , . / t v
Vy 3 5(y) # 0:k € 5(y);V.\:;Vy , (3 . 2B)
where s(j) is the set of all adjacent, successor control 
areas to control area j.
Although production cost minimization is the objective 
for LaDEUX, production facilities that are not part of or 
are partially part of the optimal solution are important for 
determining stranded costs. Each generation facility not 
dispatched to serve demand becomes a stranded facility. The 
same is true for a partially dispatched facility—it becomes 
a partially stranded facility. The identification of 
stranded facilities and the power pool's market clearing 
price are the most important modeling contributions for 
determining stranded generation facility costs.
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3.6 Constraints
Generation facility capacities, control area seasonal 
peak demands, contract and import power supplies, 
transmission interconnection capacity, and loss 
characteristics all provide limitations for a power system. 
It is these limitations which are the basis for LaDEUX's 
constraints. Formulations and explanations of all system 
constraints are found in the following subsections.
3.6.1 Generation Facility Capacities
The sum of nameplate capacities for individual 
generation units within a facility imposes a maximum amount 
of power production for the facility. A control area may 
have several different types of generation facilities to 
supply power for the region. For instance, a control area 
may have generation facilities owned and operated by the 
local electric utility (GF_,x) , and it may have internal 
and/or external non-utility facilities contracted to meet 
the demand for the area (CGFjx) - In addition to both of 
these providers, power may also be imported into the control 
area (IGFjx) • Regardless of the type of generation present 
to meet demand, each facility has its own capacity 
limitation (GFCAPjx, CGFCAPjx and IGFCAPjx) • The mathematical 
formulation of capacity constraints for each type of 
generation facility is found in Equations 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
(1) Local Electric Utility Generation Capacity 
GFj. < GFCAPjx , Vy; V.r . (3.3)
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(2) Contracted Non-Utility Generation Capacity
CGF,. < CGFCAP,. , Vy; V,r . (3.4)
(3) Imported Generation Capacity
IGF,. < IGFCAP,. , Vy;V.r . (3.5)
3.6.2 Control Area Demand Balancing
Satisfying planned peak demand within a control area 
can be accomplished either through generation resources 
inside the area or from power flowing into the area through 
transmission interconnections. To balance, LaDEUX simply 
sums power produced within a control area (GFjx and CGFjx) 
with power flows into the area (TDj;<y) , removes any power 
leaving the area for resale in another control area (TP-̂ y) 
while satisfying peak demand with the remainder. A simple 
illustration of control area peak demand balancing can be 
found in Figure 3.1.
Peak demand for any control area is made up of two 
components. The first component is the actual load* which 
must be served. The second component concerns "spinning 
(generation) reserves" which are used to meet demand under 
emergency conditions.
In order to provide users with reliable service, 
utilities have adopted a tactic of running one or more extra 
generation units. The units are productive, but supply 
electric power at a very low rate of output. Such units are 
said to provide spinning reserves. Spinning reserve 
generators can increase power production within a few
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CONTROL AREA j
TPjicy ( - )
{ + ) TDj;<y








CONTROL AREA DEMAND BALANCING CONSTRAINT DIAGRAM
seconds, thereby avoiding a system failure when a producing 
generator fails. The continuous operation of spinning 
reserves is expensive, but has long been an essential 
element of reliable power supply in the U.S. and Canada 
(Stalon, 1997) . The economics of spinning reserves provide 
powerful incentives for all but the very largest utilities 
to interconnect in order to share such reserves. Two 
electric utilities that interconnect with a transmission 
line of sufficient capacity can use the same spinning 
reserves, thereby reducing imposed federal requirements to 
provide their own reserves.
Both components of peak demand are expected to exhibit 
seasonal effects. Summer peak (SPDj) and winter peak (WPDj) 
demand are expected to vary generation facility dispatching. 
As demand increases from winter to summer, more facilities 
will be dispatched to increase the supply of electric power. 
The increase in demand strands fewer facilities, but as
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demand decreases from summer to winter, fewer facilities are 
dispatched. Therefore, the supply of electric power is 
reduced. The decrease in demand from the seasonal effect 
strands more facilities.
The constraints formulated below incorporate seasonal 
demand effects for balancing control area demands. The 
mathematical formulation for seasonal control area demand 
balancing is found in Equations 3.6A and 3.6B.
(1) Summer Seasonal Effect on Control Area Demand 
Balancing
X GF,. +  X CGFj. +X X -  X X  = SPDj ,t r k \ k \
V/ 3 s{j) # 0:k e 5(y);V.v.V_v . ( 3 . 6A)
(2) Winter Seasonal Effect on Control Area Demand 
Balancing
X GFj, + X CGFn + X X - X X = WPDj ,t c k \ k \
vy 3 s{j) ̂  0:k 6 5(y);V.v;Vy . (3 . 5B)
3.6.3 Contract emd Import Facility Power Balancing
Quite often a power pool may have external power 
producers who wish to sell economically produced power to 
the pool through control areas with uneconomic production 
costs. These producers may be contracted by the power pool 
to do so, or they may simply be entrepreneurs who wish to 
sell excess power. Figure 3.1 illustrates how power can be 
wheeled from externally located contracting (CGFjx) or 
importing (IGFjx) generation facilities to economically 
inferior control areas.
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These power producers are dependent upon the capacity 
of connecting transmission lines (TPĵ y) for wheeling power 
to the pool. It is therefore necessary for LaDEUX to assure
that any amount of contracted and/or imported power sold
into the pool does not exceed the capacity of the
transmission lines connecting it with the external
generation sources.
The mathematical formulation for control area contract 
and import power balancing is found in Equation 3.7.
Z  CGF,. + %  IGF,. - X  E  TP,k. = 0 ,c t tv
vy 3 j) # 0:t e jt( j)\Vx:Vy . (3.7)
3.6.4 Transmission Interconnection Capacity
Sufficient transmission interconnection capacity is 
vital for wheeling power between control areas within the 
power pool. Similar to generation facility production 
limitations, transmission interconnections between control 
areas have limitations too. A constraint is needed to assure 
that power wheeled between control areas (TP.-̂ y) does not 
exceed the capacity of the transmission lines (TCAPjky) 
interconnecting the areas. More simply put, the total power 
transferred across an interconnection cannot be more than 
the total capacity of the interconnection. For modeling 
purposes it is therefore assumed that power flow on an 
interconnecting transmission line is limited only by the 
characteristics of the line regardless of the loadings of 
other interconnecting lines in the power system. Stoll
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(1989) makes the same assumption for his transportation 
optimal power flow model.
The mathematical formulation for transmission 
interconnection capacity is found in Equation 3.8.
TP,k. < TCAP,k. ,
Vj 3 sij) # <Z:k e 5(7);Vy . (3.8)
3.6.5 Transmission Interconnection Losses
Electrical losses are mathematically represented as a 
quadratic function. Thus, nonlinearities are imposed on the 
model when representing transmission interconnection losses 
for constraint purposes. These nonlinearities results in a 
model that is much more complex and difficult to solve. 
Linear programming solution methods such as the Simplex 
Method or the Transportation Algorithm cannot properly 
handle constraints with nonlinear functions and another 
means for solution must be used.
Formulating a generalized transmission interconnection 
loss constraint requires some basic power engineering 
knowledge. However, the derivation is relatively straight 
forward and is presented in subsequent paragraphs.
To begin, total power (TP) on a transmission line can 
be separated into two components (see Figure 3.2):
(1) power that is delivered (TD) to a customer, and
(2) power that is lost (TL) during transmission.
TP = TD + T L . (3.9A)
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TRANSMISSION INTERCONNECTION POV/ER BALANCE DIAGRAM
In order to mathematically model a transmission line 
loss component, one must consider several different 
mathematical representations of transmission lines. Each 
representation is dependent upon line length. The 
electrically shore line representation is for lines 
generally less than 5 0 miles in length. The medium line 
representation is for lines roughly 50 to 150 miles in 
length and the long line representation is considered for 
lines of more than 150 miles. Stevenson (1982) states that 
if an overhead transmission line is classified as 
electrically short, the mathematical representation of the 
shunt capacitance characteristic is so small that it can be 
omitted entirely with little loss of modeling accuracy, and 
one need only consider the series resistance (R) and series 
inductance (L) when obtaining an impedance parameter (Z) for 
the line. Ellgerd (1982) refers to transmission lines below 
approximately 100 miles in length as electrically short.
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since almost all transmission interconnections are 
less than 100 miles in length, electrically short line 
assumptions are used to derive the transmission 
interconnection loss constraint. Therefore, the impedance 
parameter (Z) of an electrically short transmission 
interconnection can be formulated as
Z = ̂JR- + Lr , (3 . 9B)
and, subsequently, a mathematical representation of (three- 
phase) transmission interconnection losses can be formulated 
as
TL = 3*r-*Z. (3.90
Next, the power delivered (TD) and loss (TL) variables 
can be rewritten in the following form
TP = {y/3*Vi - I *  f) + {3* r- *Z) , (3.90)
where,
V'.-i = transmission interconnection line-to-line
voltage, and 
I = line current of the transmission 
interconnection.
To determine interconnection line current (I), the power
delivery portion of the total power equation,
TD = y[3*Vi - I* I  , (3.9E)
rearranges into
I  = TDIî /3*Vi-i) . (3.9F)
By substituting the value of the line current (I) into the 
loss portion of the total power equation, this yields:
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TL = 3*{TD/i^f3*V,-,)y*Z, (3.9G)
which reduces to
TL = {TD-/V,-r)*Z , (3.9H)
and finally assumes the mathematical constraint form found 
in Equation 3.10.
TL,k. = [((TD,iv)- * Z,;.) / (%iv)-] , Vy 3 s{j) # 0:k e s(y);Vy . (3.10)
3.6.6 Power Delivery and Loss Balance
As illustrated in the derivation for the loss 
constraint, the total power transferred across a 
transmission interconnection can be divided into two 
components. The total power on any interconnection is 
composed of power that is actually delivered to another 
control area and power that is lost across the 
interconnection (as a result of resistance heating, etc.) 
when completing a transaction. Figure 3.2 illustrates how 
electric power on transmission interconnections can be 
broken into its three component parts.
This constraint assures that the power on a 
transmission interconnection (TPĵ y) is equal to the power 
delivered to a control area (TDjky) and the power lost (TLj;<y) 
while completing the transaction. The mathematical 
formulation for the transmission interconnection delivery 
and loss balance constraint is found in Equation 3.11.
TDjkv + TL,kx = TPjk̂ , Vy 3 s{j) ̂ 0;k e 5(y); Vy . (3.11)
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3.7 Modeling Assumptions
Several modeling assumptions for determining optimal 
electric power flow on the transmission interconnections 
must be mentioned. Some assumptions are technical in nature 
and others are economic. A list of all modeling assumptions 
follows.
Assumption #1 ;
It is assumed that each control area has sufficient 
internal transmission capacity in order to satisfy 
demand within itself. The only transmission 
constraints considered in the model are for 
interconnections alone.
Assumption #2 :
One-hour coincident summer or winter peak demands are 
assumed for all control areas. In addition, any 
changes in the quantity of electricity demanded, 
resulting from modeled price changes, are based on a 
system weighted average elasticity between 
residential, commercial, and industrial consumers. 
Assumption #3 :
All constraints with respect to electric power 
generation operating limits are assumed to be 
satisfied. In other words, thermal, voltage, and 
frequency stability limits are all assumed to be met 
for continuous operation of the electric power system.
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Assumpcion #4:
Reactive power constraints are assumed to be satisfied 
by the local electric utility or its consumers. Recent 
research notes that there is a wide range of reactive 
power compensation equipment on the market, from low 
cost fixed capacitors to more expensive static VAr 
compensators (Kahn and Baldick, 1994). These devices 
are relatively inexpensive, and it is assumed that 
either consumers or competitive power providers will 
purchase the compensators in order to avoid power 
factor penalties from local transmitting electric 
utilities.
Assumption #5:
Qualifying Facilities (QFs) are assumed to be economic 
(Dismukes and Kliet, 1997). In other words, the 
avoided cost of generation revenue which QFs have 
received in the past is assumed to cover their 
production costs or QFs would not be selling power to 
their local electric utility.
Assumption ^6:
It is assumed that all power sold into a power pool by 
a QF represents full QF capacity. A QF will not be 
able to use the power it needs and then sell its 
excess capacity into the power pool.
Assumption #7;
It is assumed that generation (supply-side) 
efficiencies do not accrue within the system as a
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result of increased competition. In other words, the 
value of the entire generation system is equivalent to 
the sum of the component generation facilities. 
Assumpcion #8:
It is assumed that no transmission synergies or losses 
accrue as a result of economic dispatch or 
coordination from the power pool. In other words, the 
value of the entire transmission system is equivalent 
to the sum of all component transmission lines.
Assumpcion #9;
The model assumes no market power which could 
influence the economic dispatch or bidding of 
generation facilities.
3.8 A Simple Example Formulation
In order to motivate development of LaDEUX, a small, 
simplified electric power system is introduced. The system 
is designed to economically dispatch generation facilities 
and wheel electric power between control areas when 
necessary.
The small electric power system consists of three 
control areas, seven generation facilities, and three 
interconnecting transmission lines. It is depicted in 
Figure 3.3. Its characteristics and system parameters are 
detailed in Table 3.2. It operates as a Poolco, and no 
reserve margins are required. Assume the system has a 
coincident one-hour peak demand for all three control 
areas.
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Demand = SPD2 








SIMPLE EXAMPLE POWER SYSTEM
TABLE 3.2
SIMPLE EXAMPLE POWER SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
CONTROL AREA #1 CONTROL AREA #2 CONTROL AREA #3
Peak Demand 
SPDi = 200 MVJ
Peak Demand 
SPD2 = 12 5 MW
Peak Demand 
SPD] = 100 MW
Capacity
GFii = 100 MIV
GF12 = 150 I-IW 
G F = 50 MW
Capacity
GF21 = 10 0 MÎV 
GF22 = 50 MLV
Capacity
GF31 = 7 5 MV7 
GF32 = 5 0 MW
Power Pool Bid 
GFii = $4/MWh 
GF12 = $5/MlVh 
GFi3 = $6/MWh
Power Pool Bid 
GF21 = $8 /MWh 
GF22 = $9/MWh
Power Pool Bid 
GF31 = $15/MWh 
GF32 = $16/MWh
LINE #1 LINE #2 LINE #3
Capacity = 100 MW 
between Control 
Areas #1 and #2
Capacity = 100 MW 
between Control 
Areas #1 and #3
Capacity = 100 MW 
between Control 
Areas #2 and #3
Cost = $l/MWh Cost = $l/MWh Cost = Sl/MWh
Voltage = 115 kV Voltage = 115 kV Voltage = 115 kV
Impedance = 10 Q Impedance = 10 Q Impedance = 10 Q
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It is a simple, straightforward procedure to formulate 
a nonlinear programming model for the problem in order to 
determine the economic dispatch of generation facilities 
and power transfers between control areas. Assume an 
objective function that minimizes production costs and 
transmission interconnection costs. The constraints 
necessary for model formulation include generator 
capacities, control area demand balancing, transmission 
interconnection capacity, transmission interconnection 
losses, and transmission interconnection delivery and loss 
balancing. An economic dispatch model for the simple 
example is found below.
NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING EXAMPLE MODEL
Minimize
+ t p ,l. ,
Subject To
{1 ) GFi. < GFCAP,. , VylV.v
( 3 ) TP,k. < TCAPik. ,
( 4 ) TL/k\ = [{(TDjky)' * Z/k\ ) / (Vytv)"] ,
{5 ) TDik\ + TL/kx = TPiks ,
Vj 3 s(j) # 0;k e j(y);V.v:Vv , 
Vy 3 s(j) ̂ 0\k sijyyy , 
Vy 3 J(y) ̂ 0 '^ k  e ̂ (y);Vv , 
V/ 3 s{j) ̂  0\k E sijyyy .
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
EXAMPLE MODEL FORMULATION
Minimize
4 * G F , , + 5 * G F : 2 + 6 * G F  23 + 8 * G F 2 i+ 9 * G F 2 2 + 15*GF3i + 1 6 * G F 3  2 + 1 * T P 2 2 14- 1 * T P 2 i i + 1 * T P i 32 + 1 * T P 3 1 2  + 1 * T P 2 3 3+ 1 * T P 3 2 3 ( 3 . 1 2 )
Subject To
( 1 ) Generator Capacities
G F i i < 1 0 0 ( 3 . 1 3 )
G F :2 < 1 5 0 (3 . 14)
G F 13 < 5 0 ( 3 . 1 5 )
G F 21 <  1 0 0 ( 3 . 16)
G F 22 <  5 0 ( 3 . 1 7 )
G F 31 < 75 ( 3 . 18)
GF32 < 5 0 ( 3 . 19)
(2) Control Area Demand Balancing
GFi: + GFi2 + GFi3 + TDjn + TD312 - TPi.i - TP132 = 200 (3.20)
G F 21 + G F 22 + T D 121 + T D 323 -  T P 211 -  T P 233 = 125 (3.21)
G F 31 + G F 32 + TDi32 + T D 233 " T P 312 - T P 323 = 100 (3.22)
(3) Transmission Interconnection Capacity
TP221 < 100 (3.23)
TP21: < 100 (3.24)
TPi32 < 100 (3.25)
TP312 < 100 (3.26)
TP233 < 100 (3.27)
TP323 < 100 (3.28)
(4) Transmission Interconnection Losses
TL121 = ( (TDi2i)^*10) / (115)- (3.29)
TL211 = ( (TD2ii)-*10) / (115) - (3.30)
TLi32 = ( (TDi32)̂ *10) / (115) - (3.31)
TL322 = ( (TD312)-*10) / (115)- (3.32)
TL233 = ( (TD233 )^*10) / (115)- (3.33)
TL323 = ( (TD323 )“*10) / (115)2 (3.34)
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(5) Transmission Interconnection Delivery and Loss 
Balance
TDi2i + TL12I = TPi2I (3.35)
TDiii + TL211 = TP211 (3.36)
TDi32 + T1>132 = TP%32 (3.37)
TD312 + TL312 = TP312 (3.38)
TD233 + TL233 = TP233 (3.39)
TD323 + TL323 = TP323 (3.40)
3.9 Solution to the Simple Example Formulation
Solution to the example problem introduced in the 
previous section is easily obtained using software 
developed to solve nonlinear mathematical programming 
problems. Table 3.3 displays the simple problem's solution.
The solution indicates how economic dispatch was 
performed based on production cost bids by the generation 
facilities into the power pool. Notice that Control Area 
#l's generation facilities are the most economic at $4, $5
and $5 per MWh and get dispatched into the system first. 
They provide 3 00 MW of the 431.2 needed to meet the 
system's one-hour peak demand and transmission 
interconnection losses. Again, notice that Control Area 
#2 's generation facilities are the next most economic at $8 
and $9 per MWh. These generation facilities provide the 
final 131.2 MW needed to meet the one-hour peak demand and 
transmission interconnection losses of the system.
Results from the nonlinear programming model also 
indicate how power transfers take place within the simple 
system. Line #2 transfers 89.7 MW from Control Area #1 to 
Control Area #3 while losing 6.1 MW across the
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TABLE 3.3
NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING SOLUTION 
FOR THE SIMPLE EXAMPLE POWER SYSTEM
CONTROL AREA #1 CONTROL AREA #2 CONTROL AREA #3
GFii = 100.0













LINE #1 LINE #2 LINE #3
TD:21 = 4.2 MV7 TDi32 = 89.7 MW TD233 = 10.3 Mti'J
TLi2 1 — 0.0 MW TL332 = 6.1 MW TL233 = 0.1 MW
TD011 = 0.0 MIV TDii? = 0.0 MW TD323 = 0.0 MW
TL211 = 0.0 MW TL312 = 0.0 MV/ TL323 = 0.0 MW
interconnection. Line #1 transfers 4.2 MW from Control Area 
#1 to Control Area #2 while accruing negligible losses 
across the interconnection. Finally, Line #3 transfers the 
remaining 10.3 MW from Control Area #2 to Control Area #3 
while losing 0.1 MW across the interconnection.
Since there is sufficient transmission interconnection 
capacity to satisfy individual control area demands, the 
major finding of this simple example is the stranded 
generation facilities of Control Area #3. The market 
clearing price for electricity for this example is $9 per 
MWh^. Control Area #3's generation bids were well above 
this price, so its facilities were not dispatched into the 
system. If Control Area #3's facilities are investor-owned, 
the cost of each facility must be determined for stranded 
cost recovery.
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3.10 Model Analysis
The purpose of the chapter so far has been formulation 
of a modeling methodology to characterize economic power 
production and wheeling transactions using estimated 
marginal production costs, generation facility and 
transmission system parameters, and seasonal peak demand. 
This methodology determines a power system's minimum 
production cost and market clearing price and identifies 
stranded generation facilities. One must keep in mind that 
formulation of any model is just a method of simplifying and 
describing a real problem through the use of mathematics. No 
matter how significant the simplification is, the model must 
be evaluated before its results can be accepted.
The purpose of the remainder of the chapter is to 
evaluate model results through designed experimentation and 
supply a solution methodology for estimating stranded 
generation facility costs. Through experimental evaluation, 
purposeful changes are made to LaDEUX's input variables so 
that one can observe and identify reasons for changes in its 
stranded generation facility output response. Empirical 
experimentation of the economic dispatch methodology is 
expected to provide more detailed solutions for answering 
important stranded cost questions. The underlying motivation 
of the sensitivity analysis is to precisely determine 
stranded and uneconomically dispatched generation facilities 
and furnish cost guidelines to regulatory bodies for policy
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decisions. Details concerning the factors important for 
empirical experimentation follow.
3.11 Factors for Model Analysis
The primary decision for the LaDEUX economic dispatch 
model is total generation facility production costs, which 
are a function of its corresponding production cost 
coefficients. But, economically dispatched, uneconomically 
dispatched, and non-dispatched facilities are greatly 
dependent upon seasonal peak demand and the amount of power 
imported to the system as well. A third factor, the 
transmission interconnection usage cost associated with 
wheeling electric power, can further constrain the results 
of the other two factors. Each of the factors for empirical 
experimentation is described below.
3.11.1 Seasonal Peak Demand Factor
The objective of using seasonal peak demand factors 
allows one to determine the amount of production needed to 
meet peak demand during the summer or winter seasons, and 
thus, creates two factor levels for sensitivity analysis. 
Peak demand is defined as the highest electric requirement 
including losses experienced by a bulk electric system in a 
given period (e.g., a day, month, season, or year). It is 
equal to the sum of the metered (net) power outputs of all 
generators within a system and the metered line flows into 
the system, less the metered line flows out of the system 
often expressed in MW (lEEE-PES, 1996). For southern states, 
the production required during the winter season is
87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
considerably less than the amount required during summer 
months. The reverse is true for northern states. Thus, 
depending upon geography, there is a base production 
requirement (must-run facilities) for one season and hence, 
a base number of non-dispatched generation facilities. As 
the seasons change, peak demand rises from base production 
to fulfill the new, higher peak demand and other less 
economically productive and previously stranded generation 
facilities must be dispatched to meet the new demand. 
Therefore, depending upon seasonal peak demand, the number 
of stranded generation facilities and their costs can vary.
3.11.2 Power Imports Factor
The objective of using a power import factor allows 
one to determine the amount of power pool production needed 
to meet seasonal peak demand. If imports are not allowed 
into the power pool, the number of stranded generation 
facilities will actually depend upon the pool's seasonal 
peak demand. But, if power imports are allowed into the 
power pool, the actual number of stranded generation 
facilities may increase depending upon the pool's market 
clearing price.
For sensitivity analysis, power imports are set at two 
levels. For the first level, consider the situation of 
operating the power pool as a closed system, effectively 
allowing no power imports into the pool. In a closed system, 
the number of stranded generation facilities depends only on 
production costs and seasonal demand. For the second level.
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consider the situation where the market clearing price 
dictates the amount of power desired from sources outside 
the pool. This is considered to be an open system. The 
amount is constrained only by the capacity of the 
transmission interconnections available to import the power. 
Thus, if external producers have excess production capacity 
and their production costs are less than a closed system's 
market clearing price, then the pool will accept as much 
power as transmission interconnections will allow. This 
situation effectively lowers the pool's market clearing 
price. For an open system, the number of stranded generation 
facilities depends on production costs, seasonal demand, and 
the amount of imported power. Imported power can greatly 
affect the number of stranded generation facilities; 
therefore, depending upon the level of power imports, the 
number of stranded generation facilities can vary immensely.
3.11.3 Transiaission Interconnection Costs
Transmission interconnection costs were addressed 
earlier in Section 3.5. When implemented by LaDEUX, these 
costs are part of the model's objective function.
Using bundled transmission interconnection costs 
allows one to determine the amount of production needed to 
meet demand while considering the costs required for 
wheeling power between control areas. These costs can 
restrict power flows in a deregulated market. For instance, 
if transmission interconnection tariffs are incurred every 
time power is passed through a control area, there comes a
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point where competition for a generation facility will cease 
to occur because of the pancaked transmission 
interconnection tariffs required to wheel power from the 
facility to the user. In this case it would be possible to 
draw a circle around any given generation facility to 
identify its market. Any transactions conducted outside the 
circle would be considered uncompetitive because of 
excessive tariffs.
For sensitivity analysis purposes, bundled and 
unbundled transmission interconnection costs will be 
studied. For the first level of sensitivity analysis, the 
power pool will be configured as a completely unbundled, 
functionally independent system where economic dispatching 
is based solely on production costs. For the second level of 
sensitivity analysis, transmission interconnection costs are 
added to LaDEUX to test the affect of pancaked tariffs on 
economic dispatching.
The postage stamp method is the pricing mechanism of 
choice for this research. It is a pricing method that is 
independent of distance and direction. The same charge is 
applied whether transmission distance is long or short. 
Therefore, depending upon bundled or unbundled transmission 
interconnection costs, the number of stranded generation 
facilities and their costs are expected to vary.
3 .12 Designed Experiments
Much of the research in engineering, science, and 
industry is empirical and makes extensive use of designed
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experimentation (Montgomery, 1991). Figure 3.4 illustrates 
the sixteen experiments developed for empirical analysis 
using the three factors discussed in Section 3.11.
Production cost boundaries of average variable and fuel 
costs meant to capture true marginal production costs are 
designed to test the response of the LaDEUX model. Specific 
pairs of like experiments form the different ranges for 
capturing stranded generation facility costs from the 
boundary estimates of true marginal production costs.
3.13 LaDEUX Experimental Solution Methodology
Nonlinear mathematical programming, implemented 
through LINGO Hyper/PC Release 3.1 for Windows, is used for 
processing solutions to determine minimal production costs, 
dispatched and non-dispatched generation facilities, 
transmission interconnection loadings and losses, and the 
pool's market clearing price. The nonlinear solver software 
package employs both Successive Linear Programming (SLP) and 
Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG) algorithms.
Models with nonlinear expressions are much more 
difficult to solve and may have several solutions which are 
said to be only locally optimal. LINGO does employ both of 
its solvers (SLP and GRG) together in an attempt to 
determine a global optimal solution, but there is no 
guarantee of obtaining such a solution. It is therefore 
necessary to assist the solvers by providing several initial 
generation facility production variable values. These values 
affect the "path" LINGO takes when searching for a solution.
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ECONOMIC DISPATCH SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
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For this research, several control areas will have their 
generation facility production variables initialized 
together to full capacity to meet Louisiana's seasonal 
demand. This provides an initial solution to the model and 
one "path" for determining an optimal solution. Several 
other "paths" will be created by grouping different control 
areas together and initializing their generation facility 
production variables to full capacity to meet the same 
seasonal peak demand.
The model's optimal solution identifies economic and 
uneconomic electric power production facilities and 
indicates the movement of electric power between control 
areas. Generation facilities not dispatched or 
uneconomically dispatched by LaDEUX in order to meet system 
demand are considered stranded and may be eligible for cost 
recovery.
LaDEUX's solution methodology is a two-step process. 
Each step contains multiple empirical experiments designed 
to capture true marginal production cost dispatch. 
Experimental solutions are obtained in the following manner. 
Step One:
(A) Average variable production costs are processed by 
the model for each experimental case. Empirical 
experiments to be performed for Step One are found in 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
(B) A market clearing price for electric power 
production is determined.
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(C) Non-dispatched investor-owned utility facilities 
are identified and the Net Book. Value (original 
construction cost, plus capital additions, less 
depreciation) of each is determined to be its stranded 
cost.
(D) The Net Book Value for all remaining dispatched 
investor-owned utility facilities is then compared to 
revenues earned (market clearing price * quantity 
sold). A positive difference indicates a stranded 
benefit whereas a negative difference indicates a 
stranded cost. The total of each facility's stranded 
cost contribution becomes one boundary estimate for 
gross stranded generation facility costs.
TABLE 3.4
AVERAGE VARIABLE PRODUCTION COST EXPERIMENTS
POWER SYSTEM PEAK DEMANDS
SUMMER WINTER 1
WITH IMPORTS Experiment #I Experiment #2
WITHOUT IMPORTS Experiment #3 Experiment #4 1
TABLE 3.5
AVERAGE VARIABLE PRODUCTION 
AND TRANSMISSION COST EXPERIMENTS
POWER SYSTEM PEAK DEMANDS
SUMMER WINTER
WITH IMPORTS Experiment #5 Experiment #6
WITHOUT IMPORTS Experiment #7 Experiment #8
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The procedure is performed again to determine the 
opposing boundary for capturing true marginal production 
costs.
Step Two :
(A) Fuel production costs are processed by the model 
for each experimental case. Empirical experiments to 
be performed for Step Two are found in Tables 3.5 and 
3.7.
(B) A market clearing price for electric power 
production is determined.
(C) Non-dispatched investor-owned utility facilities 
are identified and the Net Book Value (original 
construction cost, plus capital additions, less 
depreciation) of each is determined to be its stranded 
cost.
(D) The Net Book Value for all remaining dispatched 
investor-owned utility facilities is then compared to 
revenues earned (market clearing price * quantity 
sold). A positive difference indicates a stranded 
benefit whereas a negative difference indicates a 
stranded cost. The total of each facility's stranded 
cost contribution becomes one boundary estimate for 
gross stranded generation facility costs.
Solutions obtained using the two different production costs 
provide boundary estimates for stranded generation facility 
costs. Since true marginal costs should be between average 
variable and fuel production costs, the boundary estimates
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TABLE 3.6
FU E L CO ST E X P E R IM E N T S
POWER SYSTEM PEAK DEMANDS
SUMMER WINTER
WITH IMPORTS Experiment # 9 Experiment #10




PO!̂ /ER SYSTEM PEAK DEMANDS
SUMMER WINTER
WITH IMPORTS Experiment #13 Experiment #14
WITHOUT IMPORTS Experiment #15 Experiment #16
found from this "Bottom-Up" procedure represent the best 
estimates, from available data, for determining stranded 
generation facility costs.
3.14 Modeling cind Experimentation Summary
This chapter formulated a nonlinear programming 
methodology for determining minimal production costs for a 
power pool as well as allowing for the assessment of its 
stranded generation facilities. Once the facilities are 
known, financial procedures can be employed to estimate 
stranded generation facility costs. These procedures are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
The chapter began by aggregating power system modeling 
literature in the context of network modeling. It then 
introduced an economic dispatch approach for model 
development. A notation index was provided to explain all
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cost coefficients, decision variables, and system 
parameters used for developing an economic dispatch model. 
The chapter then proceeded to introduce a nonlinear 
programming modeling methodology called LaDEUX. Objective 
functions were set-up as piecewise linear cost functions 
which minimize the cost of electric power production during 
the peak hour of a season. If necessary, the objective 
functions could be modified to include transmission 
interconnection costs. The development of generation 
facility and transmission interconnection capacity, control 
area peak demand, transmission interconnection losses, and 
power balance constraints followed the objective function 
formulations. Nine assumptions were then presented to 
simplify technical and economic modeling issues.
The chapter then introduced a simple example problem 
which illustrated the significance of the Poolco approach 
to restructuring the electric utility industry. The simple 
example problem was then solved so one could obtain an 
understanding of economic dispatch, market clearing prices, 
and power transactions between control areas.
Designed experimentation was introduced next to test 
the sensitivity of the LaDEUX solution. Variations of 
seasonal peak demand, power import factors, and 
transmission interconnection costs were used to test total 
one-hour, coincident peak production cost and generation 
facility dispatch responses to the model. A generalized
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two-step solution strategy was then presented for solving 
LaDEUX.
The model developed in this chapter is deterministic 
in design yet robust in the sense that it can handle any 
number of new generation facilities or transmission 
interconnections introduced into the system for analysis.
The ability to do sensitivity analysis makes this research a 
significant contribution to electric utility industry 
restructuring literature.
3.15 End Notes
‘ The term "actual load" includes losses that occur during 
the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric 
power inside a control area.
■ This is the bid price of the last generation unit 
dispatched and, hence, is the market clearing price.
98
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4
STRANDED GENERATION FACILITY COST ANALYSIS METHODS
4.1 Introduction
The LaDEUX model provides Che user wich an assessment 
of economically dispatched generation facilities needed to 
meet a power pool's peak demand. The information obtained 
from the assessment can further be used to estimate stranded 
generation facility costs, specifically, investor-owned 
utility stranded generation facility costs.
Two approaches for estimating these costs are 
presented in this chapter. The first is the Cost-of-Plant or 
book value method. For this method, each facility is 
evaluated solely on the criterion of economic dispatch. Book 
values are applied to stranded and partially stranded 
facilities in order to obtain stranded generation facility 
costs.
The other approach of estimating stranded generation 
facility costs is the Embedded Cost method. This method 
takes into consideration generation facilities that are 
dispatched, but are uneconomically operating in the market 
because of large sunk costs. For this method, an investor- 
owned utility's embedded rate is compared to the pool's 
market clearing price. Stranded costs accrue for a facility 
when its embedded rate is above the market clearing price 
for electricity, and stranded benefits accrue for a facility 
when its embedded rate is less than the market clearing
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price. This method is actually an extension of the Cost-of- 
Plant method.
The chapter concludes with examples of each approach. 
The simple system introduced in Chapter 3 is reintroduced 
with more detailed cost parameters to demonstrate the 
methods.
4.2 Cost-of-Plant Method
For the Cost-of-Plant method, each facility is 
evaluated solely by an economic dispatch criterion that 
determines which generation facilities are necessary to meet 
a power pool's peak demand. The term "stranded generation 
facility" is interpreted in its strictest form.
Stranded costs are then determined in a very simple 
fashion. All facilities not dispatched are considered 
"stranded," and their book values are summed to indicate the 
pool's stranded generation facility costs. In the case of a 
fully dispatched generation facility, no book value costs 
are applied. Partially stranded facilities have costs 
allocated on a percentage basis based on the proportion of 
capacity not dispatched for peak demand to the facility's 
full load capacity. The Cost-of-Plant method is described 
mathematically by Equation 4.1.
Total Stranded Cost = * NDi * D m ) , Vn, (4.1)
1 =  I
where,
BV; = Book Value of Generation Facility i,
NDi = Proportion of Full Load Capacity for Generation 
Facility i Not Economically Dispatched., and
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Divi = Diversification Factor for investor-owned
utilities that have Interstate Control Areas.
The diversification factor is necessary since most 
investor-owned utility systems cross state boundaries. This 
factor allows one to allocate stranded generation facility 
costs by state based on the power pool's peak demand. A 
mathematical representation of the diversification factor is 
found in Equation 4.2.
Div, = State's Annual Peak Load 4- System, Annual Peak Load . (4.2)
It is applicable to all generation facilities which provide 
electricity to customers of multistate companies.
The sunk costs associated with dispatched facilities 
are not considered stranded costs since the facilities are 
not strictly "stranded." These costs are considered to be 
costs for doing business since they are part of an original 
business strategy developed by an investor-owned utility 
company. Even though a regulatory body approves strategic 
capital expenditures, the original idea and subsequent 
expenditure justification reside with the investor-owned 
utility company, and hence, they are their costs to manage.
While this method is one approach for estimating 
stranded generation facility costs, it is not a true 
economic approach since it does not take into consideration 
generation facility sunk costs for operating facilities. It 
is a method that stringently estimates "stranded" generation 
facility costs. The next cost analysis method conforms to
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the popular idea of including sunk costs as a component for 
determining stranded generation facility costs.
4.3 Embedded Cost Method
While some argue that stranded costs associated with 
book values of facilities that are strictly stranded are all 
that matter, others argue that facilities which are 
dispatched and operating above a market clearing price incur 
stranded costs too. Therefore, it is the intention of the 
Embedded Cost method to capture these excess costs. The flow 
chart of Figure 4.1 provides an illustrative explanation of 
how the Embedded Cost method is performed.
Fundamentally, this method is a comparison between a 
generation facility's embedded rate to a power pool's market 
clearing price. Stranded costs occur when a facility's 
embedded rate is above the market clearing price for 
electricity, and stranded benefits occur when the embedded 
rate is less than the market clearing price.
A facility's embedded rate is made up of several 
components. A general representation of the rate follows. 
Embedded Rate = Expenses + (Return - on - Capital) + Depreciation . (4.3)
Each component is described in detail in the following 
subsections.
4.3.1 Expenses Component
The first component of a generation facility's 
embedded rate is made up of variable expenses. It is simply 
the sum of fuel and operation & maintenance expenses and
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FLOW CHART FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBEDDED COST METHOD
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can be mathemacically represented on a per KWh basis in the 
following manner.
Expenses = ( Fuel Cost + Oper. & Maint. Cost ) 4- Total KWh Sold . (4.4)
This component can also be thought of as an average 
variable cost or average production expenses.
4.3.2 Retum-on-Capital Component
The rate-of-return on capital is the most 
controversial component for estimating a generation 
facility's stranded cost. Some argue that sunk costs are 
not an issue and, hence, there is no such thing as a 
stranded cost. But, others argue that investor-owned 
utility companies have made prudent investments under 
regulatory discretion under the premise that ratepayers 
will assume and repay all sunk costs. This component allows 
for the recovery of such sunk cost debt. The mathematical 
representation of this component on a per KWh basis is 
found in Equation 4.5.
Return -  on - Capital = (R — o — C * BV)^  Total KWh Sold , (4.5)
where,
R-o-C = Regulated Rate-of-Return on Capital, and 
BV = Book Value of a Generation Facility.
4.3.3 Depreciation Component
Depreciation expenses are also a component of a 
generation facility's embedded rate. A straight line 
approach with a useful life of 40 years is normally 
assumed. Recently investor-owned utility companies have 
been employing other accelerated depreciation methods, but
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none are included here for consistency purposes. The 
mathematical representation for straight line depreciation 
on a per KWh basis is found in Equation 4.5.
Depreciation = O rig ina l Construction Cost ̂  {40 * Total KWli Sold) . (4.5)
4.3.4 Calculating Annual Embedded Stranded Costs
To estimate stranded generation facility costs using 
the Embedded Cost method, one must first employ the same 
approach used by the Cost-of-Plant method.
(1) If a facility is not dispatched, it is considered 
stranded, and its book value is used to indicate 
its stranded cost.
(2) For partially dispatched facilities, their 
stranded costs are first allocated on a 
percentage of book value basis based on the 
proportion of capacity not dispatched for system 
peak load to the facility's full load capacity.
Once this part is completed, the estimation of stranded
costs for fully and partially dispatched generation
facilities must be performed.
To continue, each fully or partially dispatched 
generation facility's embedded rate must be compared to the 
power pool's market clearing price. The difference between 
the embedded rate and the market clearing price is the 
basis for estimating stranded costs or stranded benefits 
for operational facilities. An annual estimate of stranded 
costs can be obtained using the relationship given in 
Equation 4.7.
Annual Stranded Cost = ( ER - MCP) * TAKWh * D iv , (4.7)
where,
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ER = Generation Facility's Embedded Rate,
MCP = System's Market Clearing Price, and
TAKWh = Total Available KWh from a Generation Facility 
to the power pool.
To estimate the total annual available energy to the
pool, certain load characteristics must be identified. One
such characteristic is a load factor. It is the ratio of
total annual energy served to annual peak load and is common
to all control areas (Gonen, 1986) . The mathematical
representation of a control area's load factor (LF) is found
in Equation 4.8.
LF = Total Annual KWh 4- ( Annual Peak Load * 8760) . (4.8)
A slight manipulation of the load factor equation, with the 
use of a historical load factor, can provide the following 
estimate for total annual energy consumption.
Total Annual KWh = ( Annual Peak Load * 8760 * LF) . (4.9)
The annual peak load of a generation facility can be 
obtained by multiplying its proportion dispatched (Disp %) 
to meet the power pool's peak demand with its capacity (Cap)
as shown in Equation 4.10.
Annual Peak Load = Disp % * Cap . (4.10)
Finally, total annual available energy can be estimated 
using Equation 4.11.
Total Annual KWh = ( Disp % * Cap * 8760 * LF) . (4.11)
Once an annual stranded cost figure has been found, 
there are two possible scenarios that can occur. The 
numerical figure can either be :
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(1) equal to or larger than the facility's book 
value, or
(2) smaller than the facility's book value (or 
remaining book value in the case of a partially 
operational facility).
A decision must then be made from the following two
alternatives.
(1) If a facility's annual stranded cost figure is 
equal to or larger than its book value (or 
remaining book value), then its book value (or 
remaining book value) is considered to be its 
total stranded cost.
(2) If a facility's annual stranded cost figure is 
smaller than its book value, then the number of 
years until complete recovery of the book value 
must be determined.
A simple mathematical expression can be developed to 
determine the year in question for alternative 2 above. The 
year is determined by the point of intersection between a 
generation facility's accumulated book value less 
depreciation and its total accumulated stranded cost. The 
mathematical representation of this expression is found in 
Equation 4.12.
[BV - { A n n  Dep*n) ]  = {A tuuuil Stranded C ost* tx) , (4.12)
where,
Ann Dep = Generation Facility's Annual Depreciation. 
Solving for n determines the amount of time in years that it 
will take to recover the book value of an operational 
facility.
4.3.5 Total Embedded Stranded Costs
To obtain an estimate of the total and present value 
of all stranded generation facility costs, each facility
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musc be evaluated according to the different conditions of 
dispatch (dispatched or not dispatched) and operation 
(operating as a stranded benefit or stranded cost).
Estimates of annual stranded generation facility costs must 
be accrued until all stranded book values are recovered.
Once annual stranded costs are identified, a present 
value can be obtained to reflect current total stranded 
generation facility costs. A mathematical representation of 
the present value function for future stranded cost 
obligations is found in Equation 4.13.
Present Value = ̂  Annual Stranded Costs *[l̂ (l + r)‘]. (4.13)
4.4 Stranded Cost Analysis for the Simple Example
The simple example power system first introduced in 
Chapter 3 is revisited to demonstrate the use of each cost 
analysis method. Table 4.1 provides economic dispatch 
information as well as all system parameters and costs 
necessary to perform the cost analysis methods .
4.4.1 Cost Analysis Using the Cost-of-Plant Method
For this method, stranded costs for the simple system 
are determined solely by an economic dispatch criteria. This 
method evaluates which generation facilities are necessary 
to meet the power pool's peak demand. If a facility is not 
dispatched, it is considered "stranded" and its book value 
is used to indicate its stranded cost. In the case of a 
fully dispatched generation facility, no book value is 
applied, and, in the case of a partially stranded facility.
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TABLE 4.1
SIMPLE EXAMPLE POWER SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
CONTROL AREA #1 CONTROL AREA #2 CONTROL AREA #3
Generation Facility Capacities
GF̂ i = 100 MW GF21 = 100 MW GF33 = 75 MWGF-i = 150 MW GF22 = 50 MW GF32 = 50 MW
GF13 = 50 MW
Embedded Rates
GF-1 = $ 6/MWh GF21 = $ll/MWh GF33 = $17/MWh
GF12 = $13/MWh GF22 = $12/MWh GF32 = $20/MWh
GF 33 = $ 8/MWh
Book Values
GF” = $ 4,000,000 GF23 = $ 400,000 GF33 = $1,500,000
GF 32 = $10,000,000 GF22 = $1 ,000,000 GF32 - $ 500,000
GF 33 = $ 2,000,000
Straight Line Depreciation (40 Year Life)
GF:1 = $150,000 GF23 = $ 50,000 GF33 = $ 40,000
GF32 = $300,000 GF22 = $ 30,000 GF32 = $ 20,000
GF33 = $ 75,000
Economic Dispatch
GF33 = 100.0 MW GF21 = 100.0 MW GF31 = 0 . 0 MW
G F 3 2 = 150.0 MW GF22 = 31.2 MW G F 3 2  = 0 . 0 MWGF33 = 50.0 MW
System Market Clearing Price
GF22 = $9/MVJh (Based on Power Pool Production Cost)
Load Factors
LF = 0.50 (Assumed for each Control Area)
its cost is based on the percentage of the proportion of 
capacity not dispatched to meet the pool's peak demand to 
the facility's full load capacity.
According to Table 4.1, GF31 and GF32 are not 
dispatched and have stranded costs equal to their 
respective book values. GF22 is partially dispatched and 
has its stranded cost based on the ratio of non-dispatched
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capacity to full load capacity. By summing the book value 
figures for these stranded and partially stranded 
generation facilities, estimates for the simple system's 
stranded generation facility costs, according to the Cost- 
of-Plant method, total $2,376,000.
4.4.2 Cost: Analysis Using the Embedded Cost Method
To determine stranded generation facility costs for 
the simple system by the Embedded Cost method, a comparison 
between each generation facility's embedded rate and the 
system's market clearing price must be performed. First, 
cost analysis results indicate that GF31 and GF32 are not 
dispatched and have stranded costs equal to their 
respective book values. GF22 is partially dispatched and 
has a portion of its stranded cost based on its book value 
multiplied by the ratio of its non-dispatched capacity to 
its full load capacity. Next, after computing the annual 
stranded cost figures for GF- and GF:; it was determined 
that they incur stranded benefits and, therefore, have no 
recoverable stranded costs. Annual stranded costs were 
calculated next for GF-.2, GF21, and GF22 • The annual stranded 
cost figure for GF21 is above its book value, so its book 
value is assigned as its stranded cost. The next step in 
the process involves the determination of time necessary to 
recover the book value of GF12 and the remaining book value 
of GF22 • GF12 takes 3.42 years for full recovery and GF22 
takes 2.06 years for full recovery. It must be noted that 
GF22 begins to have stranded benefits starting in year 3.
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Figure 4.2 summarize the results of the Embedded Cost 
method of estimating stranded generation facility costs for 
the simple system.
Table 4.2 is presented to summarize the figures 
obtained in Figure 4.2 from use of the Embedded Cost 
method. To conclude the Embedded Cost analysis method for 
the simple system, the present worth of future stranded 
generation facility costs are determined. Table 4.2 also 
provides the equivalent present worth using a 6% discount 
factor.
4.5 Cost Analysis Summary
This chapter presented the Cost-of-Plant and Embedded 
Cost methods for cost analysis that can be used to determine 
stranded generation facility costs. The Cost-of-Plant method 
accumulates stranded generation costs based solely on the 
criterion of economic dispatch. Book values are applied to 
stranded and partially stranded facilities in order to 
obtain total stranded generation facility costs. The 
Embedded Cost method takes into consideration generation 
facilities that are dispatched, but are operating 
uneconomically because of large sunk costs. In this method, 
a generation facility's embedded rate is compared to its 
power pool's market clearing price. Stranded costs accrue 
for a facility when its embedded rate is above the market 
clearing price for electricity, and stranded benefits accrue 
for a facility when its embedded rate is less than the 
market clearing price. A flow chart of the Embedded Cost
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method was presented to provide the reader with a better 
understanding of how its cost analysis is performed. The 
chapter concluded with examples of each method using the 
simple system introduced earlier in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA SOURCES FOR THE LaDEUX MODEL
5.1 Introduction
Chapter five presents data used for the creation of 
LaDEUX. The Louisiana Public Service Commission is currently- 
considering an option to restructure the state's electric 
utility industry into its own power pool, thus providing 
motivation for this state-specific economic dispatch model. 
The LaDEUX model was developed using these data to determine 
whether a power pool is feasible, how it will function, and 
which generation facilities are needed to meet demand. It 
furthermore adds a significant contribution to determining 
whether or not restructuring is in the best interest of 
Louisiana electric power consumers.
The estimation of stranded generation facilities and 
their costs significantly depends upon the data collected.
It is therefore imperative that actual company-specific data 
be used in the model.
Louisiana-specific data required by LaDEUX have been 
gathered from a variety of sources covering generation 
facility production and cost parameters, summer and winter 
peak demand, and transmission interconnection capacity. In 
general, transmission networks do not adhere to state 
boundaries. Therefore, all data relating to generation 
facilities and transmission interconnections located 
adjacent to and within the boundaries of Louisiana have been
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included since they affect the operation of the state's 
electric utility system. The most recent data available for 
generation production, transmission interconnections, and 
seasonal demand are from 1996. Sources used for all data 
collected are listed in the following sections of this 
chapter.
5.2 The Making of LaDEUX
In order to model Louisiana's electric utility system 
adequately, all generation facilities, transmission 
interconnections, and control area peak demands must be 
included. The Southwest Power Pool's (SPP) 1996 Summer and 
Winter Peak, Base Case, Load Flow Data provided support for 
formulating the LaDEUX model. Figure 5.1 depicts the 
Louisiana-specific model in diagram form. SPP load flow data 
identified 12 control areas operating in Louisiana. Five 
other external control areas were identified as potential 
power importers. The SPP data also identified 88 
transmission interconnections, 24 qualifying generation 
facilities in and adjacent to the State, 2 Rural Utility 
Services generation facilities, 11 municipally-owned 
generation facilities, 38 investor-owned utility generation 
facilities in and adjacent to the state, and 2 contracted 
generation facilities. An illustration of the complete 
system can be found in Appendix A.
An examination of Figure 5.1 reveals control areas 
that can be categorized as potential power exporters (having 
excess generation capacity) while others can be classified
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ERGOT P.S.Co. of OK
Peak Demand Peak Demand
N/A N/A
Import Cap. Import Cap.
600.00 MW 1098.00 mi
zz
MURRAY HYDRO SWEPCO ENTERGY, AR
Peak Demand Peak Demand Peak Demand
N/A 3 555.56 MIV N/A
Contract Cap. Capacity Import Cap.







































653 3 .99 MW 
Capacity






CAJUN CLECO SOUTH SOUTHERN CO.
Peak Demand Peak Demand Peak Demand
0.00 MW 417.60 MW N/A
Capacity Capacity Import Cap.
1965.10 MW 438.00 MV/ 3853.00 MW
LEPA (M. CITY) CLECO EAST
Peak Demand Peak Demand
39.50 MW 384.10 MW
Capacity Capacity
65.60 MW 0.00 MW
FIGURE 5.1
ONE-LINE LaDEUX MODEL 
USING 1996 SPP SUMMER PEAK DEMAND DATA
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as potential power importers (having generation capacity 
shortages). Thus, it is important for the Louisiana system 
to have sufficient transmission interconnection capacity in 
place in order to support importing or exporting power 
transactions. The LaDEUX model determines whether adequate 
interconnection capacity exists and how it can support a 
restructured electric utility industry. A list of likely 
importers and exporters is found in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1
COMPANIES LIKELY TO HAVE CAPACITY SURPLUSES OR SHORTAGES
SURPLUS CAPACITIES SHORTAGE CAPACITIES
City of Alexandria CLECO
Cajun Electric (East Operations)
CLECO Lafayette Utilities
(North Operations) Entergy


















* - Indicates a bordering company or power pool
expected to have excess generation capacity to
export into Louisiana.
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5.3 Generation Facility Data
Data sources for power production by investor-owned, 
municipally-owned, and government-owned generation 
facilities, as well as qualifying facilities and power 
importers are presented in this section. All sources are 
identified along with their contributions toward developing 
a Louisiana-specific database for modeling the state's 
electric power system.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the data 
sources, several caveats must be noted. First, not all 1996 
power production data could be obtained. Data for the 
Alexandria municipally-owned system and several qualifying 
facilities were not available. For modeling purposes, 1995 
data was available in published form and used for the 
following Qualifying Facilities:
(1) Fina Oil and Chemical,
(2) NISCO,
( 3) E .I. Dupont, and
(4) Exxon Chemical.
In addition, only 1994 data was available in published form 
for the Alexandria municipally-owned system and the 
following Qualifying Facilities:
(1) Jeanerette Sugar,
(2) Dean Lumber, and
(3) Snider Industries.
The facilities together provide 583.2 MW of generation 
capacity. In comparison to total system wide available 
generation capacity of 25,517.92 MW, they account for only 
2.29% of all available production capacity. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the inability to obtain 1996
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production data will not present a significant problem for 
modeling or analysis.
Second, there are also several generation facilities 
within the Louisiana system which are jointly owned. Precise 
locations and costs are necessary for modeling accuracy. For 
placement purposes, these facilities are positioned within 
control areas which correspond to their actual geographic 
location. Average variable costs and fuel costs for these 
facilities are determined by means of a weighted average, 
where percent of ownership is used as the weight.
Third, Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin generation 
facility was not 100% operational during 1996. Unit #1 is 
currently under repair, and its normal capacity of 50 MW is 
not available. Normal capacity for the facility from Units 
#1, #2, and #3 is 325 MW. Therefore, the production 
capability of the generation facility was adjusted to 27 6 Ml'/ 
for modeling purposes. It is estimated that Unit #1 will be 
available sometime in late 1998 or early 1999.
Finally, System Energy Resources, Inc.'s Grand Gulf 
nuclear generation facility is jointly owned by companies 
both internal and external to the Louisiana system. Of the 
1235.25 MW of generation capacity, 90% is contracted to 
Entergy's Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New Orleans 
companies. Entergy's Louisiana and New Orleans companies 
account for 14% and 17% of the contracted capacity 
respectively, making approximately 345 MW of capacity 
directly available to Louisiana consumers.
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Data collected for all generation facilities can be 
found in Appendix B and are listed by control area. Average 
variable and fuel cost coefficients specific to model 
formulation (ACjx, ACCjx, ACIjx, FCj%, FCCjx, and FCIjx) are 
included. Appendix B.l contains ranked values for average 
variable cost of production by facility under the column 
heading TOTAL AVERAGE VARIABLE COST. Appendix B.2 contains 
ranked values for fuel production cost by facility under the 
column heading FUEL COST. Capacities for each type of 
generation facility (GFjx ,CGF-x , and IGFjx) can also be 
found in either entry of Appendix B. Corresponding values 
are located under the column heading MW CAPACITY.
5.3.1 Investor-Owned
Data for investor-owned electric power generation 
facilities (CLECO, Entergy Gulf States, Entergy Louisiana, 
Entergy New Orleans, SWEPCO, and System Energy Resources) 
were collected from FERC Form No. 1: Annual Report of Major 
Electric Utilities, Licensees and Others for all companies. 
The filing of this form is required by FERC (Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission) for each investor-owned electric 
utility. The form contains important modeling parameters 
such as facility name, year originally constructed, total 
installed capacity, primary fuel type, total production 
expenses per net KWh, average cost of fuel burned per KWh, 
net generation, etc., but does not contain marginal 
production costs. Investor-owned electric utility companies
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consider marginal production costs proprietary information 
and do not release such information to the public.
Capital costs, book values, and sales data for 
investor-owned electric utility companies (including the 
portion of Cajun Electric Power Cooperative that is 
invescor-owned) were collected from various reports. Both 
cost analysis methods presented in Chapter 4 require the use 
of such data. Construction cost data were obtained from the 
Utility Data Institute. Report UDI-2053-94, Electric Utility 
Power Plant Construction Costs, lists construction costs for 
conventional steam turbine, simple-cycle gas turbine, 
combined-cycle (steam turbine and gas turbine), 
hydroelectric, and internal combustion power plants. Book 
values, sales data, control area load factors, and Louisiana 
diversification factors were all obtained or interpreted 
from FERC Form No. 1; Annual Report of Major Electric 
Utilities, Licensees and Others.
Data concerning a generation facility's cost-of-plant 
(book value) , original construction cost, and total energy 
sold is located in Appendix B.3. under the column headings 
COST-OF-PLANT, ORG. CONS. COST and TOTAL KMH SOLD 
respectively. In addition. Appendix B.3 includes a load 
factor and Louisiana diversification factor for each control 
area under the column headings LOAD FACTOR and LOUISIANA 
DIV. FACTOR respectively.
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5.3.2 Municipally-Owned
Data for municipally-owned electric power generation 
facilities were collected from a number of different 
sources. Municipally-owned generation facilities are not 
required to report or publish detailed system statistics or 
costs, making data collection a difficult task. To begin the 
task, the United States Department of Energy's Energy 
Information Administration report DOE/EIA-0437 entitled 
Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Publicly Owned Electric 
Utilities 1994 was consulted. The report contains 
information important to the identification of several 
Louisiana municipally-owned generation facilities 
(Alexandria, Houma, Lafayette, LEPA, Morgan City, 
Natchitoches, and Ruston), but its cost information is 
considered outdated for modeling purposes.
To obtain updated production expenses and fuel costs, 
public disclosure requests for 1996 data were made to all 
municipally-owned generation facilities (Alexandria, Houma, 
Lafayette, LEPA, Minden, Morgan City, Natchitoches, New 
Roads, Plaquemine, Opelousas, Rayne, and Ruston) through the 
Louisiana Public Service Commission Legal Department. Data 
requests included modeling parameters such as: year 
originally constructed, book value of plant, accumulated 
depreciation through 1995, total installed capacity, primary 
fuel type, total operation expenses, total maintenance 
expenses, total fuel expenses, and total sales. Since 
investor-owned generation facilities would not disclose
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their marginal production costs, it was not requested from 
the municipally-owned facilities.
Alexandria and Opelousas were the only municipally- 
owned facilities that did not respond to the disclosure 
requests. Opelousas is a mothballed facility, so its data 
are not of great concern, but Alexandria is a functional 
facility. For modeling purposes data necessary to represent 
the facility were taken from Financial Staciscics of Major 
U.S. Publicly Owned Electric Utilities 1994.
5.3.3 Government: - Owned
Data for the only government-owned electric power 
generation facility (Cajun Electric Power Cooperative) were 
collected from the United States Department of Agriculture's 
Rural Utility Services: RUS Form 12. The filing of this form 
is required by Rural Utility Services (RUS) for all 
government-owned electric utilities. The form contains 
important modeling parameters such as facility name, 
operator, total installed capacity, fuel type, total 
production expenses, average cost of fuel burned per KWh net 
generation, etc., but does not contain marginal production 
costs.
5.3.4 Qualifying Facilities
Data for Qualifying Facility (QF) generation were 
collected from the Louisiana Department of Natural 
Resources, Technology Assessment Division's Mon Utility 
Generation of Electricity in Louisiana report. The report 
contains nonutility generation data consisting of QF status.
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generation capacity, fuel type, and service arrangement 
(interconnected, utility backup or stand alone) for 
facilities affecting Louisiana's electric utility system. In 
addition, the report lists buy-back rates from each 
nonutility generation facility's host investor-owned 
electric utility. The rates are presented in month-by-month 
and yearly average format. The rates are assumed to cover 
costs for production and fuel. If not, there would be no 
incentive for a nonutility generator to sell power back to 
its host electric utility.
5.3.5 Power Importers
Data for companies or power pools importing power into 
Louisiana were collected from production cost reports 
published by the Utility Data Institute. Reports UDI-2011-97 
and UDI-2023-98 list production costs for operating steam- 
electric plants, gas turbines, and combined-cycle power 
plants respectfully.
An overall production cost for each potential importer 
was determined by taking a weighted average of production 
costs of all potential importing generation facilities. Each 
importer's peak demand was used as the weight for the cost 
calculation. Weighted average variable as well as fuel 
production cost data were determined and can be found in 
Appendix B.l and B.2 respectively. Each potential importer's 
weighted average variable and fuel production costs are 
highlighted in bold letters under the column headings TOTAL 
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST and FUEL COST. These cost figures were
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used with the presumption that an importer has not only- 
sufficient transmission interconnection capacity into 
Louisiana but also excess power production capacity.
For modeling purposes, power imports are treated as 
variables. Given a bordering company's generation, 
interconnection capacity, and power pool bid, the LaDEUX 
model can determine the state's market clearing price for 
power and amount of imported power necessary to meet summer 
or winter peak demand.
5.4 Transmission Interconnection Data
Data for transmission interconnections were obtained 
from the Southwest Power Pool's 1996 Summer Peak, Base Case 
Load Flow Model. The model is configured as a series of 
demand nodes (transmission substations) interconnected by 
arcs (transmission lines). Each node has its own 
identification number containing company, area and zone 
information. Arcs are identified by their respective "From" 
and "To" nodes.
The load flow model contains information for all 
transmission lines rated 69 kV and above in the power pool. 
It contains data consisting of transmission line capacity 
ratings (for both normal and emergency conditions), line-to- 
line voltage, and line impedance. For conservative modeling 
purposes, normal operation capacity data were used for all 
interconnecting lines.
An overall postage stamp transmission cost was 
calculated for Louisiana's electric power system. It is a
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weighted average of average transmission provider costs.
Each provider's summer peak demand is used as the weight for 
the postage rate calculation.
Transmission interconnection data are available in 
Appendix C. It contains a weighted average postage rate cost 
coefficient (TC) and interconnection parameters for capacity 
(TCAPj:<y) , line-to-line voltage (V-̂ y) , and line impedance 
(Z.ky) - A 3-phase, 100 MVA base was used to obtain true 
impedance parameters for all transmission interconnections. 
The weighted average postage rate value is highlighted in 
Appendix C.l. System parameters for interconnection 
capacity, voltage, and impedance are indicated under the 
column headings I'M CAP., V 1-1, and IMPEDANCE in Appendix 
C.2 .
5.5 Summer cind Winter Peak Demand Data
Data for summer and winter peak demand were extracted 
from the Southwest Power Pool's 1996 Summer Peak and Winter 
Peak, Base Case Load Flow Models. The Southwest Power Pool's 
models indicate seasonal peak demand for each transmission 
substation within the pool. Transmission substations are 
identified by utility company, area, and zone. Their 
respective demands indicate total seasonal control area peak 
demand when summed together.
For reliability reasons, spinning reserve requirements 
are included with the seasonal peak demand data. The 
Southwest Power Pool's seasonal peak demand figures have 
been increased 15% to include spinning reserve generation
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facilities economically dispatched by LaDEUX. Scherer (1976) 
incorporates this same spinning reserve requirement in his 
ex ante approach for estimating peak and off-peak marginal 
costs for an electric power system. These facilities provide 
consumers with a level of service they expect from the 
industry.
Seasonal peak demand affects the identification of 
stranded generation facilities and their costs. As demand 
increases from winter to summer, more facilities are 
dispatched to increase power production. The increase in 
demand strands fewer generation facilities and decreases 
stranded generation facility costs. But, as demand decreases 
from summer to winter, fewer facilities are needed. The 
decrease in demand strands more facilities and increases 
stranded generation facility costs.
Data collected for summer and winter peak demand with 
spinning reserve requirements are listed in Appendix D. 
Specific peak demand parameters for summer (SPDj) and winter 
(WPDO are included. Appendix D.l contains values for summer 
peak demand whereas Appendix D.2 contains values for winter 
peak demand for each control area under the column heading 
TOTAL PEAK DEMAND IN MW.
5.6 Data Sources Summary
Details concerning the Louisiana electric utility 
system were presented in this chapter. This information is 
the basis for creating the LaDEUX model for estimating 
stranded generation facilities and their costs.
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All generation facility, transmission interconnection, 
and summer and winter peak demand parameters and cost 
sources were presented. Investor-owned, municipally-owned, 
government-owned, and qualifying facility sources furnished 
data consisting mainly of fuel type, capacity, and 
production costs. Production data for power importers 
consists only of capacity and costs. In addition, a few 
insignificant inconsistencies in the data were presented and 
explained.
Transmission interconnections are vital for wheeling 
to be successful. Sufficient interconnection capacity 
provides the infrastructure to move electric power from 
deregulated generation facilities to wholesale and/or retail 
customers. The transmission interconnection data found in 
this chapter includes capacity, line-to-line voltage, 
impedance, and a system-wide weighted average for 
transmission interconnection costs.
Stranded generation facility estimates are affected by 
system peak demands. More facilities are needed to meet 
summer peak demand while fewer facilities are needed to meet 
winter peak demand. The summer and winter peak demand 
figures presented in this chapter contain the losses 
incurred while transmitting and distributing electric power 
within a control area. Spinning reserves were included in 
excess of peak demand figures to estimate which generation 
facilities are needed to satisfy consumer demand, system 
reliability, and security requirements.
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The research thus far has identified generation and 
transmission interconnection parameters, supplied system 
cost data, developed an economic dispatch model, and 
presented two cost analysis methods for determining stranded 
generation facility costs. In this chapter, the data, 
economic dispatch model, and cost analysis methods come 
together for experimental analysis of Louisiana's electric 
utility system. Stranded generation facilities are 
identified, market clearing prices are determined, and 
stranded generation facility costs are estimated according 
to experimental design factors of summer or winter peak 
demand, an open or closed system for power imports, and 
bundled or unbundled transmission interconnection costs.
Generalized economic dispatching results are discussed 
in Section 6.2; complete economic dispatching results are 
presented in Appendix E. The effects of power imports on 
Louisiana's electric utility system are discussed in Section 
6.3. Economic dispatch results are then used in conjunction 
with each cost analysis method to determine boundary cost 
estimates for stranded and uneconomically operating 
generation facility costs. Results and comparisons from the 
Cost-of-Plant and Embedded Cost estimation methods are found 
in Section 6.4. Some interesting economic dispatching
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
discoveries are presented in Section 5.5, and the chapter 
concludes with a summary of the two stage estimation 
methodology for stranded generation facility costs in 
Section 6.6.
6.2 Economic Dispatching Results
In Chapter 3, sixteen experiments were designed to 
test the sensitivities of solution to the LaDEUX model. 
Variations of peak demand, power import factors, and 
transmission interconnection costs were used for 
experimentation purposes to study the dispatching of 
generation facilities as well as production cost responses 
to the model. Complete economic dispatch solutions from 
LaDEUX for Louisiana's generation facilities can be found in 
Appendix E.
Experimental solutions to the LaDEUX model provide 
results which indicate how Louisiana's generation facilities 
can be categorized into three classes. These classes are 
listed and briefly described as follows.
(1) Must-run facilities, otherwise known as base-load 
facilities, are facilities that are dispatched by 
LaDEUX in all sixteen experiments. These facilities 
can be found in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
(2) Transitional facilities, better known as 
intermediate, peaking, and spinning reserve 
facilities, are regulated facilities dispatched by 
LaDEUX to meet peak demand as it cycles 
transitionally from base-load to peak-load. These 
facilities can be found in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
(3) Stranded facilities, or non-dispatched facilities, 
are facilities that are never dispatched in any of 
the sixteen experiments by LaDEUX. These facilities 
can be found in Tables 6.5 and 6.6.
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Production parameters vary greatly between the above 
classes. Thus, each class provides unique information for 
determining stranded generation facilities and estimating 
their costs. Descriptions of each are found in the following 
subsections.
Traditional economic dispatch commits generation 
facilities for service according to lowest production costs 
only. It is worthy to note that although the average 
variable and fuel production costs of Tables 6.1 through 6.6 
are ranked according to $/MV/h, generation facilities were 
not necessarily selected in this order for inclusion in all 
experimental optimal solutions. The technical transmission 
interconnection power flow constraints associated with line 
capacity, losses, and costs, in some instances, required the 
dispatching of higher cost facilities. In such situations, 
load pockets are likely to arise. Load pockets are areas 
lacking the resources necessary to "wheel in" low-cost 
power, and provide for discontinuities in supply curves.
6.2.1 Must-Run Facilities
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate Louisiana's must-run 
facilities according to average variable and fuel production 
cost dispatching (AVC Dispatch and FC Dispatch) 
respectively. These are facilities that are allocated to 
meet Louisiana's base demand and are dispatched to full 
capacity in all LaDEUX experiments.
Both of these groups contain a large number of 
qualifying facilities. Although the total amount of power
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TABLE 6.1
MUST-RUN FACILITIES UNDER AN
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC) DISPATCHING PRIORITY







Minden Minden LA Gas $7 . 50/MtVh 34.50
Fina Oil QF/Entergy TX Gas 14 . 00 37 . 00
NISCO QF/Entergy LA Gas 15 .70 200 .00
E . I. Dupont: QF/Entergy TX Gas 16.50 85.00
Exxon Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 17 . 60 84.00
Cogen Power QF/Entergy TX Heat 18.50 5.00
IMC-Agrico QF/Entergy LA Slph 19 . 00 22.00
Calciner QF/Entergy LA Coke 19.10 27.00
Formosa QF/Entergy LA Gas 19 .10 46.00
Doc Bonin LAFA LA Gas 19.35 276 . 00
Engr. Carbons QF/Entergy TX Heat 19.80 10.00
Vulcan Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 20 . 10 108.00
Grand Gulf S.E.R. MS Nclr 20 .20 345.00
Huntcsman QF/Entergy TX Gas 20.30 72 . 00
B.P. Oil QF/Entergy LA RGas 21.20 19 .15
Clark Ref. QF/Entergy TX Gas 21.30 84 .80
Air Liquide QF/Entergy TX Gas 21. 40 36.00
JeanereCte QF/CLECO LA BGas 21. 90 0 .10
Waterford 3 Entergy LA Nclr 22 .10 1,200.00
Dow Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 22.20 670.00
Bordon Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 22 .40 91.50
James River QF/Entergy LA Pulp 22.40 57 . 50
Star Entp. QF/Entergy TX Gas 22 . 90 164.00
Air Products QF/Entergy LA Gas 23 .70 23 .00
Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX Lgnt 24 . 60 619.38
Big Cajun 2 Cajun LA Coal 24 .76 1,735.10
Dean Lumber QF/SWEPCO TX Wood 25.70 0 . 60
Snider Ind. QF/SWEPCO TX Wood 25 . 90 5 . 00
Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA Coal 26.00 558.00
River Bend 1 Entergy LA Nclr 28 . 68 1,022.30
BASF QF/Entergy LA Gas 28.70 36. 60
Agrielectric QF/Entergy LA Rice 34 . 90 12 . 50
Dolet Hills CLECO LA Lgnt 35.40 650.37
R.S. Nelson 6 Entergy LA Coal 40.20 430 . 00
Natchitoches Natch. LA Gas 40.21 48 . 00
Welsh 5 SWEPCO TX Coal 41.90 1,674.00
Morgan City Mrgn. City LA Gas 51.73 65.60
Big Cajun 1 Cajun LA Gas 52 . 67 230.00
Teche CLECO LA Gas 53 .10 427.90
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TABLE 6.2
MUST-RUN FACILITIES UNDER A
FUEL COST (FC) DISPATCHING PRIORITY







Murray Hydro QF/Entergy LA None $0.00/MWh 192.00
Minden Minden LA Gas 3.33 34 . 50
Grand Gulf S.E.R. MS Nclr 5.10 345.00
Doc Bonin LAFA LA Gas 5.76 276.00
Waterford 3 Entergy LA Nclr 6.00 1,200.00
River Bend 1 Entergy LA Nclr 6.74 1,022.30
Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX Lgnt 11.00 619.38
Fina Oil QF/Entergy TX Gas 14 . 00 37.00
Dolet Hills CLECO LA Lgnt 15 . 50 650.37
NISCO QF/Entergy LA Gas 15.70 200 . 00
E .I. Dupont QF/Entergy TX Gas 16.50 85.00
P.S. Nelson 6 Entergy LA Coal 17.00 430 . 00
Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA Coal 17.38 558.00
Exxon Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 17.60 84 . 00
Big Cajun 2 Cajun LA Coal 17 . 95 1,735.10
Cogen Power QF/Entergy TX Heat 18.50 5.00
IMC-Agrico QF/Entergy LA Slph 19.00 22 . 00
Formosa QF/Entergy LA Gas 19 .10 46. 00
Calciner Ind. QF/Entergy LA Coke 19 .10 27 . 00
Engr. Carbons QF/Entergy TX Heat 19 . 80 10 . 00
Vulcan Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 20 .10 108 . 00
Huntsman Corp. QF/Entergy TX Gas 20.30 72 . 00
Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX Coal 21.00 1,674.00
B.P. Oil QF/Entergy LA RGas 21.20 19.15
Clark Refining QF/Entergy TX Gas 21.30 84 . 80
Air Liquide QF/Entergy TX Gas 21.40 36.00
Jeanerette QF/CLECO LA BGas 21.90 0 .10
Dow Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 22.20 670 . 00
Borden Chem. QF/Entergy LA Gas 22.40 91.50
James River QF/Entergy LA Pulp 22.40 57 . 50
Star Entp. QF/Entergy TX Gas 22.90 164.00
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produced by these facilities is relatively small (1,293.75 
MV/ out of 11,756.9 MV'7 total for Table 6.1 and 2,034.05 I4W 
out of 10,578.7 MW total for Table 6.2), they are dispatched 
first because they are the most cost effective to operate.
Traditional electric utility economic dispatch 
involved classifying and dispatching generation facilities 
according to size, type, and production costs concurrently. 
In the past, nuclear and large fossil-fired facilities made 
up an electric utility's must-run classification. These 
units typically have capacities of considerable size and 
require constant output settings and steam system thermal 
balance. With the onset of deregulation, this method of 
classifying generation facilities is in jeopardy. As more 
inexpensive qualifying facilities enter power pools, they 
are displacing traditional, capital intensive facilities 
from their must-run classification.
In Louisiana's case, all three nuclear generation 
facilities maintained their status as must-run facilities, 
but very few of the state's large fossil facilities managed 
to keep their must-run status. They were replaced by 
qualifying facilities and displaced into the transitional 
category which is certain to initiate requests for 
substantial stranded and uneconomically dispatched 
generation facility cost recovery by investor-owned 
utilities when deregulation becomes a reality.
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6.2.2 Transitional Facilities
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 indicate Louisiana's transitional 
facilities and are identified according to average variable 
and fuel production cost dispatching (AVC Dispatch and FC 
Dispatch) respectively. They are allocated on an incremental 
basis to meet Louisiana's cyclical peak demand while taking 
into consideration all transmission interconnection 
constraints. Some are dispatched to full capacity while 
others are not. The last facility dispatched from this group 
determines the market clearing price for each experiment 
executed by LaDEUX. Appendix E can be referenced for 
complete information concerning generation facility dispatch 
proportions for all sixteen LaDEUX experiments.
TABLE 6.3
TRANSITIONAL FACILITIES UNDER AN 
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC) DISPATCHING PRIORITY







Sabine Entergy TX Gas $55 . 00/M&fh 2,051.00
Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX Gas 55 .70 881.52
R.S. Nelson 
3&4
Entergy LA Gas 59 . 80 755.00
Arsenal 
Hill 1
SWEPCO LA Gas 60 . 60 125.00
Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA Gas 62 .10 445.50
Murray Hydro QF/Entergy LA None 63 . 80 192.00
9 Mile Point Entergy LA Gas 64 .20 1,917.00
Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX Gas 66 . 50 499.50
Little Gypsy Entergy LA Gas 66.80 1,251.00
Willow Glen Entergy LA Gas 67 .10 2,178.00
Michoud Entergy LA Gas 69.40 959.00
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TABLE 6.4
TRANSITIONAL FACILITIES UNDER A
FUEL COST (FC) DISPATCHING PRIORITY







Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA Gas $25.00/MWh 125.00
Dean Lumber QF/SWEPCO TX Wood 25 .70 0.60
Snider Ind. QF/SWEPCO TX Wood 25.90 5.00
Lewis Creek Entergy TX Gas 26.00 544 . 00
Sabine Entergy TX Gas 27 . 00 2,051.00
Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX Gas 27 . 00 881.52
BASF QF/Entergy LA Gas 28.70 36.60
R.S. Nelson 
3&4
Entergy LA Gas 29 . 00 755.00
Ruston Ruston LA Gas 29 . 62 81 . 00
Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA Gas 30.00 445 . 50
9 Mile Point Entergy LA Gas 31.00 1,917.00
Big Cajun 1 Cajun LA Gas 31.66 230.00
Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX Gas 32 . 00 499 .50
Michoud Entergy LA Gas 32 . 00 959 . 00
Willow Glen Entergy LA Gas 32 . 00 2,178.00
Little Gypsy Entergy LA Gas 32 . 00 1,251.00
Teche CLECO LA Gas 32 .10 427 . 90
Sterlington Entergy LA Gas 33 . 00 480 . 00
Coughlin CLECO LA Gas 33 .00 368.10
Hunter Alexandria LA Gas 34 . 00 171.50
Agrielectric QF/Entergy LA Rice 34 . 90 12 . 50
TOTAL
CAPACITY 13,419.72
Similar to the must-run facility classification, 
traditional electric utility economic dispatch involved 
dispatching transitional generation facilities according to 
size, type, and production costs concurrently. Facilities of 
this category usually include small fossil, hydroelectric, 
and gas turbine generators. With the onset of deregulation, 
generation facilities previously classified as must-run, 
base-load facilities are becoming transitional facilities. 
According to the results of this research, large investor-
136
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
owned fossil facilities make up the majority of this 
classification. These facilities were originally planned and 
constructed to take advantage of economies of scale in the 
industry. This situation is problematic for the industry 
since the economic dispatching of these facilities under 
deregulated conditions is forcing the facilities to operate 
uneconomically. Therefore, stranded costs are accrued and 
electric utilities will also be asking for their recovery 
once the industry is restructured.
6.2.3 Stranded Facilities
Tables 6.5 and 5.5 indicate Louisiana's completely 
stranded generation facilities according to average variable 
and fuel production cost dispatching (AVC Dispatch and FC 
Dispatch) respectively. These facilities are never allocated 
to meet peak demand by the LaDEUX model. Stranded costs from 
this group accumulate from facilities which have not been 
fully depreciated and electric utilities are certain to 
request their recovery when deregulation becomes a reality.
It should be noted that several of these fully 
stranded facilities have already been placed in long term 
storage. According to Maloney et al. (1995b), regulated 
firms have historically had incentives to idle generation 
facilities that are still economical to operate.
Furthermore, Maloney argues some of these may still be 
valuable in a competitive market and produce net positive 
cash flows. If Maloney's argument is correct and these 
stored facilities are fully depreciated, a move to
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TABLE 6.5
STRANDED FACILITIES UNDER AN
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC) DISPATCHING PRIORITY







Houma Houma LA Gas $72.51/MWh 98 . 00
Waterford 1&2 Entergy LA Gas 74.70 891. 00
Coughlin CLECO LA Gas 78.50 368.10
Ruston Ruston LA Gas 81.93 81.00
Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA Gas 85 .10 277.27
Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX Gas 95 . 90 50.00
Hunter Alexandria LA Gas 108.00 171.50
A.B. Pat. 
(Steam)
Entergy LA Oil 214.40 15 . 00
Buras Entergy LA Gas 218.80 21. 00
Rayne Rayne LA Gas 329.34 2 . 50
Plaquemine LEPA LA Gas 339.13 42.90
New Roads New Roads LA Gas 3286.19 7.60
Opelousas Opelousas LA Gas In Storage 36. 00
Market Street Entergy LA N/A In Storage 103.00
A.B. Pat. 
( Gas )
Entergy LA Gas In Storage 133.00
Thibodaux 9 Entergy LA Gas In Storage 21.00
Franklin CLECO LA Gas In Storage 10 . 00
Monroe Entergy LA Gas In Storage 137.00
LA St. #1 Entergy LA Gas In Storage 148.00
LA St. #1 
Unit 4A
Entergy LA N/A In Storage 129.00
LA St. #2 Entergy LA Gas In Storage 175.00
Neches Entergy TX N/A In Storage 269.00
Firestone QF/Entergy LA Gas Not
Connected
0.30
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TABLE 6.6
STRANDED FACILITIES UNDER A
FUEL COST (FC) DISPATCHING PRIORITY







Waterford 1&2 Entergy LA Gas $35.00/MWh 891.00
Houma Houma LA Gas 38.69 98 . 00
Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA Gas 39.00 277.27
Natchitoches Natch. LA Gas 40.21 48 . 00
Morgan City Mrgn. City LA Gas 41.45 65 . 60
Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX Gas 42 . 00 50 . 00
New Roads New Roads LA Gas 49 .18 7 . 60
Rayne Rayne LA Gas 65.17 2 . 50
Plaquemine LEPA LA Gas 79.53 42.90
Buras Entergy LA Gas 90 . 00 21.00
A.B. Pat. 
(Steam)
Entergy LA Oil 107.00 16 . 00
Opelousas Opelousas LA Gas In Storage 36. 00
Market Street Entergy LA N/A In Storage 103.00
A.B. Pat. 
(Gas )
Entergy LA Gas In Storage 133 . 00
Thibodaux 9 Entergy LA Gas In Storage 21. 00
Franklin CLECO LA Gas In Storage 10 . 00
Monroe Entergy LA Gas In Storage 137 .00
LA St. #1 Entergy LA Gas In Storage 148.00
LA St. #1 
Unit 4A
Entergy LA N/A In Storage 129.00
LA St. #2 Entergy LA Gas In Storage 175.00
Neches Entergy TX N/A In Storage 269.00
Firestone QF/Entergy LA Gas Not
Connected
0.30
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competition and modest capital investment could restore them 
to useful life and provide investor-owned utilities 
production benefits with which they may exercise market 
power.
It is worthy to note that Tables 6.3 and 6.5 indicate 
a discontinuity in generation supply. For instance,
Entergy's Sterlington facility is listed as a transitional 
facility whereas three south Louisiana facilities—Houma, 
Waterford 1&2, and Coughlin—are listed as stranded. All 
three of these facilities are less expensive to operate per 
MVTh than Sterlington, but in experiment #7 (experimental 
factors: average variable production cost, summer peak 
demand, a closed system for imports, and bundled 
transmission costs), transmission interconnection 
constraints of costs and losses keep them from wheeling 
power to Entergy Louisiana's northern customers.
These supply curve discontinuities are an important 
discovery uncovered by LaDEUX's economic dispatch results.
In fact, it should be noted that many experimental results 
found in Appendix E exhibit this same discontinuous 
generation supply phenomenon. The finding illustrates that a 
pure study of Louisiana's generation production capabilities 
without transmission interconnection constraints is 
inadequate for assessing stranded generation facility costs. 
This finding is discussed in greater detail in Section 6.5.
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6.3 The Effects of Power Imports
In 8 of the 16 LaDEUX experiments, an open system for 
power imports was modeled to study the cost effects of 
wheeling less expensive power to Louisiana's electric 
utility customers. For modeling purposes, power imports were 
treated as variables. Given a bordering utility's generation 
facilities, transmission interconnection capacity, and 
generation production costs on a weighted average basis, the 
LaDEUX model determined the amount of power imports 
necessary to meet peak demand under certain economic and 
technical conditions and the Louisiana system's market 
clearing price for power. The stranding of local generation 
facilities is the most important side effect encountered 
when importing economically produced power. Tables 6.7 and 
6.8 indicate the total anticipated amount of economically 
produced power to be imported into the Louisiana system 
after restructuring becomes a reality.
Several interesting results were discovered concerning 
Louisiana's neighboring utilities. First, to the west, ERGOT 
(Texas Utilities Electric Company) produces inexpensive 
power on both an average variable and fuel cost basis but 
has only one 600 MW transmission interconnection into the 
SWEPCO system. In addition to this constraint, it is also 
limited in competing on an open power market for interstate 
commerce reasons. In all eight open system experiments, the 
lone transmission interconnection was loaded to capacity, 
indicating that transmission interconnection costs and
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TABLE 6.7
ANTICIPATED TOTAL POWER IMPORTS IN MW 






CO. OF ENTERGY 
OKLAHOMA MISSISSIPPI
SUMMER PEAK DEMAND WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
1 600 2055 2055 0 0
WINTER PEAK DEMAND WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
2 600 714 1621 0 0
SUMMER PEAK DEMAND WITH TRANSMISSION COSTS
5 600 1750 1933 0 0
WINTER PEAK DEMAND WITH TRANSMISSION COSTS
6 600 646 1538 0 0
TABLE 6.8
ANTICIPATED TOTAL POWER IMPORTS IN MW 






CO. OF ENTERGY 
OKLAHOMA MISSISSIPPI
SUMMER PEAK DEMAND WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
9 600 3201 2378 180 0
WINTER PEAK DEMAND WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
10 600 2269 2099 0 0
SUMMER PEAK DEMAND WITH TRANSMISSION COSTS
13 600 2520 2177 10 0
WINTER PEAK DEMAND WITH TRANSMISSION COSTS
14 600 1458 1899 0 0
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losses were not a factor. It can therefore be concluded that 
if Louisiana's electric power system had the capability of 
receiving more power from ERCOT, it would do so.
To the north and east, Entergy Arkansas and Southern 
Companies (Mississippi Power Company) produce inexpensive 
power on both an average variable and fuel cost basis, and a 
significant amount of that power could be imported into 
Louisiana's system. It is interesting to note that bundled 
transmission interconnection prices do affect the amount of 
power each company imports. Bundled prices reduce power 
imports from Entergy Arkansas by 21% during summer peak 
demand and 3 6% during winter peak demand. They also reduce 
imports from Southern Companies by 8% during summer peak 
demand and 10% during winter peak demand.
Finally, to the northwest and northeast. Public 
Service Company of Oklahoma and Entergy Mississippi produce 
uneconomic power when referenced to Louisiana's production 
costs. Entergy Mississippi's power is never dispatched into 
Louisiana's system by LaDEUX, and only a very small amount 
of power from Public Service Company of Oklahoma is 
dispatched into SWEPCO's control area in experiment #9 
(experimental factors: fuel production cost, summer peak 
demand, and unbundled transmission costs) and experiment #13 
(experimental factors: fuel production cost, summer peak 
demand, and bundled transmission costs) . Again, it is 
interesting to note that bundled transmission 
interconnection costs do affect the amount of power exported
143
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
by Public Service Company of Oklahoma and reduce it by as 
much as 95%.
6.4 Estimates of Stranded Generation Facility Costs
The two cost analysis methods presented in Chapter 4 
can be applied to all generation facilities within LaDEUX, 
but not all facilities qualify for stranded cost recovery. 
For instance, municipally-owned generation facilities are 
not subjected to regulatory review and are therefore not 
eligible to recover any stranded generation facility costs. 
The same is true for qualifying facilities. It is the 
ambition of this research to estimate recoverable stranded 
generation facility costs. Hence, these are costs that are 
from facilities regulated by the Louisiana Public Service 
Commission.
Marginal production costs for economic dispatch of 
Louisiana's generation facilities are not published. Thus, 
it was decided early on that this research methodology would 
be designed to estimate a range for stranded generation 
facility costs by means of production cost boundaries known 
to include marginal production costs. Marginal costs are 
composed of fuel costs and other operational costs along 
with maintenance costs (O&M) and the variable portion of 
administrative and general (A&G) costs. They are known to 
exist between the boundaries of average variable production 
costs and fuel production costs, though probably closer to 
fuel costs. The reader may wish to reference Figure 3.4 for 
the research methodology's original experimental design.
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The economic dispatching of generation facilities and 
market clearing prices from the experiments designed in 
Chapter 3 were required before the estimation of stranded 
generation facility costs could begin. Once known, only the 
information concerning non-dispatched facilities was used to 
determine the range for stranded generation facility costs 
by the Cost-of-Plant method. These are estimates for 
stranded costs in their strictest form. Other estimates of 
stranded generation facility costs were found by the 
Embedded Cost method. This method extends the approach of 
the Cost-of-Plant method to include costs of uneconomically 
dispatched facilities. It does so by comparing a dispatched 
facility's embedded capital cost with an experimental market 
clearing price.
The following subsections provide stranded generation 
facility cost boundary estimates by seasonal peak demand.
The Embedded Cost method's capital cost component is 
computed assuming a 12% regulated nominal rate-of-return on 
capital for unbundled generation facilities. A 6% present 
worth factor is also assumed. Other present worth factors 
could be assumed depending upon the assumptions used for 
inflation and tax rates. Costs incurred by each investor- 
owned electric utility estimated by the Cost-of-Plant method 
can be found in Appendix F. The same information can be 
found in Appendix G by means of the Embedded Cost method.
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6.4.1 Stranded Cost Results for Summer Peak Demand
Table 6.9 provides summer peak demand economic 
dispatch results from LaDEUX for all odd numbered 
experiments. The table displays market clearing prices and 
market clearing facilities by average variable cost and 
fuel cost dispatching. Market clearing prices for 
experiments #9, #11, #13, and #15 from fuel cost
dispatching were relatively stable, between $3 2 and $34, 
with market clearing facilities located in several 
different geographic locations around the state. The market 
clearing prices and facilities determined by average 
variable cost dispatching were not as stable and 
geographically diverse. For experiments #1, #3, and #5, all 
market clearing facilities were located in the New Orleans 
area with somewhat stable market clearing prices, but 
experiment #7 ' s market clearing price was remarkably high. 
Experiment #7 ' s result indicates the importance of 
transmission interconnection constraints and costs on a 
closed system when attempting to wheel power to customers 
in northern Louisiana.
Table 6.10 provides estimates for stranded generation 
facility costs during summer peak demand using both cost 
analysis methods. Estimates by the Cost-of-Plant method are 
greatly influenced by experimental industry factors under 
summer peak demand conditions. As a general observation, 
one should note how power imports greatly affect the Cost- 
of-Plant estimates. An open system for power imports more
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TABLE 6.9
SUMMER PEAK DEMAND 
MARKET CLEARING PRICES (MCP) AND 
MARKET CLEARING FACILITIES (MCE) FOR 
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC) AND FUEL COST (FC) DISPATCHING
EXP
#
MCP FOR MCF FOR MCP FOR 
AVC AVC EXP FC 




AN OPEN SYSTEM WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
1 $66.8/MWh Little Gypsy 9 $32.0/MWh Michoud
A CLOSED SYSTEM WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
3 69.4 Michoud 11 3 3.0 Sterlington
AN OPEN SYSTEM WITH TRANSMISSION COSTS
5 66.8 Little Gypsy 13 32.0 Little Gypsy 
and 
Michoud
A CLOSED SYSTEM WITH TRAiNSMISSION COSTS
7 79.0 Sterlington 15 34.0 Hunter
TABLE 6.10
RANGE ESTIMATES FOR STRANDED GENERATION FACILITY COSTS 
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than doubles the estimated amount of stranded generation 
facility costs. In contrast, estimates obtained by the 
Embedded Cost method are fairly stable since they are based 
on each experiment's market clearing price.
The only result in Table 6.10 that is out of the 
ordinary is the Embedded Cost estimate for average variable 
cost dispatching obtained for experiment #7. it is less 
than half of other similar summer peak demand average 
variable cost dispatching results. This result is explained 
by its experimental market clearing price of $79.0/MWh. It 
is much higher than other summer peak demand, average 
variable cost, experimental market clearing prices found in 
Table 5.9. Its occurrence allows for all generation 
facilities with embedded costs under this abnormally high 
market clearing price to operate profitably.
6.4.2 Stranded Cost Results for Winter Peak Demand
Table 6.11 provides winter peak demand economic 
dispatch results from LaDEUX for all even numbered 
experiments. The table displays market clearing prices and 
market clearing facilities by average variable and fuel 
cost dispatching. Market clearing prices for experiments 
#10, #12, #14, and #16 from fuel cost dispatching were 
relatively stable, between $31 and $32, with all market 
clearing facilities located in the New Orleans area. In a 
similar fashion, Entergy's Nine Mile Point facility was the 
market clearing facility and provided the market clearing
148
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
price for experiments #̂2, #4, #6, and #8 using average
variable cost dispatching.
The stability of these results is not unexpected since 
winter peak demand is much more predictable and easier to 
manage in the southern United States than summer peak 
demand. This is because most electric utility system 
planning is based on summer peak demand. Winter peak demand 
is simply regulated by transitional generation facilities 
designed to manage the summer peak demand cycle.
Table 5.12 provides estimates for stranded generation 
facility costs during winter peak demand using both cost 
analysis methods. Estimates by the Cost-of-Plant method 
are, once again, influenced by the utilization of specific 
experimental industry factors. As a general observation, 
one must again note how power imports affect the Cost-of- 
Plant estimates. Stranded generation facility cost 
estimates for an open system are approximately $200 to $300 
million less than the estimates for a closed system. In 
contrast, estimates obtained by the Embedded Cost method 
are once again stable since they are based on each 
experiment's market clearing price.
6.4.3 A Comparison of Stranded Cost Analysis Methods
When comparing the Cost-of-Plant figures of Tables 
6.10 and 5.12, one can collectively conclude that winter 
peak demand estimates for stranded generation facility 
costs are significantly higher, approximately $350 to $550 
million higher regardless of any other experimental
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TABLE 6.11
WINTER PEAK DEMAND 
MARKET CLEARING PRICES (MCP) AND 
MARKET CLEARING FACILITIES (MCF) FOR 
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC) AND FUEL COST (FC) DISPATCHING
EXP
#
MCP FOR MCF FOR MCP FOR 
AVC AVC EXP FC 




AN OPEN SYSTEM WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
2 $64.2/MWh 9 Mile Point 10 $31.0/MWh 9 Mile Point
A CLOSED SYSTEM WITHOUT TRANSMISSION COSTS
4 54.2 9 Mile Point 12 32.0 Michoud
AN OPEN SYSTEM WITH TRANSMISSION COSTS
6 64.2 9 Mile Point 14 32.0 Michoud
A CLOSED SYSTEM WITH TRANSMISSION COSTS
8 64.2 9 Mile Point 16 32.0 Michoud
TABLE 6.12
RANGE ESTIMATES FOR STRANDED GENERATION FACILITY COSTS 
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factors. Figure 6.1 illustrates these findings. Since costs 
are strictly being applied to facilities that are not 
dispatched, these results are not unexpected. In contrast, 
when one compares the Embedded Cost results of Tables 6.10 
and 6.12, different conclusions are drawn depending on 
which production cost dispatching factor is used. Stranded 
generation facility costs found by dispatching with an 
average variable cost priority are much different than 
stranded costs obtained by fuel cost dispatching. When 
using average variable costs dispatching, uneconomically 
dispatched generation facilities reveal a reasonable 
increase (approximately doubles on average) over estimates 
obtained using the Cost-of-Plant method. These estimates 
exhibit signs of costs differences based on seasonal 
demand, power imports, and transmission interconnection 
costs. In addition, when average variable cost dispatching 
is used, 10 of the 38 generation facilities operate 
profitably and are considered to be stranded benefits in 
all experiments performed (#1 through #8) . Table 6.13 
identifies these facilities. Market clearing prices between 
$64.2/MWh and $79.0/MWh for the experiments were high 
enough to support such profitable operation.
Much different stranded cost results were obtained 
when fuel cost dispatching was used. The results of all 
eight experiments (#9 through #16) are very similar. 
Estimates of stranded generation facility costs do not 
exhibit costs differences based on seasonal demand, power
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TABLE 6.13
GENERATION FACILITIES IDENTIFIED AS STRANDED BENEFITS
UNDER AN AVERAGE VARIABLE COST DISPATCHING PRIORITY







Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA Coal $39.32/MWh 558.00
Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX Lgnt 44.21 619.38
Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX Coal 48 .97 1,674.00
Dolet Hills CLECO LA Lgnt 55.15 650.37
Big Cajun 1 Cajun LA Gas 55.49 230.00
Lewis Creek SWEPCO TX Gas 57 .71 544.00
Teche CLECO LA Gas 58.08 427 . 90
Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX Gas 59.75 881.52
Sabine Entergy TX Gas 60.60 2,051.00
Waterford 3 Entergy LA Nclr 63.68 1,200.00
imports, and transmission interconnection costs. Figure 6.2 
illustrates this point. Fuel production cost dispatching 
provided market clearing prices low enough, between 
$31.0/MWh and $34.0/MWh, to expose the uneconomical 
operation of all investor-owned facilities which would 
require stranded cost recovery over time of all net book 
values .
6.5 Other Economic Dispatching Conclusions
The most important finding from the LaDEUX model is 
not peak-hour production cost, but the determination of a 
market clearing price and identification of the market 
clearing facility. It is the market clearing price which 
makes possible the estimation of stranded generation 
facility costs.
Analysis of the economic dispatch results provided 
another interesting observation concerning the determination 
of the market clearing facility. In 12 of the 16 experiments
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performed, at least one uneconomically priced generation 
facility was dispatched in favor of a more economically 
priced facility. This confirms the existence of a 
discontinuous supply curve for Louisiana's generation system 
which was first mentioned in Section 6.2. The 
discontinuities were created by transmission interconnection 
constraints as well as costs. This discovery indicates that 
any wholesale or retail wheeling study of Louisiana's power 
production capabilities for stranded cost determination that 
does not take into account constraints associated with 
transmission interconnections would not adequately assess 
stranded and uneconomically operating generation facilities.
Figures 5.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.5 indicate the existence 
of the supply system discontinuities. In each graph, supply 
curves of like experiments are compared to a supply curve 
developed from pure economic dispatch (ECON. DISPATCH) , 
which is dispatching without transmission interconnection 
constraints. These graphs indicate that transmission 
interconnections play a vital role in the determination of 
stranded and uneconomically dispatched generation facilities 
and their costs.
The discontinuities also established the existence of 
a load pocket. This is an area where demand is typically 
high and economically produced power is not able to 
penetrate it enough to force market clearing prices down. In 
13 of the 16 experiments performed, the market clearing 
facility was located in the New Orleans area. Given
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EXR #5 (w/l, wrrc)
8,000 12,000 
Capacity (MW)
EXP. #1 (w/l, wo/TC) 
EXR #7 (wo/l, w/TC)
16,000 20,000 24,000
•  •  •  EXR #3 (wo/l, wo/TC)
FIGURE 6.3
SUPPLY CURVES BASED ON 
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST DISPATCHING 





































EXP. #6  (w/l, w/TC)
12,000 
Capacity (MW)
EXP. #2 (w/l, wo/TC) 
EXP. #8 (wo/l, w/TC)
16,000 20,000 24,000
•  •  EXP. #4 (wo/l, wo/TC)
FIGURE 6.4
SUPPLY CURVES BASED ON 
AVERAGE VARIABLE COST DISPATCHING 







































4,000 8,000 12,000 16,000 20,000 24,000
Capacity (MW)
ECON. DISPATCH 
EXP. #13 (w/l, w/TC)
EXP. #9  (w/l, wo/TC) 
EXP. #15 (wo/l, w/TC)
•  •  •  EXP #11 (wo/l, wo/TC)
FIGURE 6.5
SUPPLY CURVES BASED ON 
FUEL COST DISPATCHING 




























4,000 8,000 12,000 16,000 20,000 24,000
Capacity (MW)
ECON. DISPATCH 
EXP. #14 (w/l, w/TC)
EXP. #10 (w/l, wo/TC) 
EXP. #16 (wo/l, w/TC)
•  •  •  EXP #12 (wo/l, wo/TC)
FIGURE 6.6
SUPPLY CURVES BASED ON 
FUEL COST DISPATCHING 
AND WINTER PEAK DEMAND
appropriate modeling parameters and existing transmission 
interconnection infrastructure, the 13 experiments suggested 
that wheeling power into the southeastern portion of 
Louisiana is difficult. This would be especially true if 
other inefficient methods of restructuring, such as 
Bilateral Contracts, are implemented.
In addition to the load pocket discovery, it was noted 
that Entergy Louisiana's Waterford 3 facility operates as a 
stranded benefit in 8 of the 16 experiments performed. These 
experiments all involve economic dispatch based on the use 
of average variable production costs, one of the boundaries 
for capturing marginal production costs. This was another 
interesting finding since most investor-owned utility 
companies claim their nuclear facilities are the largest 
portion of their stranded costs. In Louisiana's case, half 
of the experiments have shown that the Nev/ Orleans load 
pocket is keeping market clearing prices high enough to 
allow Waterford 3 to operate as a profitable facility. River 
Bend, of Entergy Gulf States, and Grand Gulf, of System 
Energy Resources, are not as fortunate. Experimental market 
clearing prices would have to increase substantially before 
they would cover the embedded capital costs of these two 
facilities and allow them to operate profitably.
One final result of this research confirmed the 
existence of stranded qualifying facilities. Dismukes and 
Kleit (1997) presented power market conditions in which 
qualifying facilities could be considered uneconomical to
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operate, hence stranding the facility without the benefit of 
recovery.
Four qualifying facilities and one contracted facility- 
supported the existence of this theorized market condition. 
Two Entergy Gulf States qualifying facilities, BASF and 
Agrielectric, were not dispatched by LaDEUX in 3 of 16 and 8 
of 16 experiments respectively, whereas two of SV'/EPCO's 
qualifying facilities. Dean Lumber and Snider Industries, 
were each not dispatched by LaDEUX in 2 of 16 experiments.
In addition, the Sidney A. Murray, Jr., hydroelectric 
facility contracted by Entergy Louisiana was not dispatched 
by LaDEUX in 4 of 16 experiments. The combination of 
transmission system constraints and above average power 
production costs was the reason for non-dispatch in all 
cases.
6.6 The California Power Exchange
Some have questioned whether the production figures of 
average variable and fuel costs used to estimate true 
marginal production costs are realistic. The best method of 
clarification would be a comparison of Louisiana's 
production cost figures to actual market clearing prices 
obtained from an existing power exchange. Fortunately, there 
is such an exchange in existence. Since January 1, 1998, a 
new competitive market for electric power has been in 
operation in California.
The present California Power Market consists primarily 
of utility-owned generation, transmission, and distribution
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used to meet each utility's demand by way of a complicated 
market comprised of both Poolco and Bilateral Contract 
systems. There are three major control areas operated by 
three investor-owned utilities. Each utility is responsible 
for matching demand and resources within its control area to 
maintain technical constraints and match scheduled and 
actual flows at the interconnection points.
The power market has only been in existence for the 
past six months and has not yet reached peak demand. 
Therefore, any data gathered during its first year of 
operation should be considered experimental (warm-up data) 
and not used for designing other power exchange systems. 
Table 6.14 indicates peak market clearing prices for each of 
the four weeks of June 1998 for comparison purposes.
TABLE 6.14
PEAK DEMAND VOLUME AND MARKET CLEARING PRICE DATA 






June 1- 7, 1998 24,340.0 $26 . 40/MlVh
June 8-14, 1998 23, 814.7 22 . 07
June 15-21, 1998 27,456.1 38 . 02
June 22-30, 1998 28,499.4 37 . 01
One must realize that these are peak market clearing prices 
presented in Table 6.14, not market clearing costs. They may 
be inflated to reflect strategies used to subsidize low 
demand periods during each day. For instance, early morning
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bids from generation facilities have been known to approach 
$0.00/MWh. Power is not free. There is always some 
production cost, but this strategy is used to keep 
generation facilities connected to the power grid and 
spinning. It is uneconomic for a generation facility to be 
unconnected from the grid and spinning. It is also 
uneconomic for a facility to be unconnected and not spinning 
since start-up can take as long as 10 to 24 hours, on 
average, depending on the type of facility. Therefore, peak 
day (typically 2-6 p.m.) pricing is known to include margins 
to cover the early morning costs associated with this 
production strategy.
For comparison purposes, Louisiana's fuel production 
costs figures used to estimate true marginal production 
costs are more closely related to the market clearing prices 
of California's Power Exchange. Unfortunately, an accurate 
comparison is not possible at this time since summer peak 
demand data are not available. However, if the early trend 
of market clearing prices in the $35/MWh to $45/MWh range 
continues, it could be an indication that Louisiana is 
certain to have stranded generation facility costs totaling 
4 to 5 billion dollars.
6 .7 Experimentation Results Summary
The results of this two stage methodology have 
provided a significant contribution to restructuring 
Louisiana's electric utility system. First, two levels of 
peak demand, power imports, and transmission interconnection
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costs were used to test response sensitivities to the LaDEUX 
model where market clearing facilities and market clearing 
prices were determined. This information was then used in 
the second stage of the methodology to implement the Cost- 
of-Plant and Embedded Cost methods of stranded generation 
facility cost analysis. Each method provided a range for 
estimating stranded generation facility costs.
The chapter presented several interesting results 
concerning the classification of generation facilities, 
identification of stranded facilities, formation of a load 
pocket, and boundary estimates for stranded and 
uneconomically dispatched generation facility costs. More 
importantly, it has opened the door for future research 
incorporating other economic and decision science topics to 
add more detail and further refine these estimates.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1 Introduction
With oncoming competition brought forth by The Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, many regulatory bodies and electric 
utility companies must determine the economic condition of 
their system's generation mix. This research focused on a 
"Bottom-Up" method for estimating such economic conditions. 
It predicted stranded generation facilities for Louisiana 
using a Poolco restructuring method to estimate investor- 
owned utility stranded generation facility costs.
The "Bottom-Up" approach began with the construction 
of a nonlinear programming model, LaDEUX, to provide an 
economic dispatch of deregulated generation facilities to 
meet Louisiana's summer and winter peak needs. Sensitivity 
analysis for LaDEUX was conducted by designing several 
experiments to simulate industry conditions. Each experiment 
provided contrasting generation facility economic dispatch. 
To conclude the "Bottom-Up" process, two methods of cost 
analysis were employed to estimate investor-owned utility 
stranded generation facility costs.
Results based on experimentation of LaDEUX and 
subsequent costs analysis are summarized in Section 7.2. 
Economic and technical limitations to the results are 
presented in Section 7.3. Topics for future research are
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discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5, and finally, general 
conclusions are drawn in Section 7.6.
7.2 Research Results
Chapter 5 presented two stage results which first 
determined the economic dispatch of Louisiana's electric 
utility system from the LaDEUX model and then provided 
estimates of stranded generation facility cost. Some 
interesting conclusions concerning the restructured 
operation of Louisiana's electric utility system were drawn 
from the research methodology.
In the first stage of the methodology, the following 
sets of factors were used to create sixteen experiments, or 
eight experimental boundary cases, for capturing marginal 
production costs.
(1) Fuel vs. Average Variable Production Costs,
(2) Summer vs. Winter Peak Demands,
(3) Opened vs. Closed Power Import Policies, and
(4) Bundled vs. Unbundled Transmission Interconnection 
Costs.
Complete economic dispatch results from all LaDEUX 
experiments can be found in Appendix F.
While reviewing these results, it was noted that 
Louisiana's generation facilities could be categorized into 
three distinct classes. The classes are :
(1) must-run facilities,
(2) transitional facilities, and
(3) stranded facilities.
Generation facilities within each classification provided 
particular contributions toward stranded generation facility 
cost estimates.
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The economic dispatch experiments were designed to 
determine a coincident peak hour production cost for 
Louisiana's electric utility system, but also indicated the 
system's market clearing price and market clearing facility. 
Other interesting economic dispatch discoveries included the 
identification of a New Orleans area load pocket, the 
recognition of discontinuous generation production supply 
curves, and the justification of previous research 
theorizing the potential for stranded qualifying facilities.
Each of the discoveries is significant, but the 
detection of discontinuous supply curves for Louisiana's 
generation system is a major finding of this research. It 
proves that any study of the state's generation facilities 
that does not take into account transmission interconnection 
constraints is incapable of accurately evaluating stranded 
generation facility costs.
In the second stage of the methodology, stranded 
generation facility costs were calculated using LaDEUX's 
economic dispatch results and supplied the following 
optimistic and pessimistic stranded costs estimates.
OPTIMISTIC
STRANDED GENERATION FACILITY COSTS: $ 984,268,058 
This figure was obtained using the Embedded Cost method for 
stranded cost estimation and the following experimental 
dispatch factors :
(1) average variable production costs,
(2) coincident summer peak demand conditions,
(3) a closed power import policy, and
(4) bundled transmission interconnection costs.
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PESSIMISTIC
STRANDED GENERATION FACILITY COSTS: $ 5,536,825,022 
This figure was obtained using the Embedded Cost method for 
stranded cost estimation and the following experimental 
dispatch factors :
(1) fuel production costs,
(2) coincident winter peak demand conditions,
(3) an open power import policy, and
(4) unbundled transmission interconnection costs.
Economic dispatch results indicated that LaDEUX 
experiments which included power imported from neighboring 
electric utilities greatly affected the identification of 
Louisiana's stranded generation facilities and estimates for 
their costs. The estimates were higher for open system 
experiments compared to closed system experiments. These 
results were expected, but they indicated the additional 
amount of stranded costs incurred if Louisiana's electric 
utilities decided to strand their own high cost facilities 
and purchase inexpensive power on the open market. In 
addition, results showed that stranded generation facility 
cost estimates climbed even higher when transmission 
interconnection costs were bundled with production costs. 
These results were also expected.
There is some concern about complete stranded 
generation facility cost recovery. The concern has to do 
with the fact that once these stranded or uneconomically 
operating facilities are completely depreciated, owners will 
have the ability to manipulate market clearing prices and 
control their customer base. It is hoped that future
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litigation or legislation will take this looming situation 
into consideration before rulings are made or policy is 
developed.
7.3 Research Limitations
In contrast to the interesting findings of this 
research, there are a few academic and practical limitations 
which should be mentioned. For instance, the Murray Hydro 
facility is always dispatched first by LaDEUX using the fuel 
production cost priority rule. This result is expected since 
the facility incurs no fuel costs. But, there is a problem 
with dispatching this facility to meet summer peak demand. 
The facility has the ability for peak production in the 
spring when northern snow melts and seasonal showers 
increase water levels in the Mississippi River.
Unfortunately, peak demand does not occur in the spring. It 
occurs in late summer. Even though this is a low head, high 
volume facility, river conditions are generally low enough 
to constrain capacity. Consequently, another facility is 
required to provide the unmet capacity.
In addition, some readers may argue that there are 
technical limitations associated with the LaDEUX model. They 
may indicate that certain significant electrical components 
inherent to electrical networks are not completely modeled. 
This may be true, but because of the level of aggregation 
required for modeling control area generation facilities and 
transmission interconnections, a trade-off of detailed 
network load flow modeling must be made for economic
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analysis. One must keep in mind that economic analysis is 
difficult to perform using detailed electric utility load 
flow software since costs are not part of the software's 
parameters.
Another controversial modeling subject to consider is 
the boundary issue associated with wheeling excess capacity. 
This shortcoming of assessing the ability of neighboring 
systems to wheel their excess power into the state can 
present uncertainties with identifying stranded generation 
facilities. The LaDEUX model is designed to saturate a power 
pool with as much power as transmission interconnections and 
model-driven market clearing prices will allow.
This modeling limitation may be valid since there is 
currently no restructuring precedent for meeting native 
demand first. If Louisiana's power market is priced higher 
than those of neighboring states, then generation facilities 
in those states may respond to market conditions by selling 
outside their native system for higher profits. The boundary 
issue has no definite solution but has the ability to 
increase stranded generation facility costs by stranding 
native facilities.
One final limitation concerns the static nature with 
which stranded generation facility costs are estimated.
Price elasticities and efficiency gains are two topics that 
must be addressed since future market prices are expected to 
decline. The anticipated decline in prices coupled with an 
increase in demand will likely decrease estimates of
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stranded generation facility costs. Further discussions 
concerning these two topics can be found in Sections 7.5.1 
and 7.5.2.
7.4 Future Research for the LaDEUX Model
While developing the LaDEUX model, a number of 
additional research topics were identified. Each adds 
different qualities for economic dispatch. The topics 
include transmission interconnection pricing mechanisms, 
economic dispatch under environmental constraints, and 
simulation modeling. Each is described in separate sections 
below.
7.4.1 Trajismission Interconnection Pricing Mechanisms
An electric utility company's transmission system is 
the "bridge" between market-driven generation facilities 
and regulated distribution facilities. It is the most 
important function when it comes to evaluating different 
restructuring methods. Wholesale, as well as retail, 
wheeling is not possible without sufficient capacity and 
advantageous pricing mechanisms.
Theories on pricing mechanisms for electric utility 




(3) direction- and load-sensitive.
No matter which mechanism is implemented, transmission 
system oivners must be assured of a return on their 
investment subject to FERC regulation.
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In LaDEUX, only transmission system interconnections 
between competing control areas are modeled to determine 
the economic dispatch of generation facilities. The 
theories for determining rates for these interconnections 
are the same as the theories for determining rates for an 
entire transmission system. Brief descriptions of each 
theory are presented in the following paragraphs.
Poscage stamp transmission rates are independent of 
distance and direction, and is the pricing mechanism of 
choice for this research. It is a simple and straight­
forward pricing mechanism to implement since the same 
charge is applied whether transmission distance is long or 
short.
Distance-sensitive rates are based on the electrical 
distance between a generation facility source and electric 
load or, in other words, the distance over the primary 
electrical path. A common way to measure this is in MW- 
miles, which is the product of the capacity and distance 
involved.
This type of pricing mechanism sends "signals" to the 
market, whether intended or not. For example, distance- 
sensitive prices indicate where potential new generation 
facilities should be located. In addition, it discourages 
competition from more distant generation facilities. 
Therefore, if a high degree of distance sensitivity were 
built into transmission rates, one could draw a circle
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around the load beyond which all generation facilities 
would be uncompetitive due to excessive transmission fees.
Direction- and load-sensitive rates attempt to price 
transmission usage on the basis of the scarcity of the 
resource at the time of use. Similar to the distance- 
sensitive pricing mechanism, this one also sends a "signal" 
to the market. Load-sensitive pricing indicates locations 
for new generation facilities in places where there is 
ample preexisting transmission capacity or where the 
prevailing direction of power flow on the system is 
opposite the intended flow pattern.
The addition of such distance-sensitive and direction- 
or load-sensitive pricing mechanisms would be expected to 
change solutions obtained from the LaDEUX model and in turn 
require an adjustment to estimates for stranded generation 
facility costs. The inclusion of such pricing mechanisms 
can provide an interesting new approach for determining 
stranded facilities and their costs.
7.4.2 Economic Dispatch, with Environmental Constraints
Recent seminars on electric utility deregulation have 
presented environmental concerns associated with 
restructuring the industry. Adapting this research subject 
into the LaDEUX model to incorporate a set of constraints 
to simulate economic environmental dispatch should be 
straightforward. It is currently unclear how environmental 
concerns will affect economic dispatch and stranded 
generation facility costs for Louisiana, but this modeling
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enhancement may help provide answers to environmental 
concerns.
7.4.3 Simulation Modeling of the Poolco System
There is also a dynamic nature to the problem of 
identifying stranded generation facilities and their costs 
since markets evolve in complex and unpredictable ways. In 
its current form, LaDEUX statically estimates stranded 
facilities at two moments in time, summer peak and winter 
peak. From these estimates, typical power engineering 
relationships are used for estimating annual energy sales to 
determine stranded costs for generation facilities. The 
reformulation of LaDEUX using dynamic simulation modeling 
techniques may improve the estimates of this research. This 
future research would be expected to take at least a year to 
implement. In addition, it is unclear at the present time if 
such an improvement in results would be worth the effort.
7.5 Future Research for the Embedded Cost Method
Determining true stranded generation facility costs 
requires the estimation of uncertain future market prices. 
The major reason for such uncertainty rests with not knowing 
the industry's future structure because it is being debated 
now. Therefore, three topics of future research for 
estimating stranded generation facility costs using the 
Embedded Cost method concern price elasticities, efficiency 
gains, and net stranded costs. Each is described in a 
separate section below.
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7.5.1 Price Elasticities
Price elasticities can be used to further enhance 
estimates for stranded generation facility costs. Changes in 
summer and winter peak demand are expected as facility 
production costs change. As costs drop' and quantity demand 
rises, previously identified stranded generation facilities 
may become unstranded and reduce total stranded generation 
facility costs. Since this is simply an economic improvement 
of original cost data, there is no limit to the different 
levels of price elasticities that can be studied. The 
addition of price elasticities also creates the ability to 
study the dynamics of transmission interconnections. For 
instance, as production costs drop and seasonal peak demand 
rises, transmission interconnection capacity margins may 
decrease to a point where certain control areas become 
isolated and totally dependent on local production creating 
a new monopolistic market instead of an open market for 
electric power. If this situation could occur, significant 
rents would accrue to the owners of must-run generation 
facilities.
7.5.2 Efficiency Gains
Efficiency gains have not been included in the cost 
analysis process for a number of different reasons. First, 
the data used were taken from FERC Form 1 information for 
existing investor-owned utilities. All of these utilities 
were under traditional rate-of-return regulation at the 
time of publication, and, as noted earlier in this
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research, this regulatory regime has been criticized as not 
providing utilities with adequate cost savings incentives. 
When analyzing utility expense activities, there has been 
no incentive to produce at a cost-minimizing level. Since 
traditional regulation sets a "reasonable" rate-of-return 
as its benchmark, any utility cost-minimizing activities 
are immediately passed on to ratepayers and not utility 
shareholders. Also, when analyzing utility capital 
activities, Averch and Johnson (1962) noted that rate-of- 
return regulation gave utilities incentives to over­
capitalize and not produce efficiently.
A significant motivating factor in the policy debate 
of moving forward with restructuring rests with encouraging 
competition to stimulate cost efficiencies which do not 
exist under current rate-of-return regulation. Therefore, 
efficiency gain modifications to the Embedded Cost method 
for estimating stranded generation facility costs are 
needed and provide another interesting topic for continued 
research.
7.5.3 Net Stranded Costs
In this research, gross stranded costs were estimated 
for recovery. Net stranded costs differ from gross stranded 
costs because gross stranded costs ignore generation 
facilities that have market values greater than their book 
values. Baxter and Hirst (ORNL/CON-406, 1995) assume in 
their literature on estimating potential stranded 
commitments that a complete assessment of a utility's
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competitive position should include both generation 
facilities that are above and below market value. Hence, 
estimates of net stranded generation facility costs would 
reflect the difference between uneconomical and economical 
facilities. They argue that a net stranded cost calculation 
is the appropriate measure of the potential losses to 
utility shareholders (or core customers) from wholesale or 
retail wheeling. Therefore, a natural progression of this 
research would include estimates for net stranded 
generation facility costs. It would provide an interesting 
and more realistic topic for continued work.
7 . 6 Dissertation Conclusions
This research has developed an innovative, two stage 
methodology for combining the technical and economic 
knowledge needed for the estimation of Louisiana's stranded 
generation facility costs. In the first stage, a nonlinear 
programming model was developed to provide the technical 
evaluation of generation facilities under economic 
dispatch. This part by itself is a significant contribution 
to restructuring Louisiana's electric utility system. It 
provides valuable information about the state's production 
capabilities to regulators, electric utilities, and power 
marketers. The second stage of the methodology contains two 
approaches for economic analysis to determine stranded 
costs associated with the assessment of non-dispatched and 
uneconomically dispatched generation facilities.
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Electric utility deregulation was legislated without 
the vision of all restructuring implications for a new 
electric power market. This dissertation has successfully 
investigated the implications of stranded generation 
facilities and their costs. Thus, a foundation has been 
formed for future exploration into the many facets of this 
complex issue. Developing reasonable and equitable ways to 
mitigate and allocate stranded generation facility costs 
will be a crucial precondition to restructuring the 
electric utility industry both here in Louisiana and across 
the nation.
7.7 End Notes
‘ A drop in costs is defined as all production parties 
submitting lower bids into the Poolco.
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APPENDIX A 
THE LOUISIANA SYSTEM MAP
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ÎY GULF STATES: CONTROL AREA = 1 MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
1 Fina Oil & Chem.** Q.F./GSU TX GAS 37.00 0.01400 37.00
2 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2“ Q.F./GSU LA GAS 200.00 0.01570 237.00
3 E.l. Dupont** Q.F./GSU TX GAS 85.00 0.01650 322.00
4 Exxon Chemical** Q.F./GSU LA GAS 84.00 0.01760 406.00
5 Cogen Power Q.F./GSU TX Waste Heat 5.00 0.01850 411.00
6 Formosa Plastics Q.F./GSU LA GAS 46.00 0.01910 457.00
7 Engineered Carbons Q.F./GSU TX Waste Heat 10.00 0.01980 467.00
8 Vulcan Chemical Q.F./GSU LA GAS 108.00 0.02010 575.00
9 Huntsman Corp. Q.F./GSU TX GAS 72.00 0.02030 647.00
10 Clark Refining Q.F./GSU TX GAS 84.60 0.02130 731.80
11 Air Liquide Q.F./GSU TX GAS 36 00 0.02140 767.80
12 Dow Chemical Q.F./GSU LA GAS 670.00 0.02220 1437.80
13 James River Paper Q.F./GSU LA Paper ByProd. 57.50 0.02240 1495.30
14 Borden Chemical Q.F./GSU LA GAS 91.50 0.02240 1586.80
15 Star Enterprises Q.F./GSU TX GAS 164.00 0.02290 1750.80
16 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA NUCLEAR 1022.30 0.02868 2773.10
17 BASF Q.F./GSU LA GAS 36.60 0.02870 2809.70
18 Agrielectric Q.F./GSU LA Rice Husks 12 50 0.03490 2822.20
19 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA COAL 430.00 0.04020 3252.20
20 Lewis Creek GSU TX GAS 544.00 0 05390 3796.20
21 Sabine GSU TX GAS 2051.00 0.05500 5847.20
22 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA GAS 755.00 0.05980 6602.20
23 Willow Glen GSU LA GAS 2178.00 0.06710 8780.20
24 Rayne Rayne LA GAS 2.50 0.32934 8782.70
25 New Roads New Roads LA GAS 7.60 3.28619 8790.30
26 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 8919.30
27 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA GAS 148.00 8.00000 9067.30
28 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 9336.30
29 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA GAS 175.00 8.00000 9511.30
30 Firestone*** Q.F./GSU LA GAS 0.30 8.00000 9511.60


























ENTERGY LOUISIANA South: CONTROL AREA = 2
PLANT#: PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST
1 IMC-Agrico Q.F./LP&L
2 Calciner Ind. Q.F./LP&L
3 B.P. Oil Q.F./LP&L
4 Waterford 3 LP&L
5 Nine Mile Point LP&L
6 Little Gypsy LP&L
7 Houma City/Parish





ENTERGY LOUISIANA North: CONTROL AREA = 3





MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
LA Sulpher 22.00 0.01900 22.00
LA Petr. Coke 27.00 0.01910 49,00
LA Refinery Gas 19.15 0.02120 68.15
LA NUCLEAR 1200.00 0.02210 1268.15
LA GAS 1917.00 0.06420 3185.15
LA GAS 1251.00 0.06680 4436.15
LA GAS 98.00 0.07251 4534.15
LA GAS 891.00 0.07470 5425.15
LA GAS 21.00 0.21860 5446.15
LA GAS 42.90 0.33913 5489.05
LA GAS 21.00 8.00000 5510.05
MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
LA GAS 34.50 0.00750 34.50
LA GAS 480.00 0.07900 514.50
LA GAS 81.00 0.08193 595.50





ENTERGY NEW ORLEANS: CONTROL AREA = 4 MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
1 Air Products Q.F./NOPSI LA GAS 23.00 0.02370 23.00
2 Michoud NOPSI LA GAS 959.00 0.06940 982.00
3 A.B. Patterson NOPSI LA OIL 16.00 0.21440 998.00
4 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 1101.00





























CLECO North: CONTROL AREA = 5 MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
1 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA COAL 558.00 0.02600 558.00
2 Dolet Hills CLECO LA LIGNITE 650.37 0.03540 1208.37
3 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA GAS 48.00 0.04021 1256.37
4 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA GAS 445.50 0.06210 1701.87
5 Coughlin CLECO LA GAS 368.10 0 07850 2069.97
6 Opelousas Opelousas LA GAS 36.00 8.00000 2105.97
CLECO South: CONTROL AREA = 6 MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
1 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.F./CLECO LA Bagasse 0.10 0.02190 0.10
2 Teche CLECO LA GAS 427.90 0.05310 428.00
3 Franklin CLECO LA GAS 10.00 8.00000 438.00
CLECO East: CONTROL AREA = 7 MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
No Generation Plants North of Lake Ponchatrain, just Demand.
SWEPCO: CONTROL AREA = 8 MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY VARIABLE COST CAPACITY
1 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX LIGNITE 619.38 0.02460 619.38
2 Dean Lumber* Q.F./SWEPCO TX Wood 0.60 0.02570 619.98
3 Snider Industries* Q.F./SWEPCO TX Wood 5.00 0.02590 624.98
4 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX COAL 1674.00 0.04190 2298.98
5 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX GAS 881.52 0.05570 3180.50
6 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA GAS 125.00 0.06060 3305.50
7 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX GAS 499.50 0.06650 3805.00
8 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA GAS 277.27 0.08610 4082.27
















CAJUN: CONTROL AREA = 9
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST
1 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU
2 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN
LAPA: CONTROL AREA = 10
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST



































ALEX: CONTROL AREA = 11
PLANT # PLANT NAME 
1 Hunter*
LEPA: CONTROL AREA = 12











ST. FUEL TYPE 
LA GAS















CONTRACT GENERATION: CONTROL AREA = C
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST
1 Grand Gulf System Energy
2 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L
MW TOTAL AVERAGE

























WHEELED POWER/IMPORTED GENERATION: CONTROL AREA = I
CONTROL MW TOTAL AVERAGE CUMMULATIVE
AREA COMPANY NAME IMPORT HOST ST. CAPACITY VARIALBE COST CAPACITY
15 Southern Company ENTERGY MS 3653 0.04331 3853.00
16 MP&L ENTERGY MS 4079 0.06985 7932.00
17 AP&L ENTERGY/SWEPCO AR 4995 005404 12927.00
18 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098 0.06927 14025.00










1 * Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data,
2 ** Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 •** Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOST'S system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996, capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was down for repairs. 
Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
































# PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL CQST CAPACITY
1 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA NUCLEAR 1022.30 0.02868 1022.30
2 Fina Oil & Chem." Q.F./GSU TX GAS 37.00 0.01400 1059.30
3 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2" Q.F./GSU LA GAS 200.00 0.01570 1259.30
4 E.l. Dupont" Q.F./GSU TX GAS 85.00 0.01650 1344.30
5 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA COAL 430.00 0.04020 1774.30
6 Exxon Chemical" Q.F./GSU LA GAS 84.00 0.01760 1858.30
7 Cogen Power Q.F./GSU TX Waste Heat 5.00 0.01850 1863.30
8 Formosa Plastics Q.F./GSU LA GAS 46.00 0.01910 1909.30
9 Engineered Carbons Q.F./GSU TX Waste Heat 10.00 0.01980 1919.30
10 Vulcan Chemical Q.F./GSU LA GAS 108.00 0.02010 2027.30
11 Huntsman Corp. Q.F./GSU TX GAS 72.00 0.02030 2099.30
12 Clark Refining Q.F./GSU TX GAS 84.80 0.02130 2184.10
13 Air Liquide Q.F./GSU TX GAS 36.00 0.02140 2220.10
14 Dow Chemical Q.F./GSU LA GAS 670.00 0.02220 2890.10
15 Borden Chemical Q.F./GSU LA GAS 91.50 0.02240 2981.60
16 James River Paper Q.F./GSU LA Paper ByProd. 57.50 0.02240 3039.10
17 Star Enterprises Q.F./GSU TX GAS 164.00 0.02290 3203.10
18 Lewis Creek GSU TX GAS 544.00 0.05390 3747.10
19 Sabine GSU TX GAS 2051.00 0.05500 5798.10
20 BASF Q.F./GSU LA GAS 36.60 0.02870 5834.70
21 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA GAS 755.00 0.05980 6589.70
22 Willow Glen GSU LA GAS 2178.00 0.06710 8767.70
23 Agrielectric Q.F./GSU LA Rice Husks 12.50 0.03490 8780.20
24 New Roads New Roads LA GAS 7.60 3.28619 8787.80
25 Rayne Rayne LA GAS 2.50 0.32934 8790.30
26 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 8919.30
27 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA GAS 148.00 8.00000 9067.30
28 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 9336.30
29 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA GAS 175.00 8.00000 9511.30
30 Firestone"* Q.F./GSU LA GAS 0.30 8.00000 9511.60





























ENTERGY LOUISIANA South: CONTROL AREA = 2 MW CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL COST CAPACITY
1 Waterford 3 LP&L LA NUCLEAR 1200.00 0.02210 1200.00
2 IMC-Agrico Q.F./LP&L LA Sulpher 22.00 0.01900 1222.00
3 Calciner Ind. Q.F./LP&L LA Petr. Coke 27.00 0.01910 1249.00
4 B.P. Oil Q.F./LP&L LA Refinery Gas 19.15 0.02120 1268.15
5 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA GAS 1917.00 0.06420 3185.15
6 Little Gypsy LP&L LA GAS 1251.00 0.06680 4436.15
7 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA GAS 891.00 0.07470 5327.15
8 Houma City/Parish LA GAS 98.00 0.07251 5425.15
9 Plaquemine LEPA LA GAS 42.90 0.33913 5468.05
10 Buras LP&L LA GAS 21.00 0.21880 5489.05
11 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA GAS 21.00 8.00000 5510.05
ENTERGY LOUISIANA North: CONTROL AREA = 3 MW CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL CQST CAPACITY
1 Minden Minden LA GAS 34.50 0.00750 34.50
2 Ruston Ruston LA GAS 81.00 0.08193 115.50
3 Sterlington LP&L LA GAS 480.00 0.07900 595.50
4 Monroe LP&L LA GAS 137.00 8.00000 732.50
ENTERGY NEW ORLEANS: CONTROL AREA = 4 MW CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL COST CAPACITY
1 Air Products Q.F./NOPSI LA GAS 23.00 0.02370 23.00
2 Michoud NOPSI LA GAS 959.00 0.06940 982.00
3 A.B. Patterson NOPSI LA OIL 16.00 0.21440 998.00
4 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 1101.00





























CLECO North: CONTROL AREA = 5 MW CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL COST CAPACITY
1 Dolet Hills CLECO LA LIGNITE 650.37 0.03540 650.37
2 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA COAL 558.00 0.02600 1208.37
3 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA GAS 445.50 0.06210 1653.87
4 Coughlin CLECO LA GAS 368.10 0.07850 2021.97
5 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA GAS 48.00 0.04021 2069.97
6 Opelousas Opelousas LA GAS 36.00 8.00000 2105.97
CLECO South: CONTROL AREA = 6 MW CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL COST CAPACITY
1 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.F./CLECO LA Bagasse 0.10 0.02190 0.10
2 Teche CLECO LA GAS 427.90 0.05310 428.00
3 Franklin CLECO LA GAS 10.00 8.00000 438.00
CLECO East: CONTROL AREA = 7 MW CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL COST CAPACITY
No Generation Plants North of Lake Ponchatrain, just Demand.
SWEPCO: CONTROL AREA = 8 MW CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F./HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL COST CAPACITY
1 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX LIGNITE 619.38 0.02460 619.38
2 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX COAL 1674.00 0.04190 2293.38
3 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA GAS 125.00 0.06060 2418.38
4 Dean Lumber* Q.F./SWEPCO TX Wood 0.60 0.02570 2418.98
5 Snider Industries* Q.F./SWEPCO TX Wood 5.00 0.02590 2423.98
6 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX GAS 881.52 0.05570 3305.50
7 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX GAS 499.50 0.06650 3805.00
8 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA GAS 277.27 0.08610 4082.27













CAJUN: CONTROL AREA = 9
PLANT # PLANT NAME
1 Big Cajun 2















LAFA: CONTROL AREA = 10
PLANT # PLANT NAME O.F./HOST
1 Doc Bonin LAFA
ST. FUEL TYPE 
LA GAS
MW CUMMULATIVE













ALEX: CONTROL AREA = 11
PLANT # PLANT NAME O.F./HOST
1 Hunter* Alexandria
LEPA: CONTROL AREA = 12
PLANT # PLANT NAME O.F./HOST























CONTRACT GENERATION: CONTROL AREA = C
PLANT # PLANT NAME O.F./HOST
1 Grand Gulf System Energy
2 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L
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AREA COMPANY NAME IMPORT HOST ST. FUEL TYPE CAPACITY FUEL COST CAPACITY
15 Southern Company ENTERGY MS 3853.00 0.01860 3853.00
16 MP&L ENTERGY MS 4079.00 0.03283 7932.00
17 AP&L ENTERGY/SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 12927.00
18 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.02575 14025,00











1 * Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 “  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 “ * Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOST'S system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996, capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 IVIW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was down for repairs. 
Normal capacity from the facility is 326 IVIW.













INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITY GENERATION FACILITY COST AND SALES DATA
















PLANT # PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 3,095.227,159 4,512,000,000 0.4626 0.5876 6,843,285,000
2 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 400,221,256 588,325,000 0.4626 0.5876 1,983,777,000
3 Lewis Creek GSU TX 64,992,832 56,360,000 0.4626 0.5876 2,416,151,000
4 Sabine GSU TX 349,631,298 229,207,000 0.4626 0,5876 8,517,695,000
5 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 143,372,665 57,451,000 0.4626 0.5876 1,862,112,000
6 Willow Glen GSU LA 363,074,222 228,523,000 0.4626 0.5876 3,988,943,000
7 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 32,179,665 Unavailable 0.4626 0.5876 0
8 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 40,306,160 Unavailable 0.4626 0.5876 0
9 Neches GSU TX 0 Unavailable 0.4626 0.5876 0
10 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 0 Unavailable 0.4626 0.5876 0
ENTERGY LOUISIANA South: CONTROL AREA = 2
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 2,517,886,191 2,760,779,000 0.4793 1.00 8,926,846,000
2 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 227,194,376 119,680,000 0.4793 1.00 5,702,647,000
3 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 119,366,688 39,786,000 0.4793 1.00 3,598,372,000
4 Waterford 1 &2 LP&L LA 143,725,713 123,480,000 0.4793 1.00 1,897,343,000
5 Buras LP&L LA 2,119,268 Unavailable 0.4793 1.00 3,709,000
6 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 4,650,387 Unavailable 0.4793 1.00 0
ENTERGY LOUISIANA North: CONTROL AREA = 3
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 Sterlington LP&L LA 69,695,996 16,609,000 0.0995 1.00 379,899,000
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PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 Michoud NOPSI LA 112,715,311 36,904,000 0.2691 1.00 1,935,345,000
2 A.B. Patterson (Steam) NOPSI LA 22,068,263 Unavailable 0.2691 1.00 0
3 Market Street NOPSI LA 1,263,281 Unavailable 0.2691 1.00 0
4 A.B. Patterson (G.T.) NOPSI LA 1,474,282 Unavailable 0.2691 1.00 0
CLECO North: CONTROL AREA = 5
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 297,028,477 272,134,000 0.4562 1.00 3,187,051,000
2 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 491,838,254 527,800,000 0.4562 1.00 3,655,997,000
3 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 67,704,001 74,802,000 0.4562 1.00 724,919,000
4 Coughlin CLECO LA 44,587,532 14,049,000 0.4562 1.00 232,386,000
CLECO South: CONTROL AREA = 6
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 Teche CLECO LA 44,308,973 28,432,000 0.3824 1.00 1,209,205,000
2 Franklin CLECO LA 1,336,075 Unavailable 0.3824 1.00 0
CLECO East: CONTROL AREA = 7
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT # PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD




























SWEPCO: CONTROL AREA = 8
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 435,387,599 1,260,099,000 0.5158 0.3003 4,269,747,000
2 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 453,604,741 419,425,000 0.5158 0.3003 9,181,009,000
3 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 63,412,310 42,437,000 0.5158 0.3003 2,139,573,000
4 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 15,440,088 340,080,000 0.5158 0.3003 146,420,000
5 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 47,824,186 32,397,000 0.5158 0.3003 1,018,268,000
6 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 26,800,270 Unavailable 0.5158 0.3003 252,601,000
7 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 6,126,489 Unavailable 0.5158 0.3003 7,865,000
CAJUN: CONTROL AREA = 9
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD
1 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 223,924,172 1,196,000,000 0.5236 1.00 1,152,699,000
2 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA N/A 31,933,000 0.5236 1.00 282,895,000
CONTRACT GENERATION: CONTROL AREA = C
LOAD LOUISIANA TOTAL
PLANT# PLANT NAME OWNER ST. COST-OF-PLANT ORG. CONS. COST FACTOR DIV. FACTOR KWH SOLD




1 LOUISIANA DIV. FACTOR = Diversity factor for Louisiana portion of Control Area Summer Peak Demand thiat cross state lines.
2 COST-OF-PLANT figures are Book Values for 1996 unless where noted.




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX C.1
ESTIMATE FOR POSTAGE STAMP TRANSMISSION INTERCONNECTION COST
AVG. COMPANY
CONTROL ELECTRIC UTILITY SUMMER PEAK TRANSMISSION WEIGHTED AVG. 
AREA# COMPANY MW DEMAND COST PER MWh COST ALLOCATION
1 GSU 6633.99 1.57 0.5326
2 LP&L South 4603.70 0.72 0.1695
3 LP&L North 1346.58 0.72 0.0496
4 NOPSI 1153.99 1.14 0.0673
5 CLECO North 942.20 1.32 0.0636
6 CLECO South 417.60 1.32 0.0282
7 CLECO East 384.10 1.32 0.0259
8 SWEPCO 3555.56 1.07 0.1945
9 CAJUN 0.00 0.00 0.0000
10 LAFA 367.00 2.12 0.0398
11 ALEX 111.20 1.32 0.0075
12 LEPA 39.50 1.32 0.0027
TOTALS 19555.42 1.1812
Average Postage Rate = S1.18/MWh
NOTE:
The Postage Stamp for Transmission Interconnection Costs is a summer peak system 
weighted average of average company transmission costs.
2 05








TRANSMISSION INTERCONNECTION SYSTEM PARAMETERS














LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 LP&L S. Waterfo (1452) - GSU WGIen (1419) 500 1200 0.00070 0.01094 0.01096 27.40593
2 LP&L S. Bgatel (1493) - GSU Conwy (1297) 230 436 0.00173 0.01192 0.01204 6.37175
3 ÜLP&L S. - GSU: PARALLEL LINESII 230 924 0.00291 1.54192
LP&L S. Evgren (1461) - GSU WGIen (1420) 230 462 0.00070 0.00590 0.00594
LP&L S. Evgren (1461) - GSU WGIen (1420) 230 462 0.00050 0.00570 0.00572
4 GSU GonzI (1331) - LP&L S. Sorxfm (1520) 138 130 0.00738 0.02035 0.02165 4.12243
5 GSU Addis (1267) - LP&L S. Plaqmn (1463) 138/115 60 0.02287 0.11756 0.11976 15.83878
ENTERGY GULF STATES to ENTERGY LOUISIANA North INTERCONNECTION (1 <=> 3)
SERIES/
LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS VM MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 GSU Hartbrg (897) - LP&L N. MtOliv (1968) 500 1732 0.00266 0.03965 0.03974 99.34781
ENTERGY GULF STATES to CLECO North INTERCONNECTIONS (1 <=> 5)
SERIES/
LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 GSU Nelson (1027) - CLECO N. Penton (239) 230 333 0.00340 0.02170 0.02196 11.61935
2 GSU Toledo (888) - CLECO N. Leesv (209) 138 145 0.03630 0.09450 0.10123 19.27864
3 GSU Toledo (888) - CLECO N. VanPlyTap (298) 138 145 0.01670 0.06510 0.06721 12.79907
4 CLECO N. Cooper (217) - GSU Bonweir (772) 138 137 0.06020 0.17010 0.18044 34.36271
5 CLECO N. Derid (208) - GSU Nelson (1028) 138 289 0.03140 0.12380 0.12772 24.32300























ENTERGY GULF STATES to CLECO South INTERCONNECTIONS (1 <=> 6)
SERIES/
too•o
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS VM MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 GSU Buwhse (1231) - CLECO S. Ivanhoe (214) 138 141 0.00970 0.02550 0.02728 5.19570
2 GSU Richard (1168) - CLECO S. Eunice (203) 138 296 0.00460 0.01790 0.01848 3.51964
3 GSU Richard (1168) - CLECO S. Habetz (201) 138 296 0.00960 0.03700 0.03823 7.27959
4 CLECO S. Hopkins (213) - GSU Moril (1228) 138 253 0.00130 0.00950 0.00959 1.82604
5 CLECO S. Longfl (270) - GSU StMarIn (1244) 69 39 0.00037 0.00054 0.00065 0.03117
6 CLECO S. Longfl (270) - GSU LG250P (1245) 69 39 0.01455 0.02088 0.02545 1.21165
7 CLECO S. BBrid (228) - GSU Anslabu (1233) 69 58 0.01910 0.03490 0.03978 1.89415
ENTERGY GULF STATES to SWEPCO INTERCONNECTION (1 <=> 8)
LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 GSU Grimes (713) - SWEPCO Crocket (2950) 345 1315 0.00316 0.03289 0.03304 39.32759
ENTERGY GULF STATES to CAJUN INTERCONNECTIONS (1 <=> 9)
LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS VM MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 GSU Fancy (1319) - CAJUN Cajun2 (452) 500 2048 0.00004 0.00070 0.00070 1.75285
2 GSU Webre (1425) - CAJUN Cajun2 (452) 500 2598 0.00038 0.00574 0.00575 14.38141
3 GSU Addis (1266) - CAJUN Cajuni (451) 230 566 0.00401 0.02800 0.02829 14.96313
4 GSU Watloo (1422) - CAJUN Cajuni (451) 230 685 0.00017 0.00120 0.00121 0.64114
ENTERGY GULF STATES to LAFA INTERCONNECTIONS (1
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS
<=> 10)
VM MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 GSU Cecelia (1236) - LAFA Bonin (404) 138 144 0.02140 0.05741 0.06127 11.66803






























LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 GSU Mcknt (1365) - MP&L Frkiin (1864) 500 1732 0.00080 0.01210 0.01213 30.31604
ENTERGY GULF STATES IMPORTS from Southern Company (SC) INTERCONNECTION (1 <= 15)
SERIES/
LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 SC Daniel (15035)-GSU Mcknt (1365) 500 2598 0.00212 0.03273 0.03280 81.99647
ENTERGY LOUISIANA South to ENTERGY NEW ORLEANS INTERCONNECTIONS (2 <=> 4)
SERIES/
LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 NOPSI Micho (1579) - LP&L S. Slidel (1519) 230 643 0.00280 0.03090 0.03103 16.41307
2 NOPSI Micho (1579) - LP&L S. Packai (1573) 230 639 0.00090 0.00980 0.00984 5.20602
3 NOPSI Micho (1579) - LP&L S. Arabi (1574) 230 760 0.00080 0.00990 0.00993 5.25417
4 NOPSI Tricu (1592) - LP&L S. Arabi (1574) 230 760 0.00010 0.00140 0.00140 0.74249
5 NOPSI Joliet (1609) - LP&L S. SPort (1529) 230 640 0.00029 0.00300 0.00301 1.59440
6 LP&L S. 9Mile (1552) - NOPSI Derbi (1603) 230 640 0.00080 0.00871 0.00875 4.62698
7 LP&L S. 9Mile (1552) - NOPSI Napol (1607) 230 760 0.00060 0.00700 0.00703 3.71658
8 LP&L S. Chlmet (1571) - NOPSI Pater (1588) 115 200 0.00580 0.03970 0.04012 5.30606
9 LP&L S. Prstap (1528) - NOPSI AveC (1608) 115 320 0.00030 0.00230 0.00232 0.30675
ENTERGY LOUISIANA South to CLECO South INTERCONNECTION (2 <=> 6)
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS V l-l MW CAP. R p.u.
1 CLECO S. Ramos (273)-LP&L S. Gibson (1469) 138/115 228 0.00802
SERIES/



























ENTERGY LOUISIANA South to CLECO East INTERCONNECTIONS (2 <=> 7)
SERIES/
too
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS V II MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 CLECO E. Madis (240) - LP&L S, Gypsy (1485) 230 454 0.00720 0.05150 0.05200 27.50846
2 CLECO E. Madis (240) - LP&L S. Pnlchtl (1496) 230 458 0.00382 0.02810 0.02836 15.00163
3 CLECO E. SSIld (237) - LP&L S. Slidel (1519) 230 800 0.00000 0.00100 0.00100 0.52900
4 CLECO E. Ramsay (291) - LP&L S. Bogalus (1509) 230 454 0.00492 0.03885 0.03916 20.71580
5 CLECO E. Frankin (296) - LP&L S. Frankin (1506) 115 100 0.00000 0.00100 0.00100 0.13225
ENTERGY LOUISIANA South to FRKLIN (MP&L Bus) INTERCONNECTION (2 <= 14)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MWCAP, R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 LP&L S. Bogalus (1510) - MP&L Frkiin (1864) 500 1732 0.00090 0.01640 0.01642 41.06169
ENTERGY LOUISIANA South IMPORTS from Southern Company INTERCONNECTIONS (2 <= 15)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS V II MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 8 0  Logtwn (15032) - LP&L S./CAJUN FrnBra (508) 230 797 0.00102 0.01267 0.01271 6.72411
2 SC Hatbg (15030) - LP&L S. Bogalus (1509) 230 458 0.01070 0.07920 0.07992 42.27743
ENTERGY LOUISIANA South IMPORTS from MP&L INTERCONNECTIONS (2 <= 16)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS V II MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 MP&L Gilbr (1899) - LP&L S. Amite (1504) 115 108 0.05250 0.15100 0.15987 21.14232
2 MP&L CoIn.P (1908) - LP&L S. Kentwd (1505) 115 69 0.06035 0.09615 0.11352 15.01311
































ENTERGY LOUISIANA North to CLECO North INTERCONNECTIONS (3 <=> 5)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS VM MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 CLECO N. Clarn (222) - LP&L N. Monlgy (1921) 230 414 0.00300 0.01910 0.01933 10.22777
2 CLECO N. Colfax (227) - LP&L N. IVIonlgy (1921) 230 414 0.00380 0.02390 0.02420 12.80191
3 CLECO N. Beacr (207) - LP&L N. Bvrcrk (1911) 138/115 93 0.00000 0.05000 0.05000 6.61250
4 CLECO N. Fisher (232) - LP&L N. Fisher (1920) 138/115 83 0.00220 0.03060 0.03068 4.05730
5 CLECO N. Leesv (209) - LP&L N. FtPolk (1996) 138/115 100 0.00000 0.00100 0.00100 0.13225
6 CLECO N. Carroll (212) - LP&L N. Ringid (1973) 138/115 125 0.02569 0.09173 0.09526 12.59807
7 CLECO N. Marksv (218) - LP&L N. lyiarksv (1997) 138/115 100 0.00000 0.00100 0,00100 0.13225
ENTERGY LOUISIANA North to SWEPCO INTERCONNECTION (3 <=>8)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 SWEPCO IVIinden (2739) - LP&L N. IVIinden (1976) 115 99 0.00690 0.01870 0.01993 2.63606
ENTERGY LOUISIANA North IMPORTS FROM BWILSON (MP&L Bus) INTERCONNECTIONS (3 <= 13)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 MP&L BWIsn (1822) - LP&L N. Sterl (1954) 500 1732 0.00120 0.01770 0.01774 44.35158
2 MP&L BWIsn (1823) - LP&L N. Talula (1960) 115 199 0.01800 0.12800 0.12926 17.09456
ENTERGY LOUISIANA North to CONTRACT GENERATION INTERCONNECTION (3 <= C2)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
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LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS VI1-1 MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 MP&L Natses (1854) - LP&L N. Redgum (1923) 115 87 0.03210 0.09110 0.09659 12.77402
2 MP&L Nat-ln (1859) - LP&L N. Plant (1922) 115 231 0.00364 0.03021 0.03043 4.02417
ENTERGY LOUISIANA North IMPORTS from AP&L INTERCONNECTIONS (3 <=




X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 AP&L EldEHV (2073) - LP&L N. Sterl (1954) 500 1732 0.00075 0.01054 0.01057 26.41663
2 AP&L EldEHV (2073) - LP&L N. MtOliv (1968) 500 1039 0.00034 0.01143 0.01144 28.58764
3 AP&L Huttig (2065) - LP&L N./CAJUN Marlon (462) 115 98 0.02410 0.06660 0.07083 9.36678
4 AP&L Eudra (2027) - LP&L N./CAJUN Chksaw (465) 115 80 0.01320 0.06021 0.06164 8.15188
5 AP&L Cros-N (2008) - LP&L N. Sterl (1952) 115 80 0.07479 0.19519 0.20903 27.64395
6 AP&L Merldn (2083) - LP&L N. Sterl (1952) 115 68 0.11716 0.18380 0.21797 28.82592
7 AP&L Eld-Up (2091) - LP&L N. Bernic (1971) 115 159 0.02282 0.13074 0.13272 17.55177
8 AP&L Taylor (2058) - LP&L N. Springh (1977) 115 120 0.00950 0.04266 0.04370 5.77998
9 AP&L Emersn (2026) - LP&L N. Haynvl (1979) 115 114 0.02035 0.05951 0.06289 8.31763
CLECO North to CLECO South INTERCONNECTIONS (5 <=
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS
:> 6)
VIl-l MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 CLECO N. Cocodr (233) - CLECO S. VllpIt (246) 230 829 0.00130 0.01230 0.01237 6.54294
2 CLECO N. Cough (204) - CLECO S. Manuel (248) 138 151 0.01380 0.05370 0.05544 10.55891
CLECO North to SWEPCO INTERCONNECTIONS (5 <=> 8)
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS V l-l MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 CLECO N. DolHIII (292) - SWEPCO SwShv (2723) 345 962 0.00160 0.02270 0.02276 27.08571














CLECO North to ALEXANDRIA INTERCONNECTIONS (5 <=> 11)
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS
1 CLECO N. TwBrdg - ALEX TBAlex






































LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 CLECO S. Wstfork (261) - LAFA PMouton (410) 230 829 0.00250 0.02270 0.02284 12.08091
2 LAFA Flander (401) - CLECO S. Flander (235) 230/138 336 0.00070 0.02170 0.02171 4.13470
3 CLECO S. Nlcktap (269) - LAFA Elkslat (413) 69 33 0.09350 0.08480 0.12623 6.00967
CLECO South to LEPA INTERCONNECTION (6 <=> 12)
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MWCAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 CLECO S. Ramos (273) - LEPA Mrgncty (441) 138 105 0.00500 0.01370 0.01458 2.77736
SWEPCO IMPORTS from AP&L INTERCONNECTIONS (8 <= 17)
LINE# INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 AP&L EldEHV (2072) - SWEPCO Longwd (2695) 345 900 0.00450 0.04930 0.04950 58.92327
2 AP&L Murfre (2170) - SWEPCO Snashvl (2615) 138 96 0.02920 0.08600 0.09082 17.29615































LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 PSOK Valiant (4283) - SWEPCO Lydia (2830) 345 717 0.00240 0.02130 0.02143 25.51275
2 PSOK CraigJt (4261) - SWEPCO Ashwest (2505) 138 190 0.01680 0.13340 0.13445 25.60536
3 PSOK CraigJt (4261) - SWEPCO Dequeen (2528) 138 191 0.01100 0.05380 0.05491 10.45764
SWEPCO IMPORTS from ERGOT INTERCONNECTION (8
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS
<=19)
Vl-I MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 ERCOT EastDC (9992) - SWEPCO Welsh (2918) 345 600 0.00000 0.00100 0.00100 1.19025
CONTRACT GENERATION to  BWILSON (MP&L Bus) INTERCONNECTION (13 <=




X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 MP&L BWIsn (1822) - SER GGulf (1837) 500 2598 0.00030 0.00500 0.00501 12.52248
INTERNAL BUS CONNECTION to BWILSON (MP&L Bus) INTERCONNECTION (B




X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u. IMPEDANCE
1 MP&L BWIsn (1822) - MP&L BWIsn (1823) 500/115 560 0.00060 0.03070 0.03071 4.06085
Louisiana Power Grid IMPORTS from MP&L through BWILSON (MP&L Bus) INTERCONNECTION (13 <= 16)
SERIES/
UNE n INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS V l-l MW CAP. R p.u. X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u.
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T3
CONTRACT GENERATION to FRKLIN (MP&L Bus) INTERCONNECTION (14 <= C l)
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS 
1 MP&L Frkiin (1864) - SER GGulf (1837)
V l-l MW CAP. R p.u.
SERIES/
X p.u. PARALLEL Z p.u.










Louisiana Power Grid IMPORTS from MP&L through FRKLIN (MP&L Bus) INTERCONNECTION (14 <= 16)
SERIES/
LINE # INTERCONNECTION ENDPOINTS
1 MP&L R.Bras (1814) - MP&L Frkiin (1864)
V I I MWCAP. Rp.u. Xp.u. PARALLEL Z p.u.























m 1 The numbers in parenthsis beside each interconnection title denote specific Control Areas. They are;
§ Entergy Gull States (GSU) = Control Area 1,
Entergy Louisiana South (LP&L S.) = Control Area 2, 
to Entergy Louisiana North (LP&L N.)= Control Area 3,
Q Entergy New Orleans (NOPSI) = Control Area 4,
I  CLECO North = Control Area 5,
? CLECO South = Control Area 6,
-n CLECO East = Control Area 7,
5. SWEPCO = Control Area 8.
m CAJUN = Control Area 9,
^  Lafayette Utilities (LAFA) = Control Area 10,■DO 
Q .
City of Alexandria (ALEX) = Control Area 11, 
LEPA ((Morgan City) = Control Area 12,
^  to BWILSON (IVIP&L Bus) = Control Area 13,
= FRKLIN (IVIP&L Bus) = Control Area 14,
^  CONTRACT GENERATION (Grand Gulf & IVlurray Hydro) = Control Area C, and
~ IIVIPORTED GENERATION where:
^ Southern Companies = Control Area 15,
g fVIP&L = Control Area 16,
g  AP&L = Control Area 17,
g PSOK = Control Area 18, and
G ERCOT = Control Area 19.
g 2 The numbers beside each interconnection endpoint correspond to SPP load points,
w 3 A Unity Power Factor is assumed for modeling.
§ 4 The system is in Normal Operation.
5 All Interconnection Data was taken from the 1996 Summer Peak Load Flow IVIodel by SPP 
and verified by System IVlaps at the Louisiana Public Service Commission.
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APPENDIX D.1




AREA# COMPANY PEAK DEMAND RESERVES DEMAND IN MW
1 Entergy Gulf States 6,633.99 995.10 7,629.09
2 Entergy Louisiana South 4,603.70 690.56 5,294.26
3 Entergy Louisiana North 1,346.58 201.99 1,548.57
4 Entergy New Orleans 1,153.99 173.10 1,327.09
5 CLECO North 942.20 141.33 1,083.53
6 CLECO South 417.60 62.64 480.24
7 CLECO East 384.10 57.62 441.72
8 SWEPCO (affecting LA) 3,555.56 533.33 4,088.89
9 CAJUN 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 Lafayette Utilities 367.00 55.05 422.05
11 City of Alexandria 111.20 16.68 127.88
12 LEPA 39.50 5.93 45.43
TOTALS 19,555.42 2,933.31 22,488.73
APPENDIX D.2




AREA # COMPANY PEAK DEMAND RESERVES DEMAND IN MW
1 Entergy Gulf States 4,945.52 741.83 5,687.35
2 Entergy Louisiana South 3,573.90 536.09 4,109.99
3 Entergy Louisiana North 987.00 148.05 1,135.05
4 Entergy New Orleans 787.02 118.05 905.07
5 CLECO North 702.20 105.33 807.53
6 CLECO South 283.40 42.51 325.91
7 CLECO East 259.90 38.98 298.89
8 SWEPCO (affecting LA) 2,848.50 427.28 3,275.78
9 CAJUN 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 Lafayette Utilities 269.00 40.35 309.35
11 City of Alexandria 83.40 12.51 95.91
12 LEPA 30.50 4.58 35.08
TOTALS 14,770.34 2,215.55 16,985.89
NOTES:
1 Spinning Reserves are estimated to be 15% of Peak Demand.
2 Peak demand within each area includes the demand of all R.U.S. 
Cooperatives within the service area.
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APPENDIX E.1
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #1
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FiHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Mlnden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil & Chem." Q.F7GSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2*•Q.F7GSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.l. Dupont** 0.F7GSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical** Q.FiGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440.50
6 Cogen Power O.FJGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Agrico G.F7LP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. Q.F7LP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics Q.F7GSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Carbons Q.F7GSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical 0.F7GSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. Q.F7GSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil Q.F7LP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Refining Q.F7GSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide Q.F7GSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.F./CLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical O.F7GSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical Q.F7GSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper Q.F7GSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises Q.F7GSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products O.F7NOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU l_A 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumber' Q.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industnes* Q.F7SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF Q.F7GSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agrielectric Q.F7GSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southern Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 53.34% 12544.59
38 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.04891 100.00% 13144.59
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 13210.19
40 Big Ca|un 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 13440.19
41 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 13868.09
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 14412.09
43 Entergy, Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.05404 41.14% 16467.03
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 100.00% 18518.03
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.05570 100.00% 19399.55
46 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 100.00% 20154.55
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.06060 93.34% 20271.23
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.06210 0.00% 20271.23
49 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.06380 0.00% 20271.23
50 Nine fifile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.06420 100.00% 22188.23
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.06650 0.00% 22188.23
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.06680 66.88% 23024.90
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 0.00% 23024.90
54 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 23024.90
55 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 0.00% 23024.90
56 Entergy, Mississippi GSU, LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 23024.90
57 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 23024.90
58 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 23024.90
59 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 23024.90
60 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.07900 0.00% 23024.90
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 23024.90
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 23024.90
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 23024.90
64 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 23024.90
65 A.8. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 23024.90
66 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 23024.90
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 23024.90
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 23024.90
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APPENDIX E.1 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FiHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 23024.90
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
73 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
76 Firestone"* Q.FiGSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
77 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
78 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
80 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU lA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
81 Citgo*" Q.FiGSU LA 75.00 8.00000 0.00% 23024.90
NOTES:
1 ' Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 ■* Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A 4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #2
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME O.FJHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil 4 Chem.” O.FJGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NISCO/RSNelson 142* • Q.FJGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.l. Dupont” Q.F7GSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical” O.FJGSU U \ 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440.50
6 Cogen Power O.F7GSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Agnco O.F7LP4L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. Q.F7LP4L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics O.FJGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Carbons Q.FJGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical O.F7GSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. O.F7GSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil O.F7LP4L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Refining 0.F7GSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide 0.F7GSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar* O.F7CLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP4L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical O.F7GSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical Q.F7GSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper O.F7GSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises O.F7GSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products O.F7NOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumtier* O.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industries' Q.F./SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF Q.F7GSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agrielectric 0.F7GSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southern Companies GSU.LP4L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 42.08% 12110.74
38 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.04891 100.00% 12710.74
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 12776.34
40 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 13006.34
41 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 13434.24
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 13978.24
43 Entergy. Arkansas LP4L N. SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.05404 14.30% 14692.53
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 100.00% 16743.53
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.05570 36.72% 17067.22
46 Roy S. Nelson 344 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 0.00% 17067.22
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.06060 0.00% 17067.22
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.06210 0.00% 17067.22
49 Sidney A. Murray. Jr. LP4L LA 192.00 0.06380 0.00% 17067.22
50 Nine Mile Point LP4L LA 1917.00 0.06420 14.78% 17350.55
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.06650 0.00% 17350.55
52 Little Gypsy LP4L LA 1251.00 0.06680 0.00% 17350.55
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 0.00% 17350.55
54 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 17350.55
55 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 0.00% 17350.55
56 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP4L S4N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 17350.55
57 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 17350.55
58 Waterford 142 LP4L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 17350.55
59 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 17350.55
60 Sterlington LP4L LA 480.00 0.07900 0.00% 17350.55
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 17350.55
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 17350.55
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 17350.55
64 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 17350.55
65 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 17350.55
66 Buras LP4L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 17350.55
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 17350.55
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 17350.55
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APPENDIX E.2 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 17350.55
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
73 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
76 Firestone'”  Q.FiGSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
77 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
78 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
80 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
81 Citgo'" Q.FiGSU LA 75.00 8.00000 0.00% 17350.55
NOTES:
1 ' Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOST'S system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A '4 ' for Q&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.3
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #3
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil & Chem." Q.FiGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2'Q.F7GSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.L Dupont" Q.FiGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical" Q.FiGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440 50
6 Cogen Power Q.FiGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Agrico Q.FÆP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. Q.FiLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics Q.FiGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Carbons Q.FiGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. Q.FiGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil Q.FiLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Refining Q.FiGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide Q.FiGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar" Q.FiCLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper Q.FiGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises Q.FiGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products Q.FiNOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumber" Q.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industries" Q.F./SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF Q.FiGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agrielectric Q.FiGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southern Companies GSU,LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 0.00% 10489.40
38 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.04891 0.00% 10489.40
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 10555.00
40 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 10785.00
41 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 11212.90
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 11756.90
43 Entergy, Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.05404 0.00% 11756.90
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 100.00% 13807.90
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.05570 100.00% 14689.42
46 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 100.00% 15444.42
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.06060 100.00% 15569.42
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.06210 100.00% 16014.92
49 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.06380 33.21% 16078.68
50 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.06420 100.00% 17995.68
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.06650 100.00% 18495.18
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.06680 100.00% 19746.18
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 90.15% 21709.65
54 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 21709.65
55 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 100.00% 22668.65
56 Entergy, Mississippi GSU, LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 22668.65
57 Houma City/Pansh LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 22668.65
58 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 22668.65
59 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 22668.65
60 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.07900 0.00% 22668.65
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 22668.65
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 22668.65
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 22668.65
64 Hunter" Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 22668.65
65 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 22668.65
66 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 22668.65
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 22668.65
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 22668.65
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APPENDIX E.3 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 22668.65
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
73 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
76 Firestone— O.FVGSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
77 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
78 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65
LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 22668.65




1 * Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996. capacity (or Lafayette Utilities’ Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit 41 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A ”4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.4
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT M
MW AVERAGE PERCEtVT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FJHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil & Chem.” O.FJGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2"•O.F7GSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.l. Dupont" O.FJGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical” Q.FJGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440.50
6 Cogen Power Q.FJGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Aghco Q.F7LP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. Q.FiLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics Q.FiGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Cartjons Q.FiGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. Q.FiGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil Q.FiLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Refining Q.FiGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide Q.FiGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.FiCLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper Q.FiGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises Q.FiGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products Q.FiNOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumber* Q.FiSWEPCQ TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industries* Q.FiSWEPCQ TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF Q.FiGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agnelectric Q.FiGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southern Companies GSU,LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 0.00% 10489.40
38 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.04891 0.00% 10489.40
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 10555.00
40 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 10785.00
41 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 11212.90
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 11756.90
43 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.05404 0.00% 11756.90
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 100.00% 13807.90
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.05570 100.00% 14689.42
46 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 50.84% 15073.26
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.06060 100.00% 15198.26
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.06210 0.00% 15198.26
49 Sidney A. Mumay. Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.06380 4.28% 15206.48
50 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.06420 100.00% 17123.48
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.06650 0.00% 17123.48
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.06680 0.00% 17123.48
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 0.00% 17123.48
54 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 17123.48
55 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 0.00% 17123.48
56 Entergy, Mississippi GSU, LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 17123.48
57 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 17123.48
58 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 17123.48
59 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 17123.48
60 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.07900 0.00% 17123.48
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 17123.48
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 17123.48
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 17123.48
64 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 17123.48
65 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 17123.48
66 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 17123.48
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 17123.48
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 17123.48
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APPENDIX E.4 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.FiHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 17123.48
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
73 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
76 Firestone'" O.FiGSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
77 Louisiana Stalion #2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
78 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
80 LA Station 41 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
81 Citgo"* Q.F7GSU LA 75.00 8.00000 0.00% 17123.48
NOTES:
1 ■ Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 ■" Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 Dunng 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A '4* for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.5
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #5
MW AVERAGE PERCEIVr CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME O.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil & Chem." O.FJGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2" O.FVGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.l. Dupont" O.FJGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical" O.FVGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440.50
6 Cogen Power O.FVGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Agrico O.FVLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. O.FVLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics O.FVGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Carbons O.FVGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical O.FVGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. O.FVGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil O.FVLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Refining O.FVGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide O.FVGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.FVCLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical O.FVGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical O.FVGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper O.FVGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises O.FVGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products Q.FVNOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumtier* O.FVSWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industries' Q.F./SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF O.FVGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agrielectric O.FVGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southern Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 50.17% 12422.45
38 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.04891 100.00% 13022.45
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 13088.05
40 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 13318.05
41 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 13745.95
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 14289.95
43 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N. SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.05404 35.04% 16040.20
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 100.00% 18091.20
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.05570 100.00% 18972.72
46 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 100.00% 19727.72
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.06060 90.82% 19841.24
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.06210 0.00% 19841.24
49 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.06380 0.00% 19841.24
50 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.06420 100.00% 21758.24
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.06650 0.00% 21758.24
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.06680 93.94% 22933.43
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 0.00% 22933.43
54 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 22933.43
55 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 0.00% 22933.43
56 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 22933.43
57 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 22933.43
58 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 22933.43
59 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 22933.43
60 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.07900 0.00% 22933.43
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 22933.43
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 22933.43
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 22933.43
64 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 22933.43
65 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 22933.43
66 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 22933.43
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 22933.43
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 22933.43
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APPENDIX E.5 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
P U \N T # PLANT NAME O.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 22933.43
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
73 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
76 Firestone"* O.FVGSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
77 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
78 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
80 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
81 Citgo*" O.FVGSU LA 75.00 8.00000 0.00% 22933.43
NOTES:
1 * Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 ■* Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996, capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit <t1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A "4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.6
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #6







1 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil & Chem.” Q.FJGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NiSCO/RSNelson 1&2 G.F7GSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.l. Dupont" O.FiGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical" Q.FiGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440.50
6 Cogen Power Q.F7GSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Agrico Q.FiLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. Q.FAP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics Q.F7GSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Cartxins Q.F7GSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. Q.FiGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil Q.FiLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Refining Q.FiGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide Q.FiGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar' Q.FiCLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper Q.FiGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises Q.FiGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products Q.FiNQPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCQ TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumber' O.FiSWEPCQ TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industries' Q.FiSWEPCQ TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECQ LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF Q.FiGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agrielectric Q.FiGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECQ LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCQ TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 39.92% 12027.52
38 ERCOT SWEPCQ TX 600.00 0.04891 100.00% 12627.52
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 12693.12
40 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 12923.12
41 Teche CLECQ LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 13351.02
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 13895.02
43 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N. SWEPCQ AR 4995.00 0.05404 12.93% 14540.87
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 93.86% 16465.94
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCQ TX 881.52 0.05570 45.25% 16864.83
46 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 0.00% 16864.83
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCQ LA 125.00 0.06060 0.00% 16864.83
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECQ LA 445.50 0.06210 0.00% 16864.83
49 Sidney A. Murray. Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.06380 0.00% 16864.83
50 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.06420 24.14% 17327.59
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCQ TX 499.50 0.06650 0.00% 17327.59
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.06680 0.00% 17327.59
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 0.00% 17327.59
54 PSOK SWEPCQ QK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 17327.59
55 Michoud NQPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 0.00% 17327.59
56 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 17327.59
57 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 17327.59
58 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 17327.59
59 Coughlin CLECQ LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 17327.59
60 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.07900 0.00% 17327.59
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 17327.59
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCQ LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 17327.59
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCQ TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 17327.59
64 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 17327.59
65 A.B. Patterson - S NQPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 17327.59
66 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 17327.59
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 17327.59
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 17327.59
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APPENDIX E.6 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FjHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 17327.59
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
73 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
76 Firestone'" Q.F7GSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
77 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
78 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59
80 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 17327.59






* Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
"  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
Indicates a O.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power. 
During 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities’ Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
A "4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.7
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #7
MW AVERAGE PERCEIVT CUMMULATIVE
T #  PLANT NAME Q.FJHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil & Chem." O.FJGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2' •0.F7G SU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.l. Dupont" Q.F7GSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical" O.FJGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440.50
6 Cogen Power O.F7GSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Agrico Q.F7LP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. O.FJLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics O.FJGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Carbons Q.F7GSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical Q.F7GSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gull System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. a.FVGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil O.F7LP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Relining Q.F7GSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide Q.F7GSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar* O.F7CLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical Q.F7GSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical O.FJGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper O.F7GSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises 0.F7GSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products Q.F7NOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumber* O.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industries* O.F./SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/C/UUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF O.F7GSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agrielectric O.F7GSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 0.00% 10489.40
38 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.04891 0.00% 10489.40
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 10555.00
40 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 10785.00
41 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 11212.90
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 11756.90
43 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.05404 0.00% 11756.90
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 100.00% 13807.90
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.05570 100.00% 14689.42
46 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 100.00% 15444.42
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.06060 100.00% 15569.42
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.06210 100.00% 16014.92
49 Sidney A. Murray. Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.06380 30.88% 16074.21
50 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.06420 100.00% 17991.21
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.06650 100.00% 18490.71
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.06680 100.00% 19741.71
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 80.54% 21495.87
54 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 21495.87
55 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 100.00% 22454.87
56 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 22454.87
57 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 22454.87
58 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 22454.87
59 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 22454.87
60 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.07900 38.79% 22641.06
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 22641.06
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 22641.06
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 22641.06
64 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 22641.06
65 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 22641.06
66 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 22641.06
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 22641.06
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 22641.06
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APPENDIX E.7 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 22641.06
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
73 Thit3odaux9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
76 Firestone’** Q.FiGSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
77 Louisiana Station «2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
78 Neelies GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU l_A 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
80 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
81 Citgo*** Q.FiGSU LA 75.00 8.00000 0.00% 22641.06
NOTES:
1 * Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 ** Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but Is not selling back power.
4 During 1996, capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A "4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST Indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.8
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #8
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
IT# PLANT NAME Q.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00750 100.00% 34.50
2 Fina Oil & Chem.” O.F7GSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 71.50
3 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2'•' O.F7GSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 271.50
4 E.l. Dupont” Q.FVGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 356.50
5 Exxon Chemical” Q.F7GSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 440.50
6 Cogen Power O.F7GSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 445.50
7 IMC-Agrico O.F7LP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 467.50
8 Calciner Ind. Q.F7LP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 494.50
9 Formosa Plastics O.F7GSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 540.50
10 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.01935 100.00% 816.50
11 Engineered Cariions Q.F7GSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 826.50
12 Vulcan Chemical O.FVGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 934.50
13 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.02020 100.00% 1279.50
14 Huntsman Corp. O.F7GSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 1351.50
15 B.P. Oil O.F7LP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 1370.65
16 Clark Refining 0.F7GSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 1455.45
17 Air Liquide O.FVGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 1491.45
18 Jeanerette Sugar' O.F7CLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 1491.55
19 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.02210 100.00% 2691.55
20 Dow Chemical 0.F7GSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 3361.55
21 Borden Chemical Q.F7GSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 3453.05
22 James River Paper Q.F7GSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 3510.55
23 Star Enterprises 0.F7GSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 3674.55
24 Air Products O.F7NOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 3697.55
25 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.02460 100.00% 4316.93
26 Big Cajun 2 CAJUf^GSU LA 1735.10 0.02476 100.00% 6052.03
27 Dean Lumber" Q.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 6052.63
28 Snider Industries' O.F7SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 6057.63
29 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.02600 100.00% 6615.63
30 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.02868 100.00% 7637.93
31 BASF O.F7GSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 7674.53
32 Agrielectric Q.F7GSU LA 12.50 0.03490 100.00% 7687.03
33 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.03540 100.00% 8337.40
34 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.04020 100.00% 8767.40
35 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 100.00% 8815.40
36 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.04190 100.00% 10489.40
37 Southem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.04331 0.00% 10489.40
38 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.04891 0.00% 10489.40
39 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.05173 100.00% 10555.00
40 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.05267 100.00% 10785.00
41 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.05310 100.00% 11212.90
42 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.05390 100.00% 11756.90
43 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N. SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.05404 0.00% 11756.90
44 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.05500 100.00% 13807.90
45 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.05570 100.00% 14689.42
46 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.05980 22.25% 14857.41
47 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.06060 100.00% 14982.41
48 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.06210 47.20% 15192.68
49 Sidney A. Murray. Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.06380 4.67% 15201.65
50 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.06420 100.00% 17118.65
51 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.06650 0.00% 17118.65
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.06680 0.00% 17118.65
53 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.06710 0.00% 17118.65
54 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.06927 0.00% 17118.65
55 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.06940 0.00% 17118.65
56 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.06985 0.00% 17118.65
57 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.07251 0.00% 17118.65
58 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.07470 0.00% 17118.65
59 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.07850 0.00% 17118.65
60 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.07900 0.00% 17118.65
61 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.08193 0.00% 17118.65
62 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.08610 0.00% 17118.65
63 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.09590 0.00% 17118.65
64 Hunter' Alexandria LA 171.50 0.10800 0.00% 17118.65
65 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.21440 0.00% 17118.65
66 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.21880 0.00% 17118.65
67 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.32934 0.00% 17118.65
68 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.33913 0.00% 17118.65
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APPENDIX E.8 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME O.F./HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 3.28619 0.00% 17118.65
70 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
71 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
73 Thitwdaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
74 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
75 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
76 Firestone*** O.F7GSU LA 0.30 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
77 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
78 Neches GSU TX 269.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
79 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
80 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
81 Citgo*** O.FiGSU LA 75.00 8.00000 0.00% 17118.65
NOTES:
1 * Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data Is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a O.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A ’4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
234
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX E.9
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #9
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT (f PLANT NAME Q.FJHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Fina Oil & Cfiem.” Q.FJGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55
10 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2""Q.FVGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont” Q.FVGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacfier 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Ctiemical” Q.FVGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power Q.FVGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Souttiem Companies GSU,LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 61.73% 9852.11
18 IMC-Agrico Q.FVLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 9874.11
19 Formosa Plastics Q.FVGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 9920.11
20 Calciner Ind. Q.FVLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 9947.11
21 Engineered Carbons Q.FVGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 9957.11
22 Vulcan Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 10065.11
23 Huntsman Corp. Q.FVGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 10137.11
24 Welsti 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 11811.11
25 B.P. Oil Q.FVLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 11830.26
26 Entergy, Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 64.08% 15031.05
27 Clark Refining Q.FVGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 15115.85
28 Air Liquide Q.FVGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 15151.85
29 Jeanerette Sugar" Q.F./CLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 15151.95
30 ERCOT SWEPCQ TX 600.00 0.02214 100.00% 15751.95
31 Dow Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 16421.95
32 Borden Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 16513.45
33 James River Paper Q.FVGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 16570.95
34 Star Enterpnses Q.FVGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 16734.95
35 Air Products Q.FVNOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 16757.95
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.02500 100.00% 16882.95
37 Dean Lumber" O.FVSWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 16883.55
38 PSOK SWEPCQ OK 1098.00 0.02575 16.37% 17063.30
39 Snider Industries" Q.F./SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 17068.30
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 17612.30
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 100.00% 19663.30
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCQ TX 881.52 0.02700 53.48% 20134.73
43 BASF Q.FVGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 20171.33
44 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 100.00% 20926.33
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 0.00% 20926.33
46 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.03000 0.00% 20926.33
47 Nine Mile Point LP&L LW 1917.00 0.03100 100.00% 22843.33
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 0.00% 22843.33
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCQ TX 499.50 0.03200 0.00% 22843.33
50 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 60.88% 23427.17
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 0.00% 23427.17
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.03200 0.00% 23427.17
53 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.03210 0.00% 23427.17
54 Entergy, Mississippi GSU, LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 23427.17
55 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.03300 0.00% 23427.17
56 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.03300 0.00% 23427.17
57 Hunter" Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 0.00% 23427.17
58 Agrielectric Q.FVGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 23427.17
59 Waterford 1 &2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 23427.17
60 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 23427.17
61 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 23427.17
62 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 23427.17
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 23427.17
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 23427.17
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 23427.17
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 23427.17
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 23427.17
68 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 23427.17
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APPENDIX E.9 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT # PLANT NAME Q.F7H0ST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 23427.17
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
74 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
75 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
76 Citgo’ ** Q.FVGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
77 Firestone*** Q.FVGSU LA 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
78 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
79 Neches GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
80 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
81 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 4.00000 0.00% 23427.17
NOTES:
1 ' Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 ’ * Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A *4* for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.10
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #10
MW AVERAGE PERCEIMT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F7H0ST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Fina Oil & Chem." Q.FVGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55
10 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2" •Q.FVGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont" Q.FVGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacher 2 CLECQ LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Chemical" Q.FVGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power Q.FVGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Southem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 54.47% 9572.38
18 IMC-Agrico Q.FVLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 9594.38
19 Formosa Plastics Q.FVGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 9640.38
20 Calciner Ind. Q.FVLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 9667.38
21 Engineered Caitons Q.FVGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 9677.38
22 Vulcan Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 9785.38
23 Huntsman Corp. Q.FVGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 9857.38
24 Welsh 6 SWEPCQ TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 11531.38
25 B.P. Oil Q.FVLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 11550.53
26 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N. SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 45.42% 13819.26
27 Clark Refining O.FVGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 13904.06
28 Air Liquide Q.FVGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 13940.06
29 Jeanerette Sugar" Q.FVCLECQ LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 13940.16
30 ERCOT SWEPCQ TX 600.00 0.02214 100.00% 14540.16
31 Dow Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 15210.16
32 Borden Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 15301.66
33 James River Paper Q.FVGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 15359.16
34 Star Enterprises Q.FVGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 15523.16
35 Air Products Q.FVNQPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 15546.16
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.02500 34.44% 15589.21
37 Dean Lumber" Q.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 0.00% 15589.21
38 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.02575 0.00% 15589.21
39 Snider Industries" Q.F./SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 0.00% 15589.21
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 16133.21
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 64.02% 17446.26
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.02700 0.00% 17446.26
43 BASF Q.FVGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 0.00% 17446.26
44 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 0.00% 17446.26
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 0.00% 17446.26
46 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.03000 0.00% 17446.26
47 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.03100 14.44% 17723.07
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 0.00% 17723.07
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.03200 0.00% 17723.07
50 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 0.00% 17723.07
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 0.00% 17723.07
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.03200 0.00% 17723.07
53 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.03210 0.00% 17723.07
54 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 17723.07
55 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.03300 0.00% 17723.07
56 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.03300 0.00% 17723.07
57 Hunter" Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 0.00% 17723.07
58 Agrielectric O.FVGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 17723.07
59 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 17723.07
60 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 17723.07
61 Uebennan 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 17723.07
62 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 17723.07
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 17723.07
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 17723.07
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 17723.07
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 17723.07
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 17723.07
68 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 17723.07
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APPENDIX E.10 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FVHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 17723.07
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
74 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
75 TtlibodauxS LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
76 Citgo"* Q.FiGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
77 Firestone*" Q.FiGSU LA 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
78 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
79 Necties GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07
80 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 17723.07






* Indicates 1994 data, ottierv/ise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
** Indicates 1995 data, ottierwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power. 
Ounng 1996, capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
A 4 for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.11
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FiHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR.CQST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Fina Oil & Chem." Q.FiGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55
10 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2* Q.FiGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont" Q.FiGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU t_A 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Chemical" Q.FiGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power Q.FiGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Southem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 0.00% 7473.65
18 IMC-Agrico Q.FiLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 7495.65
19 Formosa Plastics Q.FiGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 7541.65
20 Calciner Ind. Q.FiLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 7568.65
21 Engineered Carbons Q.FiGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 7578.65
22 Vulcan Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 7686.65
23 Huntsman Corp. Q.FiGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 7758.65
24 Welsh 6 SWEPCQ TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 9432.65
25 B.P. Oil Q.FiLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 9451.80
26 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCQ AR 4995.00 0.02128 0.00% 9451.80
27 Clark Refining Q.FiGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 9536.60
28 Air Liquide Q.FiGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 9572.60
29 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.FiCLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 9572.70
30 ERCOT SWEPCQ TX 600.00 0.02214 0.00% 9572.70
31 Dow Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 10242.70
32 Borden Chemical Q.FiGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 10334.20
33 James River Paper Q.FiGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 10391.70
34 Star Enterprises Q.FiGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 10555.70
35 Air Products Q.FiNQPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 10578.70
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCQ LA 125.00 0.02500 100.00% 10703.70
37 Dean Lumber* Q.F./SWEPCQ TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 10704.30
38 PSOK SWEPCQ OK 1098.00 0.02575 0.00% 10704.30
39 Snider Industries* Q.F./SWEPCQ TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 10709.30
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 11253.30
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 100.00% 13304.30
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCQ TX 881.52 0.02700 100.00% 14185.82
43 BASF Q.FiGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 14222.42
44 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 100.00% 14977.42
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 100.00% 15058.42
46 Rodemacher 1 CLECQ LA 445.50 0.03000 100.00% 15503.92
47 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.03100 100.00% 17420.92
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 100.00% 17650.92
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCQ TX 499.50 0.03200 100.00% 18150.42
50 Michoud NQPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 100.00% 19109.42
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 62.59% 20472.63
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.03200 100.00% 21723.63
53 Teche CLECQ LA 427.90 0.03210 100.00% 22151.53
54 Entergy, Mississippi GSU, LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 22151.53
55 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.03300 100.00% 22631.53
56 Coughlin CLECQ LA 368.10 0.03300 0.00% 22631.53
57 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 0.00% 22631.53
58 Agrielectric O.FiGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 22631.53
59 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 22631.53
60 Houma CIty/Parish LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 22631.53
61 Lieberman 2 SWEPCQ LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 22631.53
62 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 22631.53
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 22631.53
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCQ TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 22631.53
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 22631.53
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 22631.53
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 22631.53
68 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 22631.53
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APPENDIX E.11 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FTHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 22631.53
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
74 Market Street NOPSI U\ 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
75 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
76 Citgo— O.FVGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
77 Firestone’"' Q.FVGSU LA 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
78 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
79 Neches GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
80 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
81 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 4.00000 0.00% 22631.53
NOTES:
1 ' indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data Is 1996 data.
2 ■■ Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 ■" Indicates a O.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 During 1996, capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit 41 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A 4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.12
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #12
MW AVERAGE PERCEffT CUMMULATIVE
IT # PLANT NAME Q.F7H0ST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Sidney A. Murray. Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Fina Oil & Cfiem." Q.FiGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55
10 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2• O.FiGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont" Q.FiGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacfier 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Cfiemical" Q.FiGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power Q.FiGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Soutfiem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 0.00% 7473.65
18 IMC-Agrico Q.FiLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 7495.65
19 Formosa Plastics Q.FiGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 7541.65
20 Calciner Ind. Q.FiLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 7568.65
21 Engineered Cartwns Q.FiGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 7578.65
22 Vulcan Cfiemical Q.FiGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 7686.65
23 Huntsman Corp. Q.FiGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 7758.65
24 Welsfi 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 9432.65
25 B.P. Oil Q.FiLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 9451.80
26 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N. SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 0.00% 9451.80
27 Clark Refining Q.FiGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 9536.60
28 Air Liquide Q.FiGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 9572.60
29 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.FiCLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 9572.70
30 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.02214 0.00% 9572.70
31 Dow Cfiemical Q.FiGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 10242.70
32 Borden Cfiemical Q.FiGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 10334.20
33 James River Paper Q.FiGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 10391.70
34 Star Enterprises Q.FiGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 10555.70
35 Air Products Q.FiNQPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 10578.70
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCQ LA 125.00 0.02500 100.00% 10703.70
37 Dean Lumber' Q.FiSWEPCQ TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 10704.30
38 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.02575 0.00% 10704.30
39 Snider Industries" Q.FiSWEPCQ TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 10709.30
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 11253.30
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 100.00% 13304.30
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.02700 100.00% 14185.82
43 BASF Q.FiGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 14222.42
44 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 100.00% 14977.42
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 100.00% 15058.42
46 Rodemacfier 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.03000 23.14% 15161.51
47 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.03100 100.00% 17078.51
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 0.00% 17078.51
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.03200 0.00% 17078.51
50 Micfioud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 7.20% 17147.56
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 0.00% 17147.56
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.03200 0.00% 17147.56
53 Tecfie CLECO LA 427.90 0.03210 0.00% 17147.56
54 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 17147.56
55 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.03300 0.00% 17147.56
56 Cougfilin CLECO LA 368.10 0.03300 0.00% 17147.56
57 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 0.00% 17147.56
58 Agrielectric Q.FiGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 17147.56
59 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 17147.56
60 Houma City/Parisfi LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 17147.56
61 Lieberman 2 SWEPCQ LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 17147.56
62 Natcfiitocfies Natcfiitocfies LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 17147.56
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 17147.56
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCQ TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 17147.56
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 17147.56
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 17147.56
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 17147.56
68 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 17147.56
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APPENDIX E.12 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME 0.F7H0ST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 17147.56
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
74 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
75 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
76 Citgo— O.FVGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
77 Firestone'"' O.FVGSU LA 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
78 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
79 Neches GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
80 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
81 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 4.00000 0.00% 17147.56
NOTES:
1 * Indicates T 994 data, ottierwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 ■" Indicates a Q.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 Ounng 1996, capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit 41 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A "4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.13
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #13
MW AVERAGE PERCEI^ CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F7H0ST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Sidney A. Murray. Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Fina Oil & Cfiem.** Q.FiGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55to NISCO/RSNelson t&2** Q.FiGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont** Q.FiGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacfier 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Cfiemical** Q.FiGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUI^GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power Q.FiGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Soutfiem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 56.51% 9650.98
18 IMC-Agrico Q.FiLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 9672.98
19 Formosa Plastics Q.FiGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 9718.98
20 Calciner Ind. Q.FiLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 9745.98
21 Engineered Carbons Q.FiGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 9755.98
22 Vulcan Cfiemical Q.FiGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 9863.98
23 Huntsman Corp. Q.FiGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 9935.98
24 Welsfi 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 11609.98
25 B.P. Oil Q.FiLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 11629.13
26 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N. SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 50.46% 14149.61
27 Clark Refining Q.FiGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 14234.41
28 Air Liquide Q.FiGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 14270.41
29 Jeanerette Sugar* Q.FiCLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 14270.51
30 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.02214 100.00% 14870.51
31 Dow Cfiemical Q.FiGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 15540.51
32 Borden Cfiemical Q.FiGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 15632.01
33 James River Paper Q.FiGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 15689.51
34 Star Enterprises Q.FiGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 15853.51
35 Air Products Q.FiNQPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 15876.51
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.02500 100.00% 16001.51
37 Dean Lumber* O.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 16002.11
38 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.02575 0.89% 16011.88
39 Snider Industries* Q.FiSWEPCQ TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 16016.88
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 16560.88
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 100.00% 18611.88
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.02700 78.08% 19300.17
43 BASF Q.FiGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 19336.77
44 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 100.00% 20091.77
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 0.00% 20091.77
46 Rodemacfier 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.03000 0.00% 20091.77
47 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.03100 100.00% 22008.77
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 0.00% 22008.77
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.03200 0.00% 22008.77
50 Micfioud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 100.00% 22967.77
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 0.00% 22967.77
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.03200 15.88% 23166.43
53 Tecfie CLECO LA 427.90 0.03210 0.00% 23166.43
54 Entergy. Mississippi GSU. LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 23166.43
55 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.03300 0.00% 23166.43
56 Cougfilin CLECO LA 368.10 0.03300 0.00% 23166.43
57 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 0.00% 23166.43
58 Agrielectric Q.FiGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 23166.43
59 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 23166.43
60 Houma CIty/Parisfi LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 23166.43
61 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 23166.43
62 Natcfiltocbes Natcfiltocbes LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 23166.43
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 23166.43
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 23166.43
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 23166.43
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 23166.43
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 23166.43
68 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 23166.43
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APPENDIX E.13 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FiHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 23166.43
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
74 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
75 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
76 Citgo"* Q.FVGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
77 Firestone"* Q.FVGSU 1_A 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
78 Louisiana Station #2 GSU l-A 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
79 Neches GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
80 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
81 LA station #1 Un.4 A GSU LA 129.00 4.00000 0.00% 23166.43
NOTES:
1 * Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a O.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 Ounng 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit 41 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A "4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.14
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #14
MW AVERAGE PERCEfVT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.F7HOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Fina Oil & Chem." O.FVGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55
10 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2* ' O.FVGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont" Q.FVGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Chemical" O.FVGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power O.FVGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Southem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 49.28% 9372.41
18 IMC-Agrico O.FVLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 9394.41
19 Formosa Plastics O.FVGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 9440.41
20 Calciner Ind. O.FVLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 9467.41
21 Engineered Caitons O.FVGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 9477.41
22 Vulcan Chemical O.FVGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 9585.41
23 Huntsman Corp. O.FVGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 9657.41
24 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 11331.41
25 B.P. Oil O.FVLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 11350.56
26 Entergy. Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 29.19% 12808.60
27 Clark Refining O.FVGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 12893.40
28 Air Uquide O.FVGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 12929.40
29 Jeanerette Sugar' O.F./CLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 12929.50
30 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.02214 100.00% 13529.50
31 Dow Chemical O.FVGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 14199.50
32 Borden Chemical O.FVGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 14291.00
33 James River Paper O.FVGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 14348.50
34 Star Enterprises O.FVGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 14512.50
35 Air Products O.FVNOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 14535.50
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.02500 100.00% 14660.50
37 Dean Lumber' O.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 0.00% 14660.50
38 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.02575 0.00% 14660.50
39 Snider Industnes' O.FVSWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 0.00% 14660.50
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 15204.50
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 76.67% 16777.00
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.02700 0.00% 16777.00
43 BASF O.FVGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 0.00% 16777.00
44 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 0.00% 16777.00
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 0.00% 16777.00
46 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.03000 0.00% 16777.00
47 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.03100 0.00% 16777.00
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 0.00% 16777.00
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.03200 0.00% 16777.00
50 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 74.25% 17489.06
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 0.00% 17489.06
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.03200 0.00% 17489.06
53 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.03210 0.00% 17489.06
54 Entergy, Mississippi GSU, LP&L S&N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 17489.06
55 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.03300 0.00% 17489.06
56 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.03300 0.00% 17489.06
57 Hunter' Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 0.00% 17489.06
58 Agrielectric O.FVGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 17489.06
59 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 17489.06
60 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 17489.06
61 Lietierman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 17489.06
62 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 17489.06
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 17489.06
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 17489.06
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 17489.06
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 17489.06
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 17489.06
68 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 17489.06
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APPENDIX E.14 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLAfVT# PLANT NAME O.FJHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 17489.06
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
74 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
75 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
76 Citgo'” O.FVGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
77 Firestone"* Q.FVGSU LA 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
78 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
79 Neches GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
80 Louisiana Station GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
81 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 4.00000 0.00% 17489.06
NOTES:
1 '  Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 " *  Indicates a O.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 Ounng 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A "4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.15
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #15
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME Q.FJHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
1 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP4L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP4L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey 8 SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Fina Oil 4  Cfiem.** O.FiGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55
10 NISCO/RSNelson 142* Q.FiGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont" O.FiGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacfier 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Cfiemical” Q.FiGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power O.F./GSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Soutfiem Companies GSU.LP4L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 0.00% 7473.65
18 IMC-Agrico O.FiLP4L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 7495.65
19 Formosa Plastics O.FiGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 7541.65
20 Calciner Ind. O.FiLP4L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 7568.65
21 Engineered Carbons O.FiGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 7578.65
22 Vulcan Cfiemical Q.FiGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 7686.65
23 Huntsman Corp. O.FiGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 7758.65
24 Welsfi 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 9432.65
25 B.P. Oil Q.FiLP4L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 9451.80
26 Entergy. Arkansas LP4L N. SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 0.00% 9451.80
27 Clark Refining O.FiGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 9536.60
28 Air Liquide Q.FiGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 9572.60
29 Jeanerette Sugar* O.F./CLECO LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 9572.70
30 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.02214 0.00% 9572.70
31 Dow Cfiemical O.FiGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 10242.70
32 Borden Cfiemical O.FiGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 10334.20
33 James River Paper Q.FiGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 10391.70
34 Star Enterprises O.FiGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 10555.70
35 Air Products Q.FiNQPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 10578.70
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.02500 100.00% 10703.70
37 Dean Lumber* O.F./SWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 10704.30
38 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.02575 0.00% 10704.30
39 Snider Industries* Q.F./SWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 10709.30
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 11253.30
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 100.00% 13304.30
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.02700 100.00% 14185.82
43 BASF Q.FiGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 100.00% 14222.42
44 Roy S. Nelson 344 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 100.00% 14977.42
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 100.00% 15058.42
46 Rodemacfier 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.03000 100.00% 15503.92
47 Nine Mile Point LP4L LA 1917.00 0.03100 100.00% 17420.92
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 0.00% 17420.92
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.03200 100.00% 17920.42
50 Micfioud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 100.00% 18879.42
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 62.27% 20235.66
52 Little Gypsy LP4L LA 1251.00 0.03200 100.00% 21486.66
53 Tecfie CLECO LA 427.90 0.03210 100.00% 21914.56
54 Entergy, Mississippi GSU, LP4L S4N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 21914.56
55 Sterlington LP4L LA 480.00 0.03300 100.00% 22394.56
56 Cougfilin CLECO LA 368.10 0.03300 28.86% 22500.79
57 Hunter* Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 74.57% 22628.68
58 Agrielectric Q.FiGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 22628.68
59 Waterford 142 LP4L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 22628.68
60 Houma City/Parisfi LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 22628.68
61 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 22628.68
62 Natcfiitocfies Natchitocfies LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 22628.68
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 22628.68
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 22628.68
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 22628.68
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 22628.68
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 22628.68
68 Buras LP4L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 22628.68
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APPENDIX E.15 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT» PLANT NAME O.FVHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 22628.68
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
74 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
75 Thibodaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
76 Citgo"* O.FVGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
77 Firestone"* O.FVGSU LA 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
78 Louisiana Station 42 GSU LA 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
79 Neches GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68
80 Louisiana Station 41 GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 22628.68






* Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
"  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
Indicates a Q.F. that s interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power. 
During 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit 41 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
A ■4' for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX E.16
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT #16







1 Sidney A. Murray, Jr. LP&L LA 192.00 0.00000 100.00% 192.00
2 Minden Minden LA 34.50 0.00333 100.00% 226.50
3 Grand Gulf System Energy MS 345.00 0.00510 100.00% 571.50
4 Doc Bonin LAFA LA 276.00 0.00576 100.00% 847.50
5 Waterford 3 LP&L LA 1200.00 0.00600 100.00% 2047.50
6 River Bend 1 GSU/CAJUN LA 1022.30 0.00674 100.00% 3069.80
7 Pirkey a SWEPCO TX 619.38 0.01100 100.00% 3689.18
8 Rna Oil & Chem." Q.FVGSU TX 37.00 0.01400 100.00% 3726.18
9 Dolet Hills CLECO LA 650.37 0.01550 100.00% 4376.55
10 NISCO/RSNelson 1&2"" Q.FVGSU LA 200.00 0.01570 100.00% 4576.55
11 E.l. Dupont" Q.FVGSU TX 85.00 0.01650 100.00% 4661.55
12 Roy S. Nelson 6 GSU LA 430.00 0.01700 100.00% 5091.55
13 Rodemacher 2 CLECO LA 558.00 0.01738 100.00% 5649.55
14 Exxon Chemical" Q.FVGSU LA 84.00 0.01760 100.00% 5733.55
15 Big Cajun 2 CAJUN/GSU LA 1735.10 0.01795 100.00% 7468.65
16 Cogen Power Q.FVGSU TX 5.00 0.01850 100.00% 7473.65
17 Southem Companies GSU.LP&L S MS 3853.00 0.01860 0.00% 7473.65
18 IMC-Agrico Q.FVLP&L LA 22.00 0.01900 100.00% 7495.65
19 Formosa Plastics Q.FVGSU LA 46.00 0.01910 100.00% 7541.65
20 Calciner Ind. Q.FVLP&L LA 27.00 0.01910 100.00% 7568.65
21 Engineered Caitons Q.FVGSU TX 10.00 0.01980 100.00% 7578.65
22 Vulcan Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 108.00 0.02010 100.00% 7686.65
23 Huntsman Corp. Q.FVGSU TX 72.00 0.02030 100.00% 7758.65
24 Welsh 6 SWEPCO TX 1674.00 0.02100 100.00% 9432.65
25 B.P. Oil Q.FVLP&L LA 19.15 0.02120 100.00% 9451.80
26 Entergy, Arkansas LP&L N, SWEPCO AR 4995.00 0.02128 0.00% 9451.80
27 Clark Refining Q.FVGSU TX 84.80 0.02130 100.00% 9536.60
28 Air Liquide Q.FVGSU TX 36.00 0.02140 100.00% 9572.60
29 Jeanerette Sugar" Q.FVCLECQ LA 0.10 0.02190 100.00% 9572.70
30 ERCOT SWEPCO TX 600.00 0.02214 0.00% 9572.70
31 Dow Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 670.00 0.02220 100.00% 10242.70
32 Borden Chemical Q.FVGSU LA 91.50 0.02240 100.00% 10334.20
33 James River Paper Q.FVGSU LA 57.50 0.02240 100.00% 10391.70
34 Star Enterprises Q.FVGSU TX 164.00 0.02290 100.00% 10555.70
35 Air Products Q.FVNOPSI LA 23.00 0.02370 100.00% 10578.70
36 Arsenal Hill 1 SWEPCO LA 125.00 0.02500 100.00% 10703.70
37 Dean Lumber" O.FVSWEPCO TX 0.60 0.02570 100.00% 10704.30
38 PSOK SWEPCO OK 1098.00 0.02575 0.00% 10704.30
39 Snider Industnes" O.FVSWEPCO TX 5.00 0.02590 100.00% 10709.30
40 Lewis Creek GSU TX 544.00 0.02600 100.00% 11253.30
41 Sabine GSU TX 2051.00 0.02700 100.00% 13304.30
42 Wilkes 5 SWEPCO TX 881.52 0.02700 100.00% 14185.82
43 BASF Q.FVGSU LA 36.60 0.02870 0.00% 14185.82
44 Roy S. Nelson 3&4 GSU LA 755.00 0.02900 0.00% 14185.82
45 Ruston Ruston LA 81.00 0.02962 100.00% 14266.82
46 Rodemacher 1 CLECO LA 445.50 0.03000 29.38% 14397.71
47 Nine Mile Point LP&L LA 1917.00 0.03100 95.14% 16221.54
48 Big Cajun 1 CAJUN LA 230.00 0.03166 0.00% 16221.54
49 Knox Lee 3 SWEPCO TX 499.50 0.03200 0.00% 16221.54
50 Michoud NOPSI LA 959.00 0.03200 91.98% 17103.63
51 Willow Glen GSU LA 2178.00 0.03200 0.00% 17103.63
52 Little Gypsy LP&L LA 1251.00 0.03200 0.00% 17103.63
53 Teche CLECO LA 427.90 0.03210 0.00% 17103.63
54 Entergy, Mississippi GSU,LP&LS&N MS 4079.00 0.03283 0.00% 17103.63
55 Sterlington LP&L LA 480.00 0.03300 0.00% 17103.63
56 Coughlin CLECO LA 368.10 0.03300 0.00% 17103.63
57 Hunter" Alexandria LA 171.50 0.03400 0.00% 17103.63
58 Agrielectric Q.FVGSU LA 12.50 0.03490 0.00% 17103.63
59 Waterford 1&2 LP&L LA 891.00 0.03500 0.00% 17103.63
60 Houma City/Parish LA 98.00 0.03869 0.00% 17103.63
61 Lieberman 2 SWEPCO LA 277.27 0.03900 0.00% 17103.63
62 Natchitoches Natchitoches LA 48.00 0.04021 0.00% 17103.63
63 Morgan City Morgan City LA 65.60 0.04145 0.00% 17103.63
64 Lone Star 4 SWEPCO TX 50.00 0.04200 0.00% 17103.63
65 New Roads New Roads LA 7.60 0.04918 0.00% 17103.63
66 Rayne Rayne LA 2.50 0.06517 0.00% 17103.63
67 Plaquemine LEPA LA 42.90 0.07953 0.00% 17103.63
68 Buras LP&L LA 21.00 0.09000 0.00% 17103.63
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APPENDIX E.16 (Continued)
MW AVERAGE PERCENT CUMMULATIVE
PLANT# PLANT NAME O.FVHOST ST. CAPACITY VAR. COST DISPATCH CAPACITY
69 A.B. Patterson - S NOPSI LA 16.00 0.10700 0.00% 17103.63
70 Franklin CLECO LA 10.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
71 Opelousas Opelousas LA 36.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
72 A.B. Patterson - G NOPSI LA 133.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
73 Monroe LP&L LA 137.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
74 Market Street NOPSI LA 103.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
75 ThitJOdaux 9 LP&L LA 21.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
76 Citgo— O.FVGSU LA 75.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
77 Firestone"* O.FVGSU LA 0.30 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
78 Louisiana Station #2 GSU LA 175.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
79 Neches GSU TX 269.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
80 Louisiana Station #1 GSU LA 148.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
81 LA Station #1 Un.4A GSU LA 129.00 4.00000 0.00% 17103.63
NOTES:
1 ' Indicates 1994 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
2 "  Indicates 1995 data, otherwise all unmarked data is 1996 data.
3 Indicates a O.F. that is interconnected to a HOSTs system but is not selling back power.
4 Ounng 1996. capacity for Lafayette Utilities' Doc Bonin facility was 276 MW. Unit #1 (50 MW) was 
down for repairs. Normal capacity from the facility is 326 MW.
5 A 4" for O&M COST or FUEL COST indicates a unit that is off-line.
(i.e. a mothballed or unavailable unit)
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APPENDIX F
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED 
GENERATION FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY
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APPENDIX F.l
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY
FOR EXPERIMENTS #1 AND #9






SWEPCO $ 24,558,310 $ 33,108,181
Sys. Energy Resources $ 0 $ 0
TOTALS $812,666,241 $876,736,445
APPENDIX F.2
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #2 AND #10





CLECO $ 113,627,608 $ 157,936,581
SWEPCO $ 40,936,398 $ 46,332,019
Sys. Energy Resources $ 0 $ 0
TOTALS $1,186,737,595 $1,311,133,168
APPENDIX F.3
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #3 AND #11





CLECO $ 45,923,607 $ 45,923,607
SWEPCO $ 9,887,906 $ 9,887,906
Sys. Energy Resources $ 0 $ 0
TOTALS $385,714,093 $374,815,266
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APPENDIX F.4
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY
FOR EXPERIMENTS #4 AND #12






SWEPCO $ 24,249,509 $ 24,249,509
Sys. Energy Resources $ 0 $ 0
TOTALS $933,605,105 $912,716,646
APPENDIX F.5
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #5 AND #13






SWEPCO $ 24,675,154 $ 28,423,672
Sys . Energy Resources $ 0 $ 0
TOTALS $780,482,459 $809,002,276
APPENDIX F.6
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #6 AND #14





CLECO $ 113,627,608 $ 157,936,581
SWEPCO $ 39,312,054 $ 43,292,226
Sys. Energy Resources $ 0 $ 0
TOTALS $1,176,462,080 $1,231,220,541
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APPENDIX F.7
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY
FOR EXPERIMENTS #7 AND #15





CLECO $ 45,923,607 $ 33,055,645
SWEPCO $ 9,887,906 $ 9,887,906
Sys. Energy Resources S 0 $ 0
TOTALS $379,181,222 $362,629,999
APPENDIX F.8
COST-OF-PLANT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #8 AND #16





CLECO $ 81,671,320 $138,045,146
SWEPCO $ 24,249,509 $ 24,249,509
Sys. Energy Resources $ 0 $ 0
TOTALS $925,734,685 $908,219,301
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APPENDIX G
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED 
GENERATION FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY
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APPENDIX G.l
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #1 AND 9̂





CLECO $ 113,627,608 $ 463,221,872
SWEPCO $ 24,558,311 $ 375,144,574
Sys. Energy Resources $ 379,918,684 $ 703,080,260
TOTALS $2,325,480,335 $5,468,048,773
APPENDIX G.2
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #2 AND #10





CLECO $ 113,627,608 $ 475,026,599
SWEPCO $ 40,936,398 S 381,695,233
Sys . Energy Resources $ 424,186,763 $ 707,671,486
TOTALS $2,569,594,430 $5,536,825,022
APPENDIX G.3
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #3 AND #11





CLECO $ 94,980,764 $ 446,277,801
SWEPCO $ 25,365,713 $ 369,976,280
Sys. Energy Resources $ 329,075,576 $ 698,088,391
TOTALS $1,908,322,794 $5,397,932,752
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APPENDIX G.4
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY
FOR EXPERIMENTS #4 AND #12





CLECO $ 113,627,608 $ 461,030,159
SWEPCO $ 28,886,167 $ 375,949,824
Sys. Energy Resources $ 424,186,763 $ 703,080,260
TOTALS $2,509,275,930 $5,475,240,712
APPENDIX G.5
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #5 AND #13





CLECO $ 113,627,608 $ 463,221,872
SWEPCO $ 24,675,154 $ 375,949,824
Sys. Energy Resources $ 379,918,684 $ 705,728,783
TOTALS $2,320,265,434 $5,471,627,942
APPENDIX G.6
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #6 AND #14





CLECO $ 113,627,608 $ 463,221,872
SWEPCO $ 39,312,054 $ 375,949,824
Sys. Energy Resources $ 424,186,763 $ 703,080,260
TOTALS $2,576,043,068 $5,483,069,650
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APPENDIX G.7
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY
FOR EXPERIMENTS #7 AND #15




Entergy $ 856,330,976 $3,850,324,554
CLECO $ 45,923,607 $ 429,763,051
SWEPCO $ 14,524,565 $ 363,214,522
Sys. Energy Resources $ 57,488,910 $ 693,542,309
TOTALS $ 984,268,058 $5,336,844,436
APPENDIX G.8
EMBEDDED COST METHOD FOR ESTIMATING STRANDED GENERATION 
FACILITY COSTS SEPARATED BY COMPANY 
FOR EXPERIMENTS #8 AND #16





CLECO $ 81,671,320 $ 460,655,702
SWEPCO r $ 28,886,168 $ 375,949,824
Sys. Energy Resources $ 424,186,763 $ 703,080,260
TOTALS $2,507,397,127 $5,475,608,051
258
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Robert Frank Cope, III, was born on August 10, 1963, 
in New Orleans, Louisiana. Dr. Cope holds a bachelor of 
science degree in Electrical Engineering (December 1986) 
and a master of business administration degree (May 1991) 
from Louisiana State University. He is also a registered 
Professional (Electrical) Engineer with the State Boards 
for Professional Engineers in Texas and Louisiana.
Upon completion of his undergraduate degree, he was 
employed as a Field Service Engineer with the General 
Electric Company from January 1987 to August 1989. He then 
returned to Louisiana State University to pursue a master 
of business administration degree. Upon completion of the 
master's degree, he held positions of Engineer, Senior 
Engineer, and Underground Zone Technical Engineer at 
Houston Lighting & Power Company from June 1991 to August 
1994. He again returned to Louisiana State University in 
August of 1994 to pursue a doctorate in Business 
Administration with a major in Information Systems and 
Decision Sciences. In December of 1998 he was awarded the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy. While completing his 
research. Dr. Cope also served as a Research Associate at 
Louisiana State University's Center for Energy Studies. 
Since August of 1998, he has held the position of 
Assistant Professor at Southeastern Louisiana University.
259
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: Robert Frank Cope, III
Major Field: Business Administration
(Information Systems and Decision Sciences)
Title of Dissertation: A Methodology to Identify Stranded Generation
Facilities and Estimate Stranded Costs for 







Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IMAGE EVALUATION 























yiPPLIED A  IIWIGE . Inc
- =  1653 East Main Street 
- Rochester. NY 14609 USA 
Phone: 716/482-0300 
Fax: 716/288-5989
O 1993. Applied Image. Inc.. All Rights Reserved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
